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A LOCALIST IhTERPRETATION OP-PROPOITTION TYPES 
7.1 An informal characterization of a journey 
I Our first task in this chapter will be to develop a rough and 
rather informal description of the meanings of such sentences as 
those below,, all of which de3cribeg in an intuitively obvious ways 
I* John walked from the school to the swimming pool 
2. The ball rolled from Winifred to Allan 
We drove f rom London to Edinburgh 
a (concrete) Journey of some scrt.. Abstracting away the different 
kinds of locomotion involved, sentences i. to 3. are all of the 
general form given in 4., where each of A, B, and 0 can be regarded 
A moved from B to C 
as points, Por the time being, we will restrict our attention to 
this sobematized sentence type. 
In this fir3t approximation to an explicit characterization cf 
a journey, we will introduce only ow new relational element to 
th03e We made use of in Chapter 3. flore specificallyy in addition 
to the constructs of direct location and. order (polarized and 
unpolarized), the general fcrm of which is given in 5., 6 and 7*, 
respectively (Y and Z stand for locations, X for an object),, we will 
50 X loo y (eeg, IX is at YI) 
6, Y< L(X). < Z (e*g, OX is ahead of Y and behini ZI) 
7. Y ord L(X) and Z (eog, IX is between Y and ZO) 
provisionally accept the notion of . 'directed movement'i i. e. movement 
in a direction away from S*Ome place and towards another,, as the 
367* 
N 
dynamic counterpart of polarized-spatial order. This we will 
ropresent as in B. The static and dynamic relations are, relate4 
Y -* 1; (X)-4 z (eege OX approaches Z and moves further 
away from YO) 
by the following rule of implioation: 
9, Y ---) L(X) --/ Z =1 Y4 L(X) 4Z 
That is, if X is moving toward Z and away from Yj then X is behind 
Z and ahead of Y, However, it is not necessary that Z, for 
examplep be a non-variable location: it may be the changing 
location of another object, as for example in the situation describea 
by sentence M However,, we shall assume in the folloviing' 
10. Zeke chased Mabel around the yard 
discussion that Y and 7, in 8. are non-variable locations, 
Although ow of our ultimate aiM3 will be to give a semantic 
account ar the verbs of aktiomarten - e, g, 'begins I, 
#stop' 
'finish' and 'continue' - and of progressive aspects let us for now 
use these linguistic devices simply as tools for uncovering the log- 
ical structure of sentences of the form 'A moves from B to 01. 
Consider, fcr examples the sentences belowq all of which are 
analytic: 
11, As A began to move from B to C, A ceased to be at B 
12. As A began to move from B to C. A began to move towards 0 
(ard away from B) 





to move Itowards 0 (ard away from B) 
368'. 
14. As A finished-movirg from B to C, A came to be at 0 
15o When A had stopped moving from B to Cl A was either at 
Cl or between B and C 
What these sentences reveal is that the semantic representation of 
4. will involve at least three Components: an initial locational. 
relation, a final locational relation and a component of directed 
movement* Letting linear ordering reflects for nav, the implicit 
temporal orders we can represent the compositional structure uriler- 
lying 4. as follows; 
iA loo B&B -4L(A)`4 CA A'Ioc C 
That is,, A is at B and then A moves (away from B and) toward C and 
then A is at C, Recalling'the implicational relationship between 
directed movement and polarized order formulated in 9., we have, in 
addition to 13. above, the analytic sentence in 17- Or, since the 
While A was moving from B to 0, A had C ahead of it and 
B behind it 
static polarized ordering relation implies an unpolarized ones we 
also have the analytic sentence in 18* 
18. While A was mciving from B to C. A was between B ani C 
Thus, not only do we have an initial and final l0catiOnal 
relation involved in the situation described by 4. but al3og by 
implication,, an intermediary one. If we represent B and 0 as points# 
then the' set of interme-cliate point-locations of A can be represented 
as the open interval (B, C) (i. e. the end-points are excluded)* 
369- 
Thiss roughly speaking, is A's 'path' in going from D to C- Thus 
the initial location, the path ard the final location can be 
schematized as in Pigure I* If we let an arrow represent the 
Figure I 
(BqC)M ýp B -ý p< Cl 
0 
B 
zftponint of directed movement of A towards Cl this can be super- 
imposed upon the set of locations (BOO) to give a simple# graphic 
represeEtation of Ala journey from B to C--cf. Pigure II. 
PiMe II, 
fB ---> 
A more perspicuous mode of diagamming such a journey is 
perhaps that below,, where the boxes stand not for actual locatiom 
FIGURE III 
A IOC IliT((B., (, )) 
loo B&A loo 0 
13 -)l L (A) -ý, 0 
but ratherfor the locational and directional relations into which 
A enters throu&out the course of its Journey* Although Figure III 
The fcrmula A loo INT ((B, C)) stands for "A is located in the 
intery-al (B. "-i. e, A's direct location is a member of the set 
of points in (B, C)., 
370. *, 
begs keveral important- questions', let us contirue'fcr'th6 moment 
to grant it an intuitive validity-in order to discuss informally 
some variations within such a general schema. However, for con- 
venience, we will revert to representing the component of directed 
movement by an arrow, Hence Pigure IV will be our, starting point. 
Figure IV 
In mentences 1'. 'to 3. the initial ard final locations of A are 
specified and -given avert linguistic encodings by means of the 
prepositioml phrases 'from... I and 'to... ', respectively., In 
Bannettl, s (1972) framework, following Fillmore (1968)0 these-are 
described as source aril goal expressions (cf. 
ý2,1+) and, in 
Arilersop's (1971b) grammar, ýas, expresslom of ablative and allative 
case relationst respectively, We shall be returning shortly to a 
discussion or the semantics of such expressions--first in their-- 
static and then dymmio uses--but for now let u3 graphically, repres- 
ent the fact, tbat the initial and final locatiom are given irAlivid- 




If we now comider the seritences in 19. to 22., we fini that 
19, The fer. -Y crossed the Channel 
20. The wirxlmv-oleaner climbed the ladder 
21. Martha Jumped the puddle 






f inish (line)' 
there is an alternative way of encodirg a journey still of the 
general form in Figure IV,, namely, by specifying the intermediate 
locational relation or, more accuratelyg by specifying what occupies 
the space between the initial and final locations of A, This is 
most trarsparer± in sentence 22. All of these sentences can be 
paraphrased by structures fitting the schema in 4. --cfo 23. to 26. 
23* The ferry sailed from one side of the Channel to the 
other 
24. ý The window-oleanar-olimbed- from the bottom to the top 
of the ladder 
25s Martha jumped from one. side of the puddle to the other 
26. Paul sprinted from ow endto the other of the stretch 
1, 
between the last hurdle and the finish line 
In these the specif ication of the 
_ 
initial and final locations. is 
seen to be completely in terms of opposing extremities of. some 
object which contains or defines the path (3,, 0) of A's journey. We 
shall represent this difference in linguistic encoding by shading in 
the box corresponding to the intermediate locational relation,, as 
in Figire VI. 
372o 
Firpre VI 
Let us rxm cozzider the pcosibility cC the interwdiate space 
between B aul 0 in Pigure I becoming in=easingly smaller until 
one eventually reaches the limiting case where B and 0 are contijp- 
uous locatiom ((B, O)-= ýpj B/, p<03E--' Me In such a casep 
Figure VI reduces to Figure VIL 'This is theltypei-of Journey 
Figure VII 
I 
encoded by 27s and 28* For obviouis reasons we will call this 
27t, The aeroplane flaw across the French-'ItaUaý bOrdOr 
28. Paul crossed the f itdsh Um 
special caze cr a journýy a $border-crousing'. The fact that ýhcrs 
is no intermediate locational relation in bcrder crossinp L3 rerlect- 
ed by a aearease in the co-occurrence petectial of the verbs Of 
aktionsartan-cf, 29* to 32,, Although simple co-occurrenca with 
373* 
Atlantic, -i 29. The aeroplane began to cross the 
ý? 
Hcounty border 
30, The aeroplane continued to cross the 
Atlantic 
mcounty border 




32, The aeroplane finished crossing the 
Imcounty 
border 
progressive aspect is not affected, it is not possible to have 
constructions such as in 13., i. e. progressive aspect plus a dur- 
ational. adverlýial-qf, 33, 
, 11 11 -1 ý .1 




Border-ýcrossings, like . 1.1 the , exttnde Id journeys' (i. 'e. "those"'Wit'h 
an intermediate locational. relation), can aiso have linguistic 
encodIng3 whereby the initial and final locations of A are specified 
There are, of course, imaginable situations which this sentence 
could appropriately describe. For example, suopose the plane 
was SlOwly-taxi-ing down the rumay, across which runs the county- 
border. 'Ne shall be considering such complications in 17.6 
which have to do both with the nature of the object which is 
moving anl the speed with which it is moving. (For examplel 
sentence 33. might be plausible if ona were watching slow-motion 
film. ) In addition, all of 29, to 32,,, including the starred 
variants, are appropriate under a habitual interpretation-- 
of. fn. 1, p. 227- 
374o 
rather than the border' separating the two. Tbii'ii 'the Case' in 
34-,, which can be represented as in Pigure VIII. 
34- 'Fgor crossed from France into Italy 
Figure VIII 
Let us return now to the basic extendea journey with initial 
and final locationa relations s'pe'cifiedg'as depicted in Pig=e Vq 
and cohsider'the possibility of focussing on only one istage or 
phase of it. Trivially, of course, we have the case where no move- 
ment is being described: we have only two locational relations 
which, in isolation carry no implication of a ýourney and which to-- 
gether imply but do not assert such a movement, as in 35* This can 
35. John was in London and (then) John was in 17, dinburgh 
be diagrammea simply as Figure IX. Mcre interest ing 'are the phases 
igure IX 
V/ //If \\\\\ 
of an extended Journey as described by sentences 36. anl 37- The 
partial Journeys idertified here are particular cases of b order-cros sings: 
36. Manfred left Tarbert (for Stornoway) 
37. Manfred reached Stornaway (from Tarbert) 
375* 
the fact that the (intended) final location in the case of 36. and 
the initial location in the case of 37. are specified makes it 
explicit that each is but one stage cf an extended journey. They 





these two instances is the inception and, termination of 
the whole journey described in 38., and acceptable, paraphrases of 
-38. Manfred ivent from Tarbert to Stornoway 
36. and 37. would be 39. and 40., respectively (assum'ing that 
39. Y, anfred began 
his Journey3 from Tarbert to Stornoway 
ýgping 
40* Manfred finished bis Journey from Tarbert to Stornoway 
going 
Tarbert, at least, is regarded as a point--i. e. the situation is more 
complex if the initial locational relation is one of inolusion within 
an area or volume--cf, for example, 41. ). Thus, in certain contexts 
1+1 Manfreabegan his Journey from Paris to London but he 
hadn't left, 
t ofý 
Paris before his car broke down got ou 
at least 'A leave BI and 'A reach 00 lexicalize the inception and 
termirations respectively, Of 'A move from B to Ot. If we . look at 
our graphic representation of border-cros sings (Figures VII ard VIII), 
we can dov see pictorially why it is impossible to focus upon an 
Jý6. 
inceptive or terminative pbase of such journeys (cf. 29. and 32, 
there is only om phase# namely the transition between the two 
locations; and this is simultaneously both the inception and the 
terminmtion of the Journey, We 'may also note that if instead of 
36. and 37. we consider 1+2. and 43. , in which no final or initial 
42. Manfred left Tarbert (forever) 
43* A stranger arrived at the party 
locational relation, respectively, is specified or retrievable from 
the context, then we once again have a simple border-crossing. In 
these cases one locational relation is fully specified (e. g. A loc B) 
and the other can be considered that with the complement location 
object (e. g. A loo 7). For examplep in 42. we have as the initial 
locational relation that in 44., and as the final om that in 45. 
44o Vanrred was at/in Tarbert 
45. Manfred was anywhere but in Irarbert 
Such Journeys as those in 4,2. and 43. are diagrammed in Pigure XI. 
Pigure XI 
ý, b 
In such contexts as these Oleavel anl 'arrive at' can be seen to 
lexicalize, respectively, the cessation and inception of a locatiOnal 
relation each of which can otherwise be syntagmatically realized as 
in 46, ard 47. 
377a , 
46* Manfred ceased to be at Tarbert 
47. Varfred came to be at Stornoway 
The last component of an extended Journey which can be singlea 
out pictorially is the dynamio vedtor representing directed move- 
ment* In 48. below$ for example, we are not given the origin of the 
48. 'Egor drove towards the, house 
movement nor whether the hOU3e was in fact reached or even intended 
to be reached: 
'the 
house sinply establishes the direction or 
orientation of the movement. This situation is depicted in pig=e 
XII, If we now consider sentence 49., this might be expected to 
Figure XII 
H 
49. Egor drove away from the tovfn 
correspond to 49. except for the direction of the tovemett beire- 
specified negatively rather than positively, ie- by -the, original 
location rather, than by a possible final location. such a situation 
would be that'shown in Pi&ure-'IZII. - Howeveri-it appears that this 
is not the case since 49, implies 50#, ' That is, in the case of, ý-, 
Figure XIII 
50. Igor was at/in the town 
378# 
'A'coves away from BI there'is"the Implication that the airectea 
movement had its origin at B. ' Thus, as. with the static'USeS*'Of 
'away from' and ttoward' (cf. ý 3.4.3)p we find an asymmetry in the 
use of these two expressions in describing directed movement'* 
Since 49. implies a 'leave' componentp its representation differs" 
from Fi[We XIII in having, the origin of the vector within the 
specified locational relationt and hence it includes the 'leave' 
Figure XIV 
element represented in Figure XI. a. The situatioh depicted in 
Figure XIII can nevertheless be describedg'albeit sOmewhat circuitý 
iously. by sentences of the kini exemplified in 51, The expression 
51* 7, ', go. -, drove further (and further) away from the barn 
'move Nrther (ard further) away from' has, as we shall finip a 
logical structure very similar to that underlying 'move towards'. 
which we have provisionally treated as an atomic relation. 
This discrepancy between the semantic correlates of 'movement 
towards' and 'movement away from' should not be surprising since we 
tend to have a fcrward orientation in describing movement& 
'Compares 
in this respect Aristotle's remarks about the greater linguistic 
salience of the 'whither' compared to the 'viliencel of a movem. ont 
6.2,2). Nrthermore, 'movement towards' is sufficient for Our 
characterization of a Journey since, in conjunction with the 
information that A is originally at B. movement of A towards 0 will 
I ý. - 379. *. 
nedesssAly imply vnovemýýt (furt6r)"'a*-wa, y from B. 
Pictorial renresentatiom are only useful up'to'a' certain 
point, and the foregoing discussion. has been intenled as an 
illustrative rather than a rigorous account ar the kinas'of'pheno- 
Mena related to the notion of a Journey to which we will be address- 
ing Ourselves' in the ýoilowing sections. rne distirction which wo 
have not so far been able to adequately rerresent in a graphical 
manner is that between the stopping and the finishing of a Journey- 
cf. sentemes 14. and 15. and, cruciallyq the entailments below* 
52. A finished moving from B to C 
reached C (f rom B) 
A stopped movirg 
from B to C ý 
towards 0 
53. A stopped moving 
from B to C ý 
towards C 
Aýf inished movi rf, from B to 0 
reaohed cl (from B) 
Nor have we attempted to distinguith, graphically between the SimplO 
ongoingness of a Journey (Le. the use lof- progresziveý aspect) -and 
the continuing, of a, Journey (i., e. the, u3e,, of 'continue% 'go On'-' 
in the sense of 'not stop')-cf. 13. It will be-more expedica 
to postpone a discussion of these. distinctiom until we have 
developed the rudimerts ae a descriptive framew=ke 
The reader Will of course be aware that an implicits intuitive 
appeal has been made throughout the preceding discussion to the 
notion of temporal order or succession; and this in turn presupposes 
some notion of temporal location. ý What we have been representing 
by boxes linearly ordered on- the page. and by the arrovi through theM 
380. 
will-eventually have to be made explicit. This we shall attempt 
to do in t7-1+ onwards. lUxiever, for, the time being we, will 
continue to treat the temporal dimension iziformally. 
Before going, on to explore less comrete manifestations of the 
spatial relations and constructs we have surveyed in this section, 
it will be useful to recapitulate our, prelimirary findings concerning 
the logical nature of journeys. What we haveso far concluded is 
that five defining phases of a journey of the type 'A moves from B 
to 01 can be isolated which,, in their temporal orderl are the 
f 0110A ng: 
53. a. A loo B 
b. transition from A loo, B to A loo INT ((BIG)) 
co 
d. transition from A loo IINT ((BC)) to A 100 0 
A loo C 
There are certain redurdancied in'53. -which we willbe', dble' to 
61iminate later on. Furthermore, I we w'ill: -also wanlý't-o make more 
Obviouz the fact that b. is at the same time a part or phase of ca, 
namely its inception and that d. not only is a part of c., but also 
requires its cessation. Finally, we have noted-the intrinsic 
relationship-one of a leas limitY--of a border crossing to an 
extencled Journey, the former being simply a Journey between contig- 
uous locations, the latter one betvieenrDn-contiguous 10catiOuse 
This relationship will also have to'be made explicit* We simply 
observe at this time, however, that border-crossingsg, both those 
which are self-contaimd journeys (cf. 33) and those which are part 
381 
of an extended journey (cf. 37) fall-into Venal; rts class of 
achievements' (or 1*, reiýtbergls class of momentaneous perfective 
verbs) and extended 'Journeys into his'class of accomplishments 
(or Streitberg's class of durativelyperfective verbs)--cf,,, ý'for 
ex&, nple, the typical c'o-occurreiace patterns with ei-pending, dur- 
ational and point locational adverbials in 54. and 55. The fact 
that these two classes share some propertie: ý--and have not always" 
in fifty minutes 
54, The ferry crossed the Channel *f or fifty ininates 
"-at 1 :30P. m. 
in ten minutes 
55o -Paul crossed the finish line Nfor ten minutes 
at 3: 05 
been distinguished (cf. Kenpy's performance verbsj Jespersen's 
conclu3ýve verbs)--sbould hppefully be explicable in terms of this 
intrinsic relationship. A3 regards the locational relations ard 
componert of directed movemert which enter into our characterization 
Of a_journey, we may note thatthe fprmer fall into Verdler*s class 
of states, the latter into his class of activities--cf. 56. and 57- 
at noon 
56. Maereawas (Neing) 'iit Tarbei:, t for a few minutes 
? in a few minutes 
*at noon 
57o a* Fred drove towards the mountains for several hours 
? in a few hours 
at noon 
b. Fred was drivirg towards the mountains for several hours 
,? in a few hours 
(The variants with the completion tin a few minutesAours' are 
acceptable with an inceptive interpretation--of. fn. j, p. 229. ) 
382o 
ý 
7.2 Abstract location and direction and abstract. Sourneys- 
In ourdiscu3sion of the localist hypothesis in Chapter 4, 
we observed that various kirx13 of syntactic and pemantioarguments 
can anl have been put forward in support of analyzing sever4ý 
seultence -11--ypes as encoding abstract but nevertheless spatial, 
relations. The abstract nature of such relations was seen to be 
dependent upon the semantic properties of the noun phrases involved- 
cf. the concrete and abstract locational relations expressed in 
58. and 59--as well as upon the semantic content of the associated 
5 81 a. Polly is in, the garden 
b. Polly is in the Army 
Ce olly is in a bad mood 
59. a* Sam is in the Jail 
b. Sam is in Jail 
0. Sam is in trouble 
verb--cf. the differing degrees of abstractness involved in the 
sentenops in 60#, all of which,. in 3ome-serze, identify the location 
60. a. The 
box 
'ý &oiiainea the answer 
f 
book 
b, John bad the answer 
in his ha ýin 
his h=dj 
c. John knew the amwer 
of the entity referred to by 'the amwer*.,, 
We do not wish to dwell on the details ani motivations for 
localist analys6s of such sentences: these are to be fourA in the 
references given in our discussion in § ý. 2s 
ý Zhat we would 
like to 
stressp however, is that the range of constructions whicho it would 
383ip 
appear, can be accommodated within such a framework is much 
greater than the few examples given in chapter 4. - Vot only, do 
affective and possessive constructions (cf. 60, b,, c, above) lend* 
themselves naturally to a description in terms of abstract locations 
but it has also been argued (cf. Andersons 1971bo 1973c) that 
sentences with (contingent) predicate adjectives and nominals 
(i. e. those involving the attribution of qualities/properties ard 
class membership)--cf. 61. anci 62. --also display a locatioml 
61. John is hungry I 
62ý Fred is a policeman 
structure, Furthermcre, it is, quite possible that equative 
structures anl sentemes with *absolute' pr, edicatp adjectives Or 
nomimls--cf. 63. and 64.. -are also amerable to a localist 
63- John is the policeman 
64. Pred is artistic I 
an artist 
interprýtation (cf., for example, Allans 1970: 1-17)- 
Lookipg nm at indirect rather than direct locational struct- 
uresl, we fird that paral2el to such expressions as tabovel/lbelowl 
and 'ahead off/lbehindlg which describe concrete spatial ordering 
relations, are corztructions which involve the implicit or explicit 
'grading' of qualities or properties possessed by mcre than one 
object* Implicit grading occurs, fcr example, when one term of an 
antonymous pair is predicated of the subject (cf. Sapirg J91+9i 122; 
Lyons; 1968at ý10.4.4), as in 65. and 66., whereýs explidit grading 
65. The coffee in cold 
66. Fredts wife is attractive 
38)4., 1 
is usually encoded by comparative constructiorz of some kindp as 
in 67. and 68. However, it Is quite probable that other spatial 
67. The coffee 13 colder than the 'tea. 
68. Fred's wife is mcre attractive than Bill's 
relations besides that oIf order I may underly some comparative con- 
struction3 (of,, our discussion in ý 4.2 of $convergence'/odiver- 
gencel and Isociativel/ladversativel with respect to Small's (1920) 
#spatial' anal3mis of the comparative). 
Parallel to sentences describing the direction or orientation 
of static, concrete objects (cf. ý 3-0, we have such abstract 
counterparts as those below (cf. the possessive, he me implicitly 
69. a. The text book is oriented towards theory rather than 
description 
bo The text book has a theoretical orientation 
70. The magazine is aimed at the everyday houserwife 
71 - These symptoms suggest T*B, 
72, Tho results of the experiment point tovrards an interaction 
between the genotype and the environment 
73. a. John leans toward communism 
be John has communist leanings 
74. a. Fred terxls tcxvard fascism 
b. Fred has fasoist tendencies 
75. ' a. Jin is inclined towards brunettes 
b. Jim has an inclination tawards brunettes 
76. The government faces the po3sibility of an early elect ion 
locativev altermtives for some ct these). 
305t 
Although detailed an: l/or adequate analyýqs cr the types of 
constructions-surveyed above are lacking, any strong claims for 
their locational basis thus being premature, it nevertheless, seems 
quite possible ard plausible that the range of situation types 
usually included in the category of states--e. g. location# posture 
(eege 'sit', Ista-Al. 'lean'), condition, qualityO property# 
perception (e. g. $see', 'hear')$ possession, class-membershipp.., 
grading, etc*--can all be regarded as manifestations of direct 
locative relations. (Recall that our concrete ordering relations 
involved the ordering of places cr the direct location3 of objects*) 
They differ essentially only with respect to whether the relation 
is concrete or abstract, this depending# for the most part, on the 
nature of the objects participating in the relationo We shall 
proceed on the working assumption that it is indeed the, car-e that 
a sentence which is semantically stative, describas a-locational 
(includilig ordering and orientational) relation of -sothe kirA. 
If we turn our attention now to spatial relatiom other than 
simple location, we fird the constructs of directed movemsnts 
extended journeys, and border-cros sings are also manifested in 
abstract as well as concrete domairme' Thusp the followilig sentences 
exemplify descriptions of abstract directed movement in thatp like 
77, The girl is approaching womanhood 
78. In his politicas Fred is moving tow ards the extreme left 
79. Food prices are rising 
80. Peter's self-confidence dwirdled-in the course of the 
interview 
386* 
81. Mary is growi%-r fonder of her husband. 
82. Billts Pranch'is'improvihg 
concrete instances of movement tov. "ards some placet they involve 
locations which are successively closer to some extreme, direction- 
defining location. And, like the corcrete casess, they imply a 
(static) ordering"relation. Thus, ' to take two of. the superficially 
simpler examples, 77. -and 79. imply the ordering relations described 
in 83. and 84-i respectively. 
83. a., The -girl haz womanhood ahead cf her (and her childhood 
behind) 
b. The girl is between childhood and womanhood 
-I 
Pood pride-s" are above 'what -they' were and below what they 
will be 
Correspording to such abstract locative relations, as expre3sed 
in 58. and 59., are abstract journeys such as those in 85. and 86. 
85* a. ? Olly entered 
ýJoined 3the Amy 
b. polly left ýquit 
ýthe 
Army 
86o a* 7)am got (himself) into trouble 
b. Sam got (himself) out of trouble 
Other examples with overt markers Of movement ard initial and final 
location are tho3e in 87. to 89. more interestirg cases perhaps are 
87. James went from abject povertyto absurd wealth- -- 
88# His health went from bad to worso IIý:, ý 
89. The apple went rotten 
387* 
abstract Journeys vhich are expresteaby- sentences 
m; jrkers (or', at least, some of theft) ard in which the lexical 
content of the-verb. astablishes the' mtUre or the locations 
involved and often the direction of the journey. - Compare-90. ini 
91. with 60. b. atA 6o. c., respectively. 60. b. dese'ribes-thd firal 
obtainecl/took 
90. ae i. John received the answer frota Bill 
b ought 
ii, John found the amwer (in a book) 
gave 
b. i. John sent the answer to Bill 
sold 
iiý John lost the answer 
91" a* iv John 
learnt thd answer-from Bill' 
ýheard I 
ii. John remembered the armwer 
b. i. John taught the answer to Bill 
ftold/s outea/whisperedl 
iis John fcrgpt the amwer 
locatiobal relation of'any of the journ6ys'in 90. a. a nd the in itial 
one of ArW cf these in f, n. b*_ There areq of course, differenceS 
within each set. For, exampleg selling and, buyingz in contrast 
with giving ard Obtaining/receiving,, inw1ve a secor4ary, - almult- 
aneous journey (usual. 3. y of money) AnAhe opposite directions ,, - 
Losing and firdinglike, leaving ard arriving (cf. 42. -and 430 are- 
simple bcrder-crossings with only the initial orý fiml locational 
relation specified, the other beirg the complementary relation- 
i. e. that in 92, In contrast, sencling and receivirg -are comparable 
92. John didn't have the answer 
3F, 89 
to leaving fcr somewhere ancl arriving from sOmewhere, (c: ri', 36i ara 
370, Le. to border-croi sings which are phasers c? an extendia, 
journey in which both initial and (intended) final locations are 
specified, Sentence 93. below describes the initial locational. 
relation in the Ireceivet variant of 90. a. and, the (intended) final 
93, Bill had the answer 
locational relation in the Issend' variant of 90. b. 
9imilar remarks hold for the sets in 91. Again, remembering 
(in the re-inceptive sense) and forgetting are (here) border- 
crossings between the locational relation described by 60-co (or 
the 'in his head' variant of 60. bb) and that in 94. iiearing 
(from) 
and telling (to) are perhaps similar to receiving(from) and sending 
94-. John didn't kncw the arswer ',, 
(to) or, more concretely, to arriving (from) and leaving (for)- 
cf. 95. and 96. Learning arxl teaching are,, in general, extended 
95. John sent the news to Bill but Bill didn't receive it 
96, John shouted the nows to Bill but Bill didn't hear it 
journeys but with certain important differences from those We havO 
looked at so far. First, like hearing from, and telling too learning 
something from and teaching something to someone involve the trans- 
mission cf something which we'may simply call knowledge or irXormation 
about something, In contrast to such movable objects as people# 
cars, and concrete objects in general, knowledge and'information 
can. be at more than'one place at the same time (and, significantly 
enouEýi, we speak of knowledge, irXormation and news as spreading), 
389ý 
Thus, whereas 97sa. and 97, b. both imply 97-c-, 98. a, and 98. b. do 
not imply 98. c. Furthermoreq if we look in general at how suCh 
97. a. John has given the parcel to Fred 
ba Fred has taken the parcel from John 
co John doesn't have the parcel (anytaore) 
98,, a. John has taught the predicate calculus to Fred 
b. Fred has learnt, the predicate calculus from John 
C, John doesn't know the predicate calculus (aqymore) 
sentences as 98. a. and b. behave in relation to the verbs Of 
aktionsarten and progressive aspect, we find that the paxaAigm is 
somewhat different than for our mQdel sentence (or. 4) of a concrete 
journey (of, 11. to 15., IS-# 52.,, 53. ): 
99, As John began to learn the poemq John ceased knowing 
none of the poem 
100. As John began to learn the poem, John's knocyledge of the 
poem began to inorease 
i0j. 'ý'hile John continued to 




of the Poe M continued 
to increase 
was increasing 
102. As John finished learning the poem# John came to know 
(all of ) the poem 
103* Mien John h" ptopped learning the poem, John knew 
part ýSomel 
of all of the poem 
i04s Vi"hile John was learning the poem, John knew partý 
ý 
some 
of the poem 
105. John finished learning the poem =s John stopped learning 
the poem % 
390s, 
That is, rather than an 6bject being located successively closer 
to some goal, we have successively more of the object coming to be 
located at the goal (e. g. "in" John). As we shall'see there 
no real discrepancy here between these two paradigms for a 
Journeyt we simply have not yet considered the appropriate c0rýýrete 
analogue to such abstract Journeys as this partitive interpretation 
of learning something. This will be done shortly. However, we 
may note at this time that corresponding to the border-crossings 
which can be vi". ed as the result of the set of locations between 
the initial and finoLl locations beiný empty, in this *part-v. bolel 
are WWck Wkev" (0 nsilsts 
i- 
tYPe of Journey border-cros sing; ýesult the obSe ot or is 
conceptualized as consisting of only ohe part--of. the foll6wing; 
the latter of each pair describing a border-crossing 
106. a. I forgat all my Frenen in a fevf months 
b, I forgot his name as soon as I heard it 
107- a- John lost (all of) his winnings in a couple of days 
b. John lost his umbrella at 2: 00 
108., a* ,: Ieter learnt 






all that had happenedl 
b. Peter learnt the news at 2: 00 
ýof 
the trageayl 
109. a. John 
told 
me the (whole) poem in'a few minutes 
ýtaughj 
b. John told me that word a minute ago taught 
There are, of course, many other problems involved in an 
analysis of the sentence types surveyed here which we have not 
discussed* However, our purpose has been only to show how the Sams 
notions of location, directio4/orientation, movement towards and 
391 il - 
Journey are manif ested in abstract domains as welI as L the -more. 
concrete ones in which the nature of such constructs is perhaps 
most transparent'and easily explicated. We shalIreturn to some 
qU83tionS connected with the localist amlysis Of these sentences 
below, But an adequate account of both the corcrete and abstract 
instances Of such spatial constructs as a ýourney depends on an 
urderstanaing of the role and nature of existential and tecTioral 
location, to which we must now turn our attentim 
7.3 Existential sjMtial constructs 
7.3.1 Existential locatives 
A substantial number of verbs or-sentences cussinea, for 
example,, by Vendler as accomplishmental by Fenny as performances, 
and by Jespersen as conclusives are instances of existential causa- 
tivesp sentences in which the direct object of the verb is an 
'object of result' (Oobjet effectuel, leffizientes Objekt'), 
These can be regarded as describing existential journeys in that# 
as a first approximation, something (the object of tesult) comes Or 
is brought from non-existence into existence. That isl the object 
undergoes a change in its existential status or location. Typical 
e=mples of. such Journeys are those encoded in the following 
examples; sentence 114. involves an existential pazaage in the 
reverse direction$ from existence to non-existence. .ý 
i 10* Jake built a barn 
IIIo Isabel sketched a figixe on her noteboo]k 
l12. Fred vrote a poem 
We Tom dug a hole 
114. A hurricane destroyed the house 
392a 
However, before we can propose an account of such sentencess 
we must clarify somewhat the notion of simple existential location- 
i. e. what it might possibly mean for an object, to be in. existence 
or non-existence, Ve may begin by recalling Bally0a comments -' 
( 'ý 4.2) ýthat "la, notion dlexistence-eat un cas-limite-de localis- 
ation "indeterminee""# Kahn's remark (cf. fn. 1. p. 74, also Kahn, 
1973) that the ancient Greeks operated with a conception of Obeing' 
whereby whatever 13# is. somewhere,, what is nowhere is nothing at alls 
and, more particularlyi Lyons, (1973) analy3is of existential predic- 
ations as Involving in. their underlying structure the Weak demon- 
strative adverb 'there-derived by abstraction from the notion of 
location in the ddietto. setting of the utterance. 
For our purposes it will not be necessary to embroil ourselves 
in philosophical debate over such problems as the nature of exist- 
ence, It will be sufficient to work with a simple yet intuitively 
0 
natural interpretation of existence as presence in the worldo i, e,. 
to be in existence or to exist is to be located in the unif ied 
spatio-temporal world which is intersubiectively presupposed as the 
total universe of discourse. In order to account for linguistic 
usage, however, we must allow this world to include entities, of a 
more abstract nature that, would not, strictly,, speýakiw,, be enter- 
tained by the physicist as existing in space and time. We will 
represent this world by E and location of some entity X in this w; rld 
as X in E (as an abbroviated form of X loc Vn'(F. )). we will 
represent non-existence as location in the complement of "S. i. e., 
X in 'ff. 
Now,, there is a limited set of constructions which simply assert 
3939 
the exIstowe (or norý-existenca) or com. A. ) ph)-jical entity (rm, 
PPPOzed tO. those which, presuMose such): tho min ones. are, those 
irmlving 'alive' ('in livirg'), lexitt* arA *there is*. *' arA, -az 
has ortep been rerarked, these occur (except. . perhaps,, for 'alive, 
) 
typically with'another, locational expression. These we suaest 
jj5, - Lions exUt -in-Afrioa 
There- ara, no tigers - iu Africa, 
Mý Tigers live, in IrdIA 
ii8o 1; 0, flaws exist- in the fabrio, -- 
, 119i, There are samal fla-ms, in. 1he fabrio 
j 209 Several flaws, live. - in the Mrio 
are all of the general structure in 121. where Xp generally a*Get 
100 p 1-0-0- p 
X in Bx in 
or (quantified) subset or ontitieml, will vary in it* internal 
structure, (121* -introduces the acbema of 'representation to be 
adopted in the follovdng discussion). Z*e have represarted the non- 
existential locative as suporordimto to the existential vben what 
might, be-mcre appropriate is an appo3itioml structure (of* Lyons,, 
1973). However, sinco it is not clear bov such struqtures should 
be relvementea and since such a superordinate arAly3is appmrs to be 
394o 
appropriELte in the 'c'asý e we'vi 'contime to 
use such, represertations tor the spatial- (concrete) locativeS ý as -- 
well. , Thus, 121 j. involvm the ascribing of a concrete, location p 
to the exi; tential looative relation X in E. --. 
7*3.2 -Physical extension, ,, -"-. I. _- 
In qveryday di4oourse ve, do, not ,, make extenaive, use cir such 
explioitly--existential (locational) ýtructures as. exemplifiea in., 
115, to 120. --either the existence of the objects we talk about ill 
presupposed (e. g. in our use of proper names and definite descriptions) 
or implicitly axs; rted by spatially locating the ertity at some place 
in the world, ie, at some place in E., However, we would like to r 
suggest there are two other sets of predicates which have to do with 
physical existence and which represent a straightforward extension 
of 121. abovee The first set we have in mind are such verbs as 
$stretch' and 'extend'. as used in the sentences in 122. to 125. We , 
may compare these to their indefinite, existential locative counterparts 
,, 
122* The fog extends., all over the country, 
I 1ý .4 .1_.. - 1, 
123e, The poor soil extended, as., far as, the county line 
124, The Trans-Canada Highway stretches (all the way) from 
St. John'sq Newfoundland,, to-Victoria, BC,, 
125. The crack stretched (all the way) across the calling 
126. to 129* 
126* There is fog- 
It, s foggy 
-ý`all ove'r'the country 
127* There was poor soil as far as the county line 
128. There is a trans-Canacla highway from St. John'st 
Vewfoundland to Victoria, B. C. 
.- 39ý- 
-129. 
There was a. crack, all, the way across the ceiling 
Sentence 122. simply involves structure i2i*ao within the Scope 
of a. universal quantifier whose restricted domain is the set of 
points or places which are, "over the country". Adopting provision- 
&IIY (cf- ý 7-3.3) the usual formalization of universal quantifica- 
tion andg later in 143. j of existential quantif 
icationg we Mn 
represent the semantic structure of 122* as below., 
(The formula 
13Ok* 
Vp p loc IfiT(SR(TP(COUNTRY))) 
100 p 
FM in E 
following the colon specifies the restricted domain of the universal 
quantifier, that which is embedded under p is its scope,. Thus# 
in more familiar notation, 130- its equivalent to 130'. ) 130. maY 
130-0. Vp (FoG in E) loo p) , ., r lot IMT(; Se, (TP(CoUOtzi)))- 
be glossed as "at all points over the country the fog is in existence". 
Senteme, 124. appears to differ only in the domain of the universal 
quantifier being restricted to a-get of points in an interval-cf. 
its semantio reýresertation in 13t, 
We will want to elaborate 13lo somewhat in araer to make explicit 
4 
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the source! cf the expiýessions, lfrom. iO iiýA'-Oto... '. Howeverg 
1316 
Vp'l pe IrST, JCHNISP, VICTORLL7-- L 
loo p 
T, -C, H, jnýE 
in order to do this, we must first comider the second set of 
existential predicates which can be applied to mun phrases referr- 
ing to physical entities, These are the verbs which we have 
discussed in relation to aktion-sartang namely Obegin'p 'continue% 
'stop' and 'end'* The use of these verbs with respect to exist- 
ential properties of physical objects rather than of situations 
(ioeq temporal objects) has received little attention (but of* 
Wieizbicka, 1973)t but the following sentences reveal that) they, 
behave in an- exactly parallel fashioh, 'in6luding-the ambiguity 
inherent'it 'contimet -(cfe -fn, pi %7-9)'t 
132. The Trans-Canada highway beginIs at Sto John's and' 
continues (on) for over three thousand miles 
133., At one'ti6e the highway stopped at Golden andý 
continued- only at 
Kamloops ýafter 
a stretch of a few hundred miles" 
134o At that time, the highway ended at Vancouver; now it 
ng only stops there, ýcontinui on Vancouver Island beginning againý, 
397i. 
vhere"it-enas' sit the cipit-ýI,,, "Victoria. " 
11=9 given the structures in 121., we can represent the meaning 
of the first clau3e in 132. and the first clause of 133,, by means of 




T. -C. H. in 9 'ý- p 4ý ST, JCHNIS 
1369 
loo Ip z 
T, -C, H, 'in Ep -t GCLDFN 
-loo ST. JCHN'S 
T. -CoHo, in 
z loo GOLDEN 
; C. 'H. in 
symbol L is'the iota operator of the, -preclicate calculus'ard its 
scope is that which it dominates. I ha; been superimposed upon 
the ordering symbol to represept *immeaiate,, suocession"s which notion 
can also be definitionally explicated within the predicate calculuse 
We can gloss-135,. in the following way: "at the place immediately 
preceding Sto John's. the Trans-Canada Highway does not exist (a is 
in non-existence) but at St. John's the Trans-Canada Highway does 
exist (a in-existence)". !,. The gloss for j36s is the reverseg with 
Golden replacing 3to_, Jobnls. 
Rather. than having to represent these constructions-everytime. 
398ýt. 
ýy such a cumbersome conjoined structure andb, more. importantlyp in, 
order to.. capture the 
, 
fact that inception and,, cessation are treated. 
linguistically as simple situatiomlocated at only one rather than 
twos points, let us define two complex semantic relations into E, 
ard out of E in. the following mannýx; 
-: ý 13 7. 
'def 
loc ý; -2 p-, 
ptpv 
lool Ppi p 
X in E 
loo p i: 
X into E 
1389, 
i loo o" 
, 
--7defe- & 
loo zp 100, Pi, 
I"x out cr 
'E- 7, X in E 1P. 
?, Pi, X in Y 
It will be observed that the followir)g equivalence holds: 
139* 
loop- 100 P, 
x into EX out of 
Now, if in addition to U7, we have the information th&t, at , another, 
point ph such that ph< pi #ý is the case that X is in V, then the 
conditions are satisfied for the use of 'begin again' or leontinae' 
399o 
11 1-0 "'1 ii" if 1ý 66WJiincti -n with 13 8' ) ilar 9' 0 0, in its re-incepti, ýe, siinse im 
we have the irform , ation that it'&'point bef&4 ýj'it" iisi "the "c'ase'that Pi 
X is in'E, then I stcrp again' may be' usea. 2 If 'insiiid w'e'*bave'the' 
information that at no'p 101 int following p: L'-is'it the 
'case'tliatýX is 
in E, then lenal is'applidq'61e`-as, ' for -example. "in'ihe last -c:, ý. Use' 
of 134. -ý - 
The last existential verb to be considered bere is 'Continue' 
in its non-inceptive interpretation-Lee as equivalent to 'not 
stop',, exemplified in 140. a. and J4D. b. Both. these sentences are 
140, as The fog continues for three miles 
b# The fog doesn't stop for three miles 
appropr1ite only if it has been contextually establishea that there is 
fog at some point immediately before (i. e. contiguous with) the 
stretch of three miles involved. For examples either of i4Ooa- or 
11+0. b. could be conjoined to 140., c,, Othervrises a deictic 
140. c. There's fog at Lochinver The fog begins 
ý 
interpretation is availableg in which case i4O. doi. or 140. d. iio 
140. d. i. There's. fog, here 
ii, The fog be gins here 
140. e. There's fog 




(the next) three miles 
would be. most naturally assumed 
I "to 'be, true, in either CiLse's 140.0. 
is impliea owwen. 
In view of these Aarda semariftý properiias""'of, 1ý0*'ae' kna i 40. b.,, 
it is proposed that 'contizuel be treated as a leiicalization of the 
400. 
structure-underlying 'not stop'* Hcwever,. One-, provjijoýjs necessary- 
From-the sentences in 14ii-it will be, observed-that whereas $not 
stop' can co-occur withaý point'ý 100ational, IcontirA1e#, c&n: do so onlY 
in its, re-inceptive interpretation* vagg 14I. a. involves the 
negation of an of 141*c---i-eo the spatial looativa is within the 
a, The fog doesn't Stop at, UllaP'001 
b. The fog contimes at Ullapool 
c. The fOg StOP3 at UllaPO01 - 




FOG out of B 
shall provisionally treat negation as-. an ummlysed operator, over 
entire propositiOm-ioes as the " Ot the PrOP03itioml oalculus*) 
The existence of a speoif ied locative intervening between the 
negation and the lower existential proposition prevents their beipg 
This restriction is more striking in the temporal sphere when we 
consider the related verbs *remain'. $stay' and IkeepO ýhich do 
not have an alternative inceptive interpretations 
ie N John stayecl/remained awake at midnight 
2. NPred. kept ta3king at midnight 
401 1 .'ý 
given aýport-manteau'realizit ion as I (The) fog contirme'. In such 
cases as 140. a. /140. be, however,, in, which the'locative is bound by 
a quantifier-cf, the (abbreviated) semantic representation'In'143. - 
A 4ý. 
3 P: F is an interval (isee a linear set of points) 




rim out Of E 
or where the locative is amphoric--as In the sequence in, 144. below-- 
144, We expected the fog to e nd at Ullagoole Wt when we 
ýgot 
there we fourA that it contizuea 
then it will be recoverable from the context aril hence deletable 
during the'realization. process, This woull enable le'xicalization, to 
402* 
toontimeO to take plaoe. 
Let us now return. to the struature in 131, ynAt we have 
symbolized with the customary notation for a closea, interval is- 
decomposable in terms of our semantic predicates in, E into r. ard 




9 B2 mdef 
....  ....... ..... ..... ....... . 






X in E 
These remarks could be given a more precise formulation granted 
some such realization process as the cyclic operation of predicate 
raising and lexical insertion as adhered to by the generative 
semanticists (cf* references given in fn. ( p. 14. In fact, the 
same sort of phenomenon as discussed above hhs been considered 
with regard to the 
- 
lexicalization of the structure underlying 
$cause to die' to Okill' (for argq6enis in favour 6f such an 
analysis of 'kill'. of. especially McCawley, 1973). It. bas been 
observed (cf. Podor,, 1970) that a sentence suah as 1, bel: ow is 
not eqiiivalent to 2,, and that 2, in fact is som6what anomalousa. 
19 John caused Bill to the on Sunday by stabbing him on 
Saturday 
2. John killed Bill on Sunday by stabbing him on Saturday 
-Again -, if it Is assumed that the underlying- ' 6cif ied t'ejj&ra'1. - 
locative intervenes between the -structures usnpderlying 'cause' and Idielp the unification of the configuration into one lexical item IkillO would be prevented-ofo the structure in 3. taken from' 
Seuren, 1974at il). 






is 9 by definit ion, the (linear) e nt ity which begins at St * John' s 
and ends at Victoria and exists at all points in between. 
I 
Accordingly, the notion of tpath' (or, Bennetto 1972) can be seen 
to be a derived, Leo complex, one and corresponds to the whole of 
(AIB) 
. or rather. to its -definition (or. the third conjunct in the 
definiens of -1 45i. )* - Intuitively-speakings --a. path is a linear object 
(a set of points) from"one place (a point) to another, (cf. 'all the 
wav from Sto John's to Vidtorial)* 
Before leaving the siubject of physical .. ext ensign, 
we. have yet 
to make precise the underlying nature of,, such, sentences as 146, anc 
147- Tbat is in; rolved here is the specification of the measure 
146* The fog patch exteýds northwardý (from Aberdeen) -for "- 
twenty miles 
'147. The pipeline stretches across the prairies for (a-distoLnce 
of) a thousand miles 
of an interval at all poir conce ned is is cý ýw'ýhich'th*e, 6bjeci In, 
existence, The expressions 'northward' and lacross-týe prairie' 
give locational and/or orientational information regarding the 
interval* Within our framework, thens 146. can be represented as in 
145,, isp in fact,, the 
-definition of the half-closed, half-open interval ZAjB) since the definition of out of E is such that B itself, is excluded. from the set of exi; t-e-ntial locations of X, There is a certain degree cf indeterminacy involved here ant our definition of out ar E is probably more precise than the actual-. 
usage cf 'stojT-M-ýIendli, 
404o 
where L/A- p7.7 





Tij 7) A4Pýi 
VITEIITY MILES Aa Alt, EDEEN 
Nm ECRTH 
Vp Ip e- ZAjp P' 
underlies *a stretcIVdistance* which need not appear superficiallYs 
It could be expectea that 148. azA the similar structure 
underlying 147. are relatea to those underlying sentenoes V+9. ahl 
500 
149. The fog pa 
, tch is twenty miles long from Aberdeen north 
ýnorthward 
from Aberdeen is twenty miles long 
150, The pipelino across the prairies is a thousand miles long 
Now, just as the existence of physical objects can be assigned 
locatiom in physical space, the existence of conriguratiom of 
objects ancl places (with or without a temporal dimension)-ioeo 
situations--can be located in physical spacee Consider the following 
sentences: 
15l. a. Mayfield Road 
ý*becomes 
bumpy at (the interseotion 1-begim to beý 
of ) Fountainhall Road 
b. Mayfield Road remains/stays 
ý bumpy fcr half a mile icontinies to b 
ýUp 
to the 
interseotion with West Maim Road 
4050 
all the way from Fountainhall c, lfayf ield Road is bumpy 
ýfor 
half a mile 
Road to , 'lest Mains Road 
ceases to be bumpy at West Mains Road d, Vayfield Road 
ý 
stops being 
The semantic representations for these sentences follow in a 
straightforward mannar from those above, the only difference being 
that X in our _5cvKsvttit. . 
formulae represents a situation rather 
than a physical object or, nore generally, it represents a tsedond- 
order' rather than a 'first-order' entity (of. Lyon: 3* (i968ai 
B*IAO) use of these terms with refe'rence to nominals and Kahn's 
0973) extension of them to the entities referre-I to 'by such 
nominals)a Accordingly, X win be propositional in its internal 
logical structure, Thus, for example, the semantic configumtion 
underlying 151 6 a. is that proposed in V52. (disr6jgarcling the 1091cal 
structure of 'Mayfield Road (be) bumpy' which, we assume, is 
ultimately lomtional in nature). 
152. 
loo P, R, 
nt o 
II. Ro BM, (PY 
IiNfe are now in a position to give a partial account Of such 
spatial expressiom as 'close/near to'. 'far from', '(be) separate 
from', 'meet'. --tc. which we have so far neglected. The proposals 
we will be mak ing ar e inspir ed by A alerso n0 973d) -, ons-ider first 
the senternes belax, These can be glossed as "the measire of the 
4060 
II 
153. a. Ilinnipeg is far from Calgary 
b. -. Vinnipeg is a considerable distance from Calgary 
154. a. Ottaiva is close to Tfontreal 
"ontreal is a short distance from ('tta-vm 
p 
interval beginning at Calgary and ending at Winnipeg is great/ 
cons, iderable" anI "the measure of the interval beginning at 
ýTo&, real and ending at Cttawa is small (= not pyeat)"j, respect- 
ively, The inherent 'negativity of "close' can be assumed to 
dictate that the 'from-, phrase rather than the 
f 
Oto-I phrase is 
subJectivized--hence the. discrepancy in the, order of these ,, 
elements in 154. a. and 154. b.. We- mggest, that, the structure 
underlying 153. a. /153. b., for example,, mi&t be scmething like 




110 0* UGARY 
X into EX Out of 
sub-configuration representing the universally quantifie& -portion 
of the definition of X-Je. "at all pointz between Winnipag-'and 
Calgaryt X is in existence". ) 
In a senteme such as 156, a,,, Anclerson (1973d) sugFrests. -that 
'What is irvolved is the existence cf a distame. between the two, 
407o 
156. a. The Rocky Mountains are separate(a) from the 
Coastal Range 
mountain ranges, In 157- , on the other hand, an 
interval between 
157, b,, The Jasper Highway 
5ýbranches off from the trans- Z separates from 
3 
Canada Highway at Lake Louise 
the two highways is asserted to come into existence at a-certain 
point,, and in 158. an interval between two rivers is, "serted to 
158., The Ubow River joins 
fmeets ýthe Bo-p River at Calgary 
go out of existence at a certain pointo However, perhaps more 
appropriate characterizations Of the ' anings of thes sentences me e 
(and one which allows for a more obvious source of '(pff) from' in 
Me) ard tho3e involving the non-existence# the Ceýs_sation and the 
inceptionp respectively, of some such relation as contiguityý 
coincidence or part. -whole between the two entitieso 
(Por the 
purposes of the present discussion, we win make the simplifying 
assumption that these three relations are, specializations of a 
relation of 'overlapping' in the sense of Coodman 0966): Xo 
stands for wx overlaps with y" (cf. fn. 9, j3. -67), The contradict- 
ory of x0y is "x is discrete from y" (symbolized as x 'Ly), ) Thus, 
in 156. it is asserted that it is not the case that the Rocky 
Mountains (R. 1%) are contiguous with the Coastal Range. The non- 
existence of such a relation could be spatially restricted by the 
addition of a locational adjunct, such as 'at the American border 
(A. B. )', or of an adjunct of spatial extent, such as 'for a stretch 
of one thousand miles'. Similarly, in 157. it is asserted that at 
Lake Louise (L, L, ) the Jasper Highway (J. H. ) ceases to be part Of/ 
1+080 
coincident with the Trans-Camda HighwV while in 158., 
it is asserted that at CalgarY it comes to be the case that the 
Ilbax River (P.. R. ) is part of/coincident with the Ba7 River 
(B. R*)q 
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Pinally, let us make some strictly programmatic remarks con- 
cernihg'the semantic description of -sentences containing such 
spaiiii expressions as'loverl/lunderl, -tacrosst, /IthroughI and 
$around'. Besides their uae in sentences dencribing motiont 
thes7e expressions occur in static c6nbe: Xts and in ihese cases can 
sustain at least two distinct interpretationn-an extensional ani a 
locational one. in some cases, ambiguity results@ All we wish 
to do here i. s give-some indication and illustration as to how the 
meanings of such sentences can receive an explicit characterization 
within the framework we have been developing. Consider, therefcrep 
the follcwlný sentences: 
16o. a. It's misty over the mountains 
There's mistý 
Eacross 
the lake I 
b. Vist extenia/stretches over 
the mountains ýacross 
the lake 




Sentence 160. a. is ambiguous between the interpretation of 160, b, 
and that of 160. c. The possibility-cf ambiguity resides in the 
nature of the referent of 'mist'--i. e. in the fact that mist is 
capable of having, an extension in om or more dimensions. The 
same ambioaity does not occur w1lin the object involved is not 
normally extenclable in such a manner--cf. the sentences in 161. 
over the mountains 161. a, There's a forest ranger stationýacross the lake ", 
N over the mountains b. A forest ranger station exterAs 
ýacross 
the lake 
c, There's a fcrest ranger station on the other side 
of the mountains 
ý 
lalce 
Sentence 161. b, is acceptable arul 161. a., ambiguous OnlY if a 
rather unconventional conception of a forest ranger station is 
adopted. The possibility cf a clual interpretation is therefore 
dependent upon coribextual and ultimately; so it'would-neera#' prak- 
matic factcrs. 
ý, et us confine our attention to the 
_sentences 
in 160. with 
#% ; ruber across It has been bbserved (cf. av 1965; Leech, 1969) 
that 'across' incorporates or realizes-bot. 4 a semantic configuration 
Which can othervise be realized as 'from one side of I and a semantic 
configuration otherwise realizableý'as 'to the other side of'* 
Indeed, 160. a., in one retding, abd 160. b., can be paraphrazed as 
160. a. 1 and 160. b. Ig respectively. In 160. c. an implicit 'from' 
160. b. 1 'Ust extends from om side of the lake to the otber 
ael It's misty 
There's mistý 
from one side of thelake to the other 
110. 
phrase, interpreted deictically in the absence cf specification 
to the coitrary, can be made explicitp as in 160. c. l. This latter 
'fro-, ' rhrase, hovvever, is most appropriately interpreted not as a 
160. c., '"here's mist on the other side of the lake from here 
co-constituent with 'on the other side' but rather as indicating 
the point at which an abstract path to the other side of the lake 
commences (cf. 'seen from here'). That is, whereas 160. b. asserts 
that there is mist at all points in the space from one side or the 
lake to the other, 160. c. states that there is mist at the end CC 
a line thich begins at one side of the laie (namely, that side 
containing the speaker's location) and ending at the other side. 
Thus$ Omitting. many of the details which do not affect the general 
features of the analysis, we can propose the following two urxler- 
lying structures for 160. a.: 162. a. correspouls to the extensional 
interpretation (16o. b. ) aryl 162. b. to the locational interpretation 
162. 
V Pi: Pi loc Il T (-tx) 
Pi 
l, 'I, ')T in P, v Pj< "2 
/17, ýý 
1 
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have let S, abbreviate the configuration corres- 
POndirg to "One side of the 1wke" and S', for that corresponclirZ 
to "the other side of the lake". We have not included in 162. b. 
the perhaps appositional structur6 which further specifies S, as 
i 
the side of -the lake imluding the speaker's location. 
) 
Within Bennett Is 0 972) framewcrk (cf.. ý 2-4), the semantic 
representations corresponding to 162.0 and 162. b. would be, 
respectively, 1. and 2. below (TRYPj fjVvRqF, Tresumably collapsing 
the structure corresponding to "fro-i one side of ... to the other 
side of... "): 
1, LOCATIVF, (PATF (T, CCATIVP, (rRAIý13V7Rs,, 4,, (LAKýT, )))) 
2, L(rATIVT, j_? ATH (LXATIVF, ('Rk*., Wý"ý112, (Tjj, 7ý')))) 
(90n,, 01's (L(rA'I'IV7. (x))17 
The additional structure in 2. corresponds to 'from here' in 
160. c. 1, However, it is not at all clear from such a formalism 
what logical connection this constituent has with any other 
element within the square brackets or with the initial LOCATIVE* 
More distressing. hoaever, is the fact tha-t, qmrt from this 
additional configurations the two representationa are identical 
and hence go no way towards characterizing the difference between 
the extet-mional and the locational interpretations. As we 
mentioned in ý 2.4, Bennett's formulae leave a great deal (f 
-semantic structure implicit arxI intuitive and are perhaps satis- 
factory only if they belong to some 'stratum' considebably nearer 
to that of the lexotacticso 
412 
162. a. can be glossed as *mist is in existence at all points in 
the space which begins atAlong one side of the lake, ends at/ 
along. the other side cf the lake and is in existence at a1l 
points in between". 162. b. has the closs "mist is in existence, 
at the place at which ends the Interval beginning at (a point on) 
One side CC the lake ancl, which ends at (a point- on) the other side 
of the lake", 
7.3-3 1,4efrati6n and quantification 
Before continuing with our discussion of other existential 
structures, we must make clear how negation aril quantification are 
to be treated within our framework, Both of these logical elem- 
ents can., we feel, be given a natural interpretation in terms of 
the existential locatives we have made use of 50 far- 
In particular, we propose to interýret the w-gation operator 
(of- our use of NEG in 142. ) as a locational predicatei n=ely 
in 'T. In fact,, this treatment of negation is a direct Outcome 
Of the extension in the prýceding section of our existential 
structures X in 'P. 
,, 
X in 'F, ý and the defined existential structures 
X into B. and X out of F, to contexts in which X starrIs for a sit- 
uation, ioe. a second-order entity, "Phus . in 151 . e. b el(xrj, 
151. e, nrily at one or two places between Fountainhall Road 
and West !, fairz Road is Tfayff ie Id Road not- burlp', Y' 
non-existence is predicated of the proposition "Mayfield Road (be) 
bumpy" ard this existential location, -d relation is SDatially 
restricted to one or two places within a particular interval. 
However, the mgative element is -as oPten interpreted as binding 
413. 
the locative, be it spatial or tenporal (cf. our discussion of 
#continue' above). ". 'e may therefore ask what interpretation can, 
be given to in E and in 3 when they are prý-dicated of a structure F 
already containing specified spatial and temporal locatives,, iseo 
a structure which is a (spatially and) temporally specified pro- 
position (cf. f n. I p. Zgg). %ch propositions can be asserted 
as being true or as being false, and if truth can be identified 
as location ir, an intensional world (or in a rioLlel of the actual 
world) then in f and in when predicated of such fully specified 
propositions, can be interpreted as "is true" and "is false", 
respectively. 
4k 
This outline of the relationship between existence/non- 
existence (of objects and situal; ions) aul trut4/falsity (of 
Propositions) is necessarily over-simplified (of., for example, 
Kahn's (1973) discussion of the existential and veridical uses of 
the verb 'be' in . ', ncient ý', reek), but it vrill be sufficient fcr 
our pregent purposes. All we have tric-d to do is suggest that a 
localist fraiework presents the possibility ot relatiqF, these 
semantic and logical elemerts in a no-n-arbitrary fashion. Let us 
now consider the role of in E. and in 7, in explicating the logicians 
use of the quatitification operators and which we incorporated 
in some of the semantic representatiom given in the preceding 
discussion. 
V, Once some kizxl of existential preAicate"cr, in our terms, an 
existential locative, is founcl to be necessary ih natural-language 
contexts other than simply those involvjýng such expressions as 'a/ 
somet . tnonet, 'alV, etc., the introduction cf the'logicians* 
--- 
4jij. 
quantificational operators 3 andV, to account for these latter 
is not only superfluous but also rather misleadinge In the first 
place, the relatiomhip between 3 and 'V , on the one, hand, and 
non-quaritificational. uses of , say, in P, are obscured., 3 eco rrUy, 
(and conflate two separate notions, namely., the idea of an 
entity beirig in existence and that of a subset of a set (or of a 
member of a set or of a part of a Whole)* Les essentially a 
partitive relation, which latter is itself needed ialopendently 
of existential structures. A subset of a set can vary acccrding 
to whether, for example, the subset has a ftagnitud'e equal to one 
or a magnitude greater than one (cf. 'a/some boyt versus 'some 
boys') or, again, accordirg to mtether the supercrdinate set is, 
itself a subset of a larger set (cf. 'some boys' versus 'some of 
the boys'). Furthermore, not all partitive relations involve 
set-subset relations,. - those wbich are realized by constructions 
with a mass noun (cf. 'some che6selp laome cf the cheese', 
Kla 
cheese' (unless a variety cf cheese is moant), *a piece/lu / .% 
Mp 
quantity of cheese') involve part-whole relations (cf. Goodman, 
1966P Diks 1972). 
It is entirely beyord the sco; d of the present stuay to go ' 
into a detailed-amlysis cf these differerl quantificatioml 
construotions. Por the purposes of this study we will adopt a 
somewhat simplified version of Anderson's treatment of existential 
(and universal) quantification (cfev for example, Anderson, 1973bg 
1973f, 1973gt 1974a), which involves such a distimtion between, 
the existential predication and the quantifier (ioe. partitive) 
415. 
phrase, uand which explicitly treats the existential element as 
locational, Letting 6 abbreviate the partitive components we 
will adopt the general scheme in 163. ai. for so-called existential 
quantification,, this corresponding to Anderson's (1974b) repres- 
entation given (in simplified form) in I 63. b, Cur decision to 
163. a 
6 !4- in 'R 
Xises 
163. bo 
somq ix in E 
-. some X 
give a referential index to x rather than to e/some,, which latter 
element stands for "a subset/member/part of"j anI mo3t appropriately 
carries the referential informationp is of no theoretical or 
descriptive significance and has been made simply to bring the 
formalism somewhat more in line with traditional notation and# in 
particular, with our manner of representing formulae bound by the 
iota operator. 163. a. can be read as "some x. such that 
ssoxooep is in existence". The dotted triangle alla7s for inter- 
vening structure.. The representation of quantifier phrases con- 




What nmy of universal quantification, i. e. of phrases con- 
taining 'all', 'every', etc.? In Anderson (I 973b, 1973f, 19739) 
synta&, ic arguments are given for analyzing 'all' as realizing a 
structure like 164. ýbut with an mdditiorzl negative 
(in 7, ) inter- 
vening between the upper and lower sub-conf i gurat ions containing 




0 6xio 00 
as "no xi exists f or which it is not the case that* e -xi4p ea. quch 
an analy. qis is in accordance with the often observed equivalences 
involving existential and universal quantifiers such as those in 
166., but it makes the additional claim that only one of the 
166. a. " (V x)P(x) 3--- (9 x) v P(X) 
be " (3 X)1? (x) ('4 x) c. P(x) 
0*N 2(x) =- - (: a x) .: ý 
x )P(x) ý--2 --. (ld x) " KX) 
quantifiers is linguistically basic or primitive., ramely the 
existential quantifier, and that the other is derived from ite 
Such a decompositional analysis of 'all' not only reduces the 
number of primitives needed in our semantic description'but alsO 
makes universal as well as existential nuantification amenable tO 
0 7. 
an intuitively appealing description in terms of independently 
motivated constructsp namely existential location ani partitive 
relations, For these reasons# we will adopt the analysis Of 'all' 
as presented in 165. (In generalp we will not be considering the 
differences between lallt and such other 'universal' quantifiers 
as 'every', 'each', 'any'). 
Although we have therefore abandoned the traditional analysis 
and representation of the logical quantifiers, we will continue to 
make use of the iota operator (-Z X: f(X)) in its usual interpreta- 
tion of implying (or presupposing) existence and uniqueness or 
reference of the vari! Lble within its scope (of, Lyonst 1973t for 
suggestions as to how these two elements of meaning inherent in 
most uses of 'the' can be aralyzed as deriving from its urilerlyinglY 
deictio structure). 
7.4, Temporal location and extemion 
7. ý. l 21reliminary remarks on linEýpýtio time 
Before proceeding with a discussion of directioml existential 
structures, especially those corresponding to existential causatives, 
it will facilitate matters It we first elaborate somewhat Upon OUr 
characterization or a (concrete) spatialýjourney as developed in 
ý 7.2. To do this, hovvever, we must consider in detail the 
temporal dimension which is involved in such oorstructs and which wo 
have, up to now, left implicit. Wfore particularly, we must 
examine the parallels to physical locati= and extension which 
exist in the temporal domain. 
For our present, purposes we can operate with a minimal and 
more or less uncontroversial characterization of time as it is 
419. 
structured by ani reflected in our use of Znglish* The analysiD 
to be put fon7ard is not set out in detail and there'are few 
supporting arguments because the proposs. 13 have been discussed and 
motivated in such studies as tho: 3e of Bull (iq6O)j Leech (1969)tý 
aril H. Clark (1973) (cf. also Fillnore,, 1972; and, for French, 
Pottier, 1962)9 anLI we feel it is unnecessary to repeat their 
arguments and analyzes here. 
Essentially then,, we operate with the notion of time in terms 
of a one-dimensional entity of infinite length* This limar 
structure we will refer to as the time or temporal axisl T. "vie 
shall. assume a discrete model of, time for the. PurPOses Of this 
study* and hence T can, be represeptqd as an interval composed of 
an infinite number of temporal moments or points,, tv as in 167. 
167, Tm ýessp t. lp to, t+ll ea*3 
Formula 167. also incorporates the fact'that the time axis is 
polarized. 'Ve need not concerri ourselves at the moment with the 
nature and source of this polarization, but the fact that one 
exists makes it possible to mea-aineully apply the dyadic ordering 
relation </> to T)al. ýs of elements in T. ýIthough thýere' aii" 
difficulties in reconciling the Ispatial metaphcrs' unaerlying cur 
use of Ibefcrel/lafter' (cf. especially, 11. ', ", lark% their clonimnt 
i&,, erFretation with respect to a polarized time axis is that in 
167. which assumes that the 'future' is positive with respect to the 
168. a. It before tiI. ti <' t 
b. It after tjot ti>ti 
419* 
#past 
ýNxrthermore, T can be partitioned, i. e. segmented into a 
set of sub-intervals. The calendar system is based on a process 
of partitioning whereby the sub-intervals of a partition of T are 
of equal measure. For-example, T can be fully segmented into a 
set of year-length intervals or into a set of lunar months, 
Larger-atzed intervals can be obtained by the sequencing of a 
subset of such intervals (e. g. a century is a series of one hundred 
years) and smaller intervals by a repeated process of partitioning 
(e. g. a lunar month can be partitioned into four week-length 
intervalso a week into seven day-length intervals,. and -so On)# 
Howevers certain arbitrary discrepancies (deriving from the fact 
that our month is, not a lunar mont, h) have been incorporated into 
our standard (Gregorian) calendar system, and this upsets the ideal 
process of. partitioning into sub-intervals of equal measure (cfo 
Bull, 1960, for some discussion). 
So faro we have characterized what mightýbe-called a 'temporal' 
yardstick', a linear measure which could be applied to a situption 
This interpretation is no doubt reinforced by the fact"that these 
terms are also used to order numbers according to their magnitude 
and this numbering system plays a Crucial 
' 
role in our calendar 
aril clock ýý, y3tems, the larger-numbered years, fcr example being 
closer to or further in the future than the smialler-rArnbered 
ones (presuming, of course, that negative numbers and years 3.0. 
are analogous). However, even in our counting system there is 
a mixture of metaphors: in counting from five to ten one 
reaches five before getting to ten or, alternatively, five comes (to the counter) before ten. We shall be discussing in some- 
what more general terms below this phenomena of distinct but 




to measure its 'temporal extensiont or to measure the 'temporal 
distance' between it and another situation (of course, we have 
yet to make explicit, wbat we mean by these terms) but in no way 
can it give the direct temporal location of a situation. Vnia t is 
necesnary is for such a, temporal measuring rod to be anchored to 
or incorporated into a series of specific events--actuallys one 
unique event will do. In the case of our calendar system, the 
birth of Christ is the unique evert which establishes an absolute 
system which., with the nambering system alone, would be sufficient 
to assign direct locations to all preceding and folloairg situations* 
Howeverv although this means is used to identify specific, yearst 
Specific days of the month, and specific clock intervals and pOintst 
a significart portion of the burden of absolutely locating 
situations is carried by the cyclic systems of so-called calendar- 
unit names. These comprise the, names of the months of the year 
and of the days of the week anis in a similar-but distinctive 
fashion, the names of the-seasom and the names for the divisions 
of the day. Anis of-course, there are also the named holidays* 
Howevers although one speaks of I names! , 
iT;, thiz conrections as if 
'April's 'Tuesday', 'Summer', and 'Christmas'. were proper nounss 
it must be remembered tbat. they function as such, i, e, with unique- 
ness of reference, only when coupled with further indication of 
the location of the interval in question with respect to the 
absolute time axis (e. g. 'Jamiary, 19741, 'the first Tuesday of 
March, 1963't 'Christmas, 19721, 'the Summer of 11+11) ors as is 
most usually done, when related to the moment of utterances which 
is the other means of anchoring our temporal yardstick* 
421 - 
/+he 36ictic time akis, centred 'on the 66niefit' of utlterance, 
is indOpendertt', of the absolute one; but, it can be put into 
correspor. dence with the. truthful assertion of or assent to 
such propositions as that expressed by 169. ard 170. Bull (1960: 
Yesterday was 
16j. 70day is fhe 21st 'of June, 1974 
Tomorrow is 
70- It's naw, 1 : 00 a#m. , 
the 21st of June, 1974 
10)j, in factf claita that withoUt -the possibility Of making such 
'equational' 3tatendnts, the absolUte calendar system has no 
practical applicatiorl-, -., Ivwe cannot., make use of the Gregorian 
calendar, ufttilý, we, are able toýý, ýstablish an equation in which the 
time intervals of this calendar are identified with their equiva- 
lents in-a personal ZLe. deictic7 calendar system. Until we 
kncr, 7 -the -Gregorian calendar label for "today".. the public calendar 
is us6less, and if we cannot define "today", that is, if ve do not 
have-a persoi-al calendar, we et-A up in an asylum". 
- Once a point or,, more germanely, a named interval of the 
absoltte temporal system is located at or arounI the time of 
utterance (even sucb an 'incomplete'-dtatement as 175, will dO), 
then it is again possible to use the calendar names in unicruely, 
173. It's Tuesdaý/, ýctober/, ')pring 
referriiig expressions. "he deictic element may be made exp lici t 
by the tense (or modal auxiliary), as in 174., aWor bý'some 
174* John will arrive I on Tuesday 
ýarrived 
422o 
modif ier such as 1 mxt 'last 'past 'this' 
, 
as An 17 
175- 'a- John will mrrive"h'sý Tuesday L next 
list Tuesday b. John arrived 
ýthis 
(past)i 
Hcwever, the deictic time system can"be used independently. 
of the absolute system. It contaim its own proper nwnes 
('yesterday', 'today's 'tomorrow') as well as the means of 
uniquely referring to an unlimited number of other intervals by 
means of specifically deictic elements in combination with the 
simple expressions for the intervals (and multiples thereof) on 
our non-anchored te mporal ruler (e # g. two aVs ago in three 
minutes'. 'five years from ncwl . 'the year bercre 
last'# etc#) Or 
with expi-essions denoting subjectively miasurea intervals (e. g, $a 
moment ago', 'in a short while'), 
7-4.2 The verbs Cyr aktion-sarten, - 
Ilast'. ' ard duratioml adverbiall 
tet'us now proceed to a more'explicit COns ideration 0ý the 
interplay of temporal expressions and existential oonstructionso 
A particularly interesting manifestitio ,n of the b6mdntio ana formal 
parallels whieb exist between e: kpressiors of spatial and temporal 
location, especially in the case of prepositional phra-gesq in 
which the spatial or temporal function is determined with respect 
to what kind of entity... spatial, tempoial, or both-the object noun 
For a full discussion of the intricacies and variabilitý- ,- 
involved in the interpretation of such expressions, cf. Leech# 
1969; Pillmore, 1972. 
ILP 
phrase denotes (cf* ý 4.29, ý5-2*1), are the existential verbs 
which we, discussed in O-V with reference to physical objects 
and simplex situations such as that described by 'Mayfield Rd, 
be bumpy'. When applied to constructions describing second-oraer 
entities and when assigned temporal rather spatial adjuncts# these 
verbs function in an identical fashion.. identifying in this case 
different stages or phases of the entity's existence along the 
linear dimension of t: Lme-. J. e. rhat have come to be called the 
different aktiomarten of imeptions contimationo cessation, 
termination, Thus, we may compare the follo-, dng sentences with 
those of 132. to 134o Leaving aside for =v the verb $finish' 
176e a. The students' demonstration began at 11 : 00 
b, The students began their demonstration at 11 : 00 
ce The students began demonstrating at 11100 
177* as The students* demonstration stopped at 1: 00 but 
resumed at 2: 00 continuedý 
ba The students stopped their demonstration at I tOO but 
f resumed it at 200 continuedý 
c, The students stopped demonstrating at 1: 00 but 
resumed I 
conti nueaý at 
2: 00 
178o a* The students' demonstration continued for two hours and 
f inizhed I 
at 3100 
ýended 
b. The students continued their demonstration for two 
finishedý it at 3: 00 hours and 
ýe ded 
3, 
c, The students continued demonstrating for two hours 
424. ý 
and 
f inishe ý? 
e nded 
dl 
at 3: 00 
(since its interpretation depends on the logical structure of 
exterded Sourneys), we can see that the definitions given in 
7-3.2 fcr the complex semantic predicates unlerlying lbegin'l 
'stop', 'continue/resume, lcont'n"2' ard lend' apply equally well 
here, except that the superordinate locatives are temporal rather 
than spatial* Ignoring the superficial and semantic differencesq 
if any, between tba a., b., and c. variants, the urderlying 
structures of 176., 177- and the first ConJunct in 178. are given 
in 179. through 181* respectively, where X stands fcr a tempCral 
179* 
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entity,, i. e* the demonstration (by some students). The simple 
inceptive structure in 180* is sufficient for the representation of 
the re-inceptive use of Ocontinael since it is already conjoined 
with a structure which implies the prior existence cf X,, which is 
the contextual requirement Ibr 'continue #/resume 1. The first 
ti loa 114T(Ti)/\in E 
426* 
conJunot of 181 . diff ers from 143 * 
'only in the ref crmulation of 
negation ard the universal quantifier as discussed in the previous 
section. (Instead of having to specify the existence of a linear 
set of points as in 143. it is sufficient, given the unidimension- 
ality of the time axis, to simply specify the existence of a subset 
Ti of T. ) This whole conjunct may be glossed as "there exists a 
subset Ti of the temporal axis T measuring two hours ard such that 
it is not the ca-se that it is not the case that at ti X ceazesj ie. 
such that f or all points ti in Ti it is not the case that X 
ceases at ti"* The third co njunct in 181 . spe cif ie3 the , 
contextual requirement for the use of lend' in contrast to 1stOP's 
namely that there is no following time at Which X exists* 
In addition to sentences such as 176. to 178-,, we have those 
in 182. ard 183. which parallel sentences 124. and 146. /147. 
Thuss whereas *extend' is the general verb (t physical extensions 
182. The students' demonstration lasted from 11100 to 1100 
and from 2100 to 3: 00 
1839 The students' demonstration lasted for (a period of) 
three hours 
so 'last' is the general verb of duration, i. e., temporal exten- 
sion: both involve the ascription of existence to an entity at all 
points in an interval of a particular measure or with particular 





wit was suggýsted that 146. /147, have verY 
r. im: Liar. unclerlying struntures, t0 thOse ce 1489/149o » ., 
130, tO0 : rcr 
Thus,, we feel that there has been a certain amount of confusion 
in discussions cf the parallel between temporal arxi (concrete) 
spatial expressions involving such prepositions as 'from's Ito, # 
$for' insofar as the proper Ispatial metaphor' has not been 
identified. Lyons (1968a: 300). fcr example,, remarks that "as 
location is to motion, so being in a certain state or condition 
is to change into (or from) that state or condition., in other 
words, there-is a notional parallelism between such static 
expressions as t (be) in London* .I 
(happen) on Tuesday IjI (be) aý 
teacher' and their dynamic counterparts 1(gq/come) to London's 
'(16st) until Tuesday'. t(become) a teacher'. * 71hat is mis- 
leading here is the identification of I locat ionml'/' direct ional I 
with (one manifestation of) I static'/' dynamic' (cf, our remarks- 
in ý 4,2), 'Happen on Tuesday' or, more preoiselyt a senterne 
such as I., in certainly not statict it describes'a dynamic 
The car accident happenea, on Tuesday-' 
situation but orn located on-Tuesdayo Converselyp 'last UrItil 
Tuesday' does not necessarily describe a dynamic constrUctiOn- 
of* 2*--but does involve a directional expression of temporal 
2. My headache lasted until TuendAy 
extension (fcr. the analysis of 'until',, a cf. 
ý 8-4)- Thusp the 
confusion rests in seeing in 3* rather than in 4. the concrete 
spatial analogue of a senteme such as 5* It is not necessary to 
invoke some such notion as a 'temporal journey' in crder to acccunt 
John went from Crianlarich to Tobermory 
It was foggy from Crianlarich to Tobermory 
John was asleep from noon to midnight 
for the distribution of 'from .. to,,, *' in 5. Although there is, as we shall see, some motivation for treating the notion of 'Journey' as applicable to the temporal dorain, this can o&v be treated as an incomplete spatial metaphor,, for any attempt to treat it systematically leads to a paradox. 
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183. azA 184. belowý Howevert another variant e:; ists in th6 dase 
1849- The students' demonstration was three hqUrs long 
of temporal extension, namelys the more usual construotions involving 
an adverbial adjunct to a full sentential structures as in 185. aiA 
these we will assume to have very similar, if not' identicalp 
185, The students demonstrated from 11: 00 to 1: 00 and from 
7: 00 to 3: 00 
186. Tjýa stu4aints clemonstrated for three hours 
unlerlying structures to 182, amd 183., respectivelY* The common 
e=, Ip 16 would: -be that in underlying structire for 182. /165. t for P 
187- (ignoring tense and consideringo for simplicitYp OnlY OrO Of 
the temporal 'fromsootoe'. 1 phrases)* 187- ban te' Flossed'as 
, 187# 
t 
ti loo IIC(? 
-Ti) in E 
ti 
. 16C 11100 
into ETi out cc E UM STMENTS 
M, TIOMMATE 
"there is no time ti in the interval (T. ) which I begins at 11 : 00 and 
ends at 1: 00 such that it is not the case that at t it is the case i 
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that the, stuaents demonstrate. " This analysis will be slightly 
modif ied in § 7-4.4* 
7-4-3 Existence in time of first-order entities 
As somewhat cf an interludej let us examim the temporal uses 
of in E. into F, and out of E with f irst-order rather than second- 
crder entities. Consider, first 0 the following sentemes which 
involve inanimate entities., Vie see that although temporal 
188. The Cairngorms came into'existence 
ýappearedl 
(on the face of the earth)l 
bef ore the Cui3lim 
189, a, The Cairngorms. have existed for a longer time than tba 
cuillips 
b. The Cairngcrms have had a longer. existeme than the 
ot4llins 
a, The Cairngcrms are older mountaim than the Cuillins 
190. The Zechstein Sea vient out of existence disappeared(from the face of the earth)ý 
. about 40, Million B, F., -. 
191. Glaciers existed in Scotland roughly from, 10,800 to 
I Om 300 B,, P. - 
existence and extension can-be ascribed to, such entitiesp no 
special set of aýktion3arten verbs is employed., Of special interest 
is the relation between 189*a. 6 and,. 1 89oc* which in some, respeots 
parallels that between 146. /147o and 149. /150., and that between 
183. and 185. Hcxvever, it differs from these in the change of 
terse involved--from inalusive to non-inclusive, This reveals that 
'yourgl/Iold' are relative terms in the sense that they presuppose 
a tempcral reference pointt if the i nclu3 ive-- no n- inclusive tense 
If29. 
't'be made 6hinge is not'imlved, 'then this ref6rence p6int'ruS 
explicit by athdr'ýMoanz. " Thus 1930 is unacceptable *Uh6ut 'its, 
claus'e. '--' '(In -so=wbat--diffe'rant terms,, 
' -1young1^/9'o-ld1 'are 
192. The lochstein Sea exbted for a long time 
"Pech3toin Sea was old when it ceasi to exist 193- , 
The 
po3itioml or Iocational terw in contrast to Ishortf/Ilong' 
which arc true externioma terms (of. fie Clark, 1973)*) Gince 
age ia thu3 tied to T" hence coutl=ally increazes with To, the 
timm at which a certain age : lz ascribed to an object must be 
implicitly gl%ýen. 
The pattein is Iw-hthi'same forclas3es'of arAmaý63 excdpt 
that (I ýs an alternative to 'go out ar exLitencel j ono'has the 
equivale nt 0 
ýextinct' 
(recall the equivalenco into extina on 
ý'V 
relation in 139. ) and (2) the verb 'Imst' becomes applicablc in 
some contexts: 
194,, Dinas,, ur' 
ýcaw into existence 
appeared (on the face of the earth 
the Jurassic Period 
J95, ae 'Reptiles have existed fcr a longer time than mx1mals 
be 'rho nautiloids have 
? out-lived the ýImsted longar thaný 
ammnoids 
c,, Reptiles are an older group of animals than "n, &MM, als 
went Into extinction 196* The ammanicids went out of existence 
disappearea (from the face of the earth) 
durim, the -, -retaceau3 'ýIeriocl 
For (irAividual) animates,, tbC verb flival or the adjective 11 
We 
tiliýr6f usually, appear' in the plac6'-d` lexistl,, and 'life' in the 
plaoe or" lexistewevol-- -'Fu4hermore-i-fiastf Jý again aj7ýlicable. 
2 
'Live$ and 'be alivel are, of coursep not synorqmous, in all 
contexts: *live' has a wider application in that it can take" 
on mahces of a hebitation (of,, 'be living in a flat'/'? be alive 
in a flat') or of active participation in or supervision of one's 
existence (of, 'live well'# 'live dangerously% 'live a full life). 
However, more Perplexing is the fact that 'be alive' is riot 
simply a contextual variant of 'exist'--i. e. it is certainly an 
oversimplification to-Adentify animacy with spatio-temporal 
existence: a dead tree is still a, spatio-temporal entity arA 
even,, perhaps, still a tree. Unfortunately, we must leave this 
thorny (and rrt Philosophical) problem to the side (cf. 9 ho; yever, Kahn's (1973 discussion of the "vital" use of the Greek verb 'be'). 
2 'Last I can most likely be interpritea -as always applying to second- 
order entities if sentences with what appears to be a first-oraer 
nominal as subject of flast' are analyzed as involving an additional 
existential locative immediately above the first-crder nomiml. 
Thus, the ambiguity (if a sentence such as I& below# which can be 
I, Nixon won't last lorg 
urder3tood, for example, in either the sense of 2. or that of 3-P 
2* Nixon won't last long in view of his thrombosis 
3a Nixon won't last long as President 
is explicable if. in the first interpretationp in E is predicated 
ar Vixon- in I,? while in the secorxl in P, is predicated ct Nixon (be) 
Pre-sident. However, in these cas-es# 'last' seems to imply riore 
than just being in existence,, especially in the case of the first 
interpretation, in that some reason to expect the subject not to 
remain in existence for much longer is presupposed. This added 
element is perhaps relatable to the double (and redundant) 
existential predicate. 
We may also note that just as we speak fiiprativelY Of the life of a battery, of a tyre or of a pair of shoes, so we can 
speak oC such objects as lasting for a certain time and even of 
them dying. In E in these codexts appears to be superorainate 
to an abstract locational relation such as "be in a servicable 
cordition". 'Te also speak of food or petrol lasting for shorter 
cr longer intervals of time. Here, it is required only that at 
each momert in the interval part of the food or petrol exist. 
The equivalent of the deadt is such cases is $be all gone'. I 
431 * 
Finallý -with animals but-'not-, plants Ibe born' 
(ori-according to 
one's beliefs,, lbe. conoeived'), can lexicalize into 'R; with both 
plants andanimals 'die' can lexicalize out of ana 'survive' 
appears to lexicalize the negation of out of R under much the same 
conditions as associatecl ýYith 'continue'. These possibilities 
are 'illustrated in 198o-to 201. 
came into existence 




last forta long time without''water 199. a. The, camel: can 
survive 
lived 
b. John lasted fcr several more years. after-the operation 
survivedl 
co. John was very old when he, finally died 
d. John had ;% long life 
200. The, plant died af ter a, few weeks 
201 . "Unstein, livedfrom 1879 to 1955 
7-4-. 4 , Bouncled' versus unbounded entities and proeEesýsive', as"Ct- 
.. We'must now ý take, Up ̀  agaih- aha' improve upon an anillYsis'MOLde 
earlier, in, this chapter4o, --- - So-ýai', - *e have not' distinguished between 
the following pairs of , sentences, g which we wish to - sumost differ in 
similar respects. - The*, -obvious superficial difference betxeen 202. as 
HOWeve'r, lsurviýel is not 'limited: to animate subjects ., ýcf. I 
1, The house survivea the hurricane 
432,. 
202. A. The fog patch exterds from St. Anareim to Abercleen 
be There's fog from Ste Arxlrews to Aberaean It's foggy 
ý 
203., a4, The students demonstrated from 11100 to 1: 00 
b. The students were demonstrating from MOO to 1: 00 
and 202*bo is that between a definite and count noun phrase and an 
inlef inite and mas noun phrase. The indefinite/definite dis- 
tinction is irrelevant to the point we will be making-202oast 
202. a. ' A fog patch extends from St, Andrews to Aberdeen 
would do, Just as well. Hoffever, the count/mass distinction is 
responsible for a certain# admittedly subtlet discrepancy in the 
implications of 202. a. 1 and 202. b. The a, sentence implies not 
only that the f Og exisýis- at all points in an interval from' 
3te Andrews to Abardeeng it also implies that it doesn't exist at 
points before or after the interval. That is, the fog patch 
comes into existence at Sto ArArewa-, -arA-goeq out of existence at 
Aberdeen. The b. sentence, an the other handp lacks this secondl 
implication although the came or e4ilivalent itformation might be 
supplied by a conversational implicature (cf. Grice, fcrthcoming) 
to the effect that the speaker will be cx-it4ally, informativa 
'within the constraint of being relevanti, he knows that there is 
fog from Dover to Caithness and that this is important to the 
speaker, it would be assumed that he would say so. Now this 
difference in the implications of 202oao and 202. b. is explicable 
if one adopts some such characterization of the count/mass 
distinction as Allen's (1966) whereby the essence cf being countable 
is being bounded,, But for something to be bounded means that it 
433.. 
has a beginning aril erxi. Thus, we get an anomaly if something 
with a beginpirr, ard an end doesn't exterd all and only the vmy 
between these botuds: 
204. NThe highway from Banff to Jasper extends halfway to 
Jastor 
The only interpretýition which could be given to 204. is that the 
hi, ghwa. y which is to extend from Banff to Jasper is 0rZy half 
f inished. 
We propose to represent the difference between ý20, '-). a. and 202. b. 
in the following manner: thý 3truettire iiýerlying 202. a. is given 





100 ST, AIMRMYS d, pi in 
T*F. P. into E 
Z- 
& 
ST AIDRE7.73 <pi< AM TD*F. N 
/ý%, ýloc ABE-017, EN 
T*F, P* out cc E 
in "ý 
ocvj 
T*F. P. in E 





6 P. 4 in E 
ý pi in 2 
Aloe ST. MMMIS pt in 
L inT 
00 Pi 
AM RDSEN FOG in E 
tj 
+ 
X. into EzL out of E 
ST, AIMRMYS <p <ABERDEEN 
loc p 
xi in E 
205. is to be read as "the fog patch comes into existence at 
St. Andrews aril goes out of existence at Aberdeen and there is no 
point Pi between !, t. Andrews and Aberdeen such that it is not the 
case that the-fog patch exists at pi (i. e. the fog patch begins at 
St, Andrew3, ends at Abercleen and exists at all points between 
St. Andrews and Aberdeen)% 206. can be glossed as "there is no 
point Pi in the stretch begi=ing at St. Andrews, enling at 
Aberdeen and existing at all points in between such that it is not 
the case that the fog patch exists at p. (ie,, the fog patch exists 
4354o 
at all points in the interval beginning at St. Andrews and ending 
at Aberdeen) 
If we look now at M. a. and b. we find a similar difference 
in implication: 203. a.: implies 203. b. but also implies 203, c. 
The superficial difference between the two is that between the 
203. a. The students began demonstrating at'li 100 and stopped 
at I loo 
non-progressive and-the progressive form. 'rho former bas often 
been correlated semantically with "complete(d) evdrt"t "event seen 
in its entirety" and that is precisely the element- of meaning which 
203, co adds to the meaning of 203. b. and which is lacking in 
203, b, alone* The progressive form simply locates the 
'cituation 
in F, at or for the given time but says nothing of its inception 
or cessation, i. e. its temporal boundaries, Thusp for atudents 
to have demoratrated is a bounded situation,, for students to have 
been demonstrating a, wL7bounded one. We are suggestingp therefcre, 
that the non-progressive form, although superficially the unmarked 
form, may be semantically marked with respect to the progressive 
: roý M., Thus# we were wrong to assign 187. as the underlyirZ 
representation for 185, (z 203, a. ): rather it is the unlerlying 
representation of 203, b. while 207. below is that of 185, (= 203,, a. )., 
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? 07. 
Iz : 00 t in E loc 1: 00 
into 'T out 0 
THE ! TrUDFTlrg 'DEVON , t., loo 114T(Irli : 00, in P, 'n -M, 7T U DF, I n, 
STRATE rv 01, zSTRAn 
loo t, 
n 
THE STUDý, 'ITPS D-UJOISTRATE 
Hamever, we shall find that there are other cases where the pro- 
gressive form is semantically marked--in particular where thO 
situation being described has inherent boundariesp i. e. ones which 
are not simply arbitrary beginning and edling temporal locations, 
So far we have treated in E, into r-, ancl out of r. as 
accompanied by temporal locatives ahl as predicated of inanimate 
and animate objects or of situations which have been dynamic (which 
property is yet to be explicitly characterized). It rema: Ln3 to 
examine how they behave-i. e. how they are realized-when predicated 
of static situation3, i. e. uhat we have suggested are locational 
relations of some kind. However, this will lead us directly into 
43/ 7- 
a re-consideration of the logical structure of Journeys; so let 
us now turn our attention to this problem* 
7.5 A formal characterization of exterded journeys andborder- 
cro3sings 
7.5.1 Border-crossipris-and directed movement 
We may begin with the observation that when we moved from the 
application of. into 'R an4 out of E with nouns of spatial extent as 
subject plus spatial locatives to their application vdth situations 
as subjects and temporal locativess we inasmuch made explicit the 
notion of a border-crossing, the transition from one location to 
another, in the special case where the two successive 10catiOnal 
relations are that of a, dynamic situation being in existence# and 
then in non-existence or vice versa* flow, we I may gereralize this 
to include the simpler case of existence ard non-existence of 
static situations, Les concrete and abstract locational relationso 
Thus to leave B is to be at one moment at D ard the next mOnOnt not 
at B, Leo, for A loo B to ro out of existence--of. 208. (where 
can be read as "is lexicalized as"). Similarly, we can define-, A I 
208. 
loc t loc t 
A LEAVE BfE 
de: 100 Z th 
nEthti L 
A loc BA loc B 
arriving at 0 or A reaching () as the coming into existence of the 




/"ýý loo ti loo ti
A ARRIVI ATý c rxt oE RE'ACH 
r, 
ý 
A loo C 
def loc z t* 
17 n, th T, ti 
A loo 0 
E loc ti 
in E 
loc C 
ORnter' differs from larriye. qýt'/Ireachl in that the final 
locational relation is A loc 'A in Cý rather than 
A loo C( i. ea 'A at 01), Thus We can give the following definition: 
210* 
zz 
loo t loc t1 /2 
int A MIER C [:! o 
A loo INr (0) 
de loo ti 
int in h 
A loo Ilri (C) -A loo INr (0) 
There appears to be no expression corresponding to 'enter' for the 
opposite transition from being in a place to not being in a place: 
'leave BI neutralizes the distinction between 'move away from Bt-, 
'move out of'B' and 'move off of BI-cf. the follmving: 
211 o a* Tfary left the table 
Vary left the room 
',,! ary left the stage 
In the case of border-prossinEp where both initial ard fiml 
439o, 
location are positively zpaoiried. -as in 212. -we have a transition 
between a point in B which is cont: iguous vith a point in 0 (where 
212. A croas the border (which runs) between 13 arxl C 
B and 0 are di. elJoint)o Thus 3uch bcrder-crossings are cOmplext 
213o 
loo t def 
A CRX>S TIP. 
B UZü C 
-. out of E into E 
A lon iitT (B) A ioa ile (0 1 
loo zt h 
h; lr- 
; ýi 
7 'In En 
A loo NT(B) A loo IliT(Cy 
loo t:, 
involving simultanecus], y the leaving of one place and the arriving 
at another: 214* a, implies both 214, b. and 2%. co 
214., a* Jim crossed the border between Perthshire and .. ArgyU 
at 200 
b. Jim left Perthshire at 2: 00 
c, Jim entered ArgyU at 2: 00 
A loo IrIT(B) A loo IIM(C) 
11 44Z* 
Khoo we comIder th-- construct L(A') i. e. moveme-rit by 
to%t. %-. dz CO. which we so far have treated simply and intuitively as 
the dY=,, IiO COuntrrpart of indirect location, we fird that we nam 
have the tools to make explicit what we mean by dyramic. 71or -A 
to move tavards C is for A to be at successive moments increa3irgly 
closer to G# What amounts, to a serioa of border-cro3aings between 
pa-irs of points/locations ordered in a relation or immediate 
sucoes3ion in the direction of C (i, e, pi 3; pj ;ý . 00 : 3)0 
Sohamatically, ro have the serie3 bola.? (215e) -his car, be 
P-1 50 
zý ý, -zýý, . v, Iloo ti, 100 t 
Out of re 
, 
nlnto 7 [out of into 
A loo A -loo p. iA loo P, i A loo p 
00**0 
where 
ti tj 0*000 
ý'h Pi pj 1: "- 40 
generalized to the aefinition givan in 216. which staten that 
216, 
loo t def 1ý Vp, 
L(A) --> C 
pjc loo t 
of 
A loo A loo p 
11+104 0 
3 at t i3 semacitically "there is a pair c)f tA mave toward 'ý
locationa Pj,,, Ppsuch that Pi is 1-mediately before Pi aDI 
both arc before Cisuch that at t it both ceases to be the case 
that A is at p, aul corves to be the case that A is at prj 
Because of the superordinate irylefinite existential locati'Ve in 
216., the structure, pan be teVorally iterated without resulting 
in a, '6oi:: fradict ion, - ýmo qýee that just aomsiaer what Mad hap-Pen 
if the temporal locative in 209. was in the domain of a universal 
quantifier. For simpliCity, let us supQO: je that such a domain. ' 
acmprises a set of two contiguous time points tit t X, 
217, 
in loo t, 
x 
loc IlIr 




A loo B 
loc t 
nto 
A loo B 
nt o 




A loo B A loo B 
z 
n 
A loo B A loo B 
The middle two cpnjuncts in the fitni structure ircorporate a 
contradiction since ( tt Z) 
(tz Ttti and hence at one ana 
the same time co 
27 
lementary existential locations, a re as cribed to 
the same locatiolrelation. This contradiction underlies the 
unacceptability of such sentences as 218. and 219. In contrast, 
no anomaly is inherent in-the structure in 220. -(which, we 
have only 
1 218. 'wFlora left the house from 1 : 00 to 2: 00 
219. YIJax reached 'the bus-stop for ten minutes 
442. a. 
220. 
grt, in F, 
spi in 
6phl pi in E 
Ph Pi 
out Of E nto H 
loo Ph A loc pi 
dph,, p. in E 
. 00 ti pApi 4 OA loo ti 
dut of E into E 
A loo ph 'A loo pi 
t of ý', nt o P, 0
A loo Pi A loc Ph 
zx In 1-tistjy\in E %. 1: Pjt4 
443 o 
partly decomposed) since the pair of points pý# pi will remain 
within the scope of existential quantifiers and therefore need not 
be identical in both conjuncts, Thus,, such sentences as 221. are 
perfectly acceptable. 
221. We drove towards the mountains for several hours 
7.5.2 '-'. xterilecl Journeys ard 'finish' 
We must now turn to our main task cf characterizing an 
extenled journey of the kind 'A move from B to 0' where all of As 
B ard 0 are conceptually or perceptually points ard to show how 
the structures we have postulated above for 'leave'# 'arrive at'l 
'cross the border' arA 'move towards' are related to it* First 
of all let us reconsider the semantic structure of noun phrases 
describing a linear, spatial entity of bounded extendq as in 222. 
222. The highway (vhich extends) from B to C 
Granting the idealization involved in treating a highwAy as a one- 
dimensional entity and granting the linguistic validity of and 
necessity for a three-fold distinction between one-dimensional 
p 4-44- 
space'. two-dimensional space %nd throe dimensional space (cf , 
Bierwisch, iqGB) -Telleri 1969; Klooster, 1972; lie olarks 1973) 
we can propose the following, pomewhat amplifiedp underlying 
representation for 222. "'he element I-49PAM qtands for the class 
2U, 
2. x 
x loc II., T(I-31 ý4=0 
Pj, iE loc c 
z 
x into xi out of E 
BP< in E. 
loc P4 
xi in 
of linear entities. The structure in 223. can be read as *the 
xi* such that Xi is a one-dirien3ional entity beginning at 5-., 
ending at ICý anl existing at aU points between 
, 044- 
C. --. Other elemonts of meaning which are not relcyant- to - 
the task at harA (sucil a2l tbo3e which di5tirVi3h, a higlxwV, frlý13, 
a path or from a. aimple line) haver been ignored. ,-ý 
.t 
L450 
Now, we would lika,, to suggest that there is a strong parallel 
between 223. and the semaxtio structure underlying 224. The -main 
224.1 A's Jour'-ney-from " B" to C 
difference is that the bounded linear entity involved is a tempcral 
one whose beginning ard end points are the times at which A. leaves 
B and A reaches 0, respectiýrely. Thus, the structure we postulate 
as underlying 224. is that in 225. 
225o 
-2 Xi 
This can be glossed as "the X 
xi 100 
joc -6 t in 
z 
xi-Into E floct 




x out t, k 
i Int co E 
A loo C 
A 100 B loc t loo t 
xi in F. 
such that Xi is in T ard such that Xi begins with A ceasing to be 
at Bj X. ends with A arriving at 09 and Xi is in existence only at 
those times at whichA, moves towards C* This last clause (a the 
central conjuebt on the right of 225. ) assures that when Xi begimp 
i. e. vhen A ceaSes to be at B--A does so in the direction of C. 
Howevers it is Probably'the case that this central conSunat is 
too strong a requirement on X sirne one night wish to allow both 
for non-direct journeys from One'POint to another (i, e, where'the 
path of A'is not a straight line from B to 0) and for interrupted 
or-susperded Journeys (i. e. where A is on its way from B to 0 but 
-is not --actually moving, along the path at all times* if we let 
(BpC)'represent the path of A. relaxing the requirement that it be 
a straight line (i. e. it may be an arc# or'a conJunction of sub- 
intervals in varying'directions--cf. 226), then we can replace this 
226* A zig-zaýgged its way from B to 0 
conjunct by that in 227. which states that for all times in 




Howevers time and space has not allowed us to explore the 
I 
227& 
tr, t in 
Z 
ti-<, t< tkZ 
z 
loo t loc t 
Xi in F. A loo INT(B,, 0) 
447o 
ramifications of this alternative and so we win continue with the 
characterization of a Journey given in 225. 
Thus, assuming the correctness of some such structure as 225. 
1 
underlying 224., we can, novr proceed to account for some of the 
special properties of sentences describing a Journey, Pirst . we- 
have noted that the verý, Ifinishl is appropriately used only with 
sentences which implicitly or explicitly describe 4 Journey (recall 
Taylor's remarks on 'finish' and 'perfcrmance verbs' in 
§6.2.2). 
IrltuitivelYt to finish doing something (or for something to finish) 
is to bring something to its end (or fcr something to come to its 
end). If a jour 
IneY 
is (partU21y) defined as ending when a 
certain locational relation '(eeg, A loo 0 in 225 1 JCOMe3'into 
existence* then for sucltr a joiwney to tinish. is for that 
10cational relation to come into existence (e. g', for 0 to be reached). 
Thus, we can give the following ýeneral definition for IfiniAl 
Vhen applied to a propositional structure'. 7 describing a journey:, 
228. 
def 
loc t loc t 
z 
J FINTSll 2X into N z 
loo It 
out of E loo t 
X into E 
448o 
This structure (which may be surmounted by a causative structure) 
can be glossed as "at ti the situation X. which is such that J 
goes out of existence with X's coming into existerceg comes into 
existerce"s This semantic representation for *finish' will' 
account for both the implicational relationships belowq the Iýtter 
229. A finished moving from B to 0 
A reached C 
230. k finished moving from B to 0 _: D 
A stopped moving from B to C 
of which exemplifies, the distinction between 'stop' ard 'finish' 
discussed by Taylor and which Bull described as the element Of 
'automatic termination' inherent to cyclic events. 
We may'n(Av offer an account for the observatiora made# fcr 
example, by Jespersen, Garey,, anaLeech (cf. ý 6.3.4.1 ) to the 
effect that one Omani' I of 'the. ' irressive form is "unfinished" ng pro ,I 
"incomplete". , lo pointC'd out at the time that tjisý -interpretation 
depends upon the situation described in progr, ýssive aspect being 
an accomplishment, i. e. 'a journey. This clement of furXinishod" 
is made explicit in the following implication: 
231 *A is moving from, B, to a 
A has not finishea moving from B to 0 
Although a full explanation for 231. wil. 1 depend upon an anilysis 
of inclusive tense, we may make a substantial'step in accounting 
for it by considering the structure underlying the antecedent in 
231. and our account of *stop' and 'finish' above*- We have adopted 
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an. existential analysis of progressive aspect whereby-in H is 
predicated of the propositional structure starding for, a situation. 
As this propositional structure is functioning as an argument in 
a relational predicate, it, will be dominxted by, a nounlor name 
variables ioes in the case of a, journey it will be of the form 
225. Hence, underlying, tbe antecedent of 231- is# we suggests 
the structure belcw-. 
232o 
xi loo I14T 
x into E loo tx out ce E oc tk 
out of E tio <tkn3 into E 
A loo BA loo 0- 
loc t 
Xi in 9L (A) -* 0 
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TheýClement 7. Xi may be optionally spelled out as 'the process of' 
whichp-we suggest, is an appropriate label fcr a temporally- 
structured proposition, 'A state of', on the other hand, is 
realized when t X. (org rather,, dX:, ) is defined by a temporally 
non-structured proposition, i. e. a locational relation, Further- 
moreg whether in rl, is, realized as the progressive form or not will 
similarly depend on whether X is a process, i. e. temporally 
structuredg or a state, i, e* a locational relation# reppectively* 
The structure underlying 233. below will be identical to 232. 
: ý, -. 
233,, A stopped moving from B to 0 at ta 
except ftr the exLstentiml predicate being out of 'R rather than in 
arld -the, superordimte temporal- locative containing as its, location 
obJect a time ta which is marked, for anterioritY. with respect to too 
Acccrding to our analysis of out of R, this structure is equivalent 
to a COnJOirjbcl structure the second conjunct of which is 232, with 
t 
. replaced 
by ta and in E by in E, ie. that underlying 234. Now 
sentenco 235, differs from 233,, only in two respects: (I ) the time 
234. A vraz not moving from B to a at t 
235. A has stopped movir; g from B to 0 
Of stoppirg is an unspecified time either before or simultaneous 
with to, j and (2) there is the additional implication (which we 
suggest can be uniformly associated with inalusive-tense sertences 
describing jcurney3, including border-crossings) that the resulting 
non-existence of A*s movirg from B to 0 lasts from that time up to 
and including tog ioe. 2359 implies 236o We are nay in a position 
236* A is not moving from B to a 
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to account for 231# Starting with the antecedent, it is obvious 
that the negation of 236, is implied* From the loaical equival- 
ence P= QEIOQ'D IIIP and the fact that 235. implies 236., we can 
then derive 237. (ie. letting P= 235. and Q= 236. )* Again, 
using the same equivalence and the implicational relation in 230. 
SýWaL 
237. A has nA I movirg from B to CC 
which we have accounted far., we can deduce the comeque nt of 231 
Finally, we can use our characterization Of a journey ancl 
that of 'finish$ to explicate the semantic function of expenling, 
aaverbials of the type *in 3o much time'. which, in generalp 
co-occur only with sentences describing Journeys. For now we 
will confine our attention to sentences describing extended Journeys 
rather than border-crossings. Irformally, the temporal adverbial 
in 238* gives the measure of the temporal interval which extends from 
238. A moved from B to 0 in five secoals 
the timo at which A began to move from B to 0 to the time at which 
A finished moving from B to C,, i. e. the time at which A reached 0. 
The actuil existerce of such an interval is indicated by the past$ 
noný-progtessive form of the verb. Such an interval could equally 
well be rzediated to exist in the future, as in 239-,, or have the 
239,. A will move from B to C in five secondS 
240. It 1'0 not possible for A to move from B to 0 in five 
seconds 
possibility cf its existence denied altogether, as in 240* We 
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abbreviated the structure underlying 'A's ourney from B to Cl- 
of. 225., --by a single txlaýle). 
This adverbial, havrever, is also used in a slightlY different 
context but one that we would suggest, overlaps with that of 
sentences describirc extended dourneYsa In the following sentemes 
'in-three minutes' can be translated as 'three minutes from nowt 
24-2. John will arrive in three minutes 
243, John will be here in three minutes 
244. John will climb up the ladder in three minutes 
(=*at the eryl of three minutes,, starting from now') antl although 
only 242, has an explicitly inceptive meaningo 243,, is also inter- 
preted inceptively and as equivalent to 243, Sentence 244. is 
x&fs igurney 
from "D to 0 
X&ls Journey 
from B to 0 
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ambiguous between an inceptive interpretation--cf. 245. -and an 
experiling interpretation-of. 246--and these two interpretations are 
245. John will begin to climb up the ladder in three 
mimtes/three mi=tes from now 
246. John will neid three mimtes to climb up the ladder 
[talm I 
not incompatible--cf, 2)+76 If a secondary temporal reference point 
247. John will'alimb up the laader in three minutes (=three 
minutes from now) and he will do it in as short a time 
as possible (m he will take as little time as possible 
to climb it') 
in the past Or in the future) is 
I 
well enough established by the 
context, this same interpretation (a "three minutes from then") 
is possible ard the same ambigaity can resulti 
248. John arrived in three minutes 
249o John was here in three minutes 
250. John climbed up the lrAder in three minutes 
The two interpretatiow are given distinct realizations in the case 
where "in a short time" is lexicalizedl* the expenling sense is 
lexicalized as lquicklyýg the locative sense as *shortly'/1,30on'. 
251. John Carrived -&a oon týill arrive iZshcrtly3 
252. John was home 7 soon I 1will be home 5ý shortly 





be Lwill do] 
it quickly 
1+54* 
The pair I eve rituallY'/' 31OW17' (= #in a long time') is not 
strictly -comparables but the distinction between a locational and 
an expending, function J. % still valid, 
' 
However, what is common to both interpretations is that an 
interval is imolved výhose erxl point is the temporal, location of 
an Inceptive event (for Ifinisht is basically inceptives and Only 
by implication cessative-,! -recall 228. )* The beginning point is 
either the temporal location of the inception of a journey or Is 
the primary or a seconlaý temporal referetre point, Hencep the 
two interTretations can be expected to coalesce in those contexts 
in Vhich the ipaeptfýve event is that which finishes some Journey 
and the temporal--reference po - int Is-im ýlicitly the beginning point 
of the same journey. Th! is, for examplev there is little differ- 
ence between the sentaýoes below 
254. The plane left Frankfurt . 'and reached LondOn in thirty 
minutes 
255, The plane flew from Frankfurt to London in thirty 
mirsites 
Let us rm look briefly at the relationship between an extended 
journeyp as characterized in 225* , ard a minima3. journey, Lee 
border-crossing, az for example in 213e If 225. is supplemented 
In Prench the two adverbial functions are given distinct 'realiz- 
ations,, lenO for the expending function as examplified in 1, and 
1. On peut aller la Londres en cinq heures 
Idans' fcr the locational function as exemplifiea in 2# (of* 
Pottier, 1962). There are, of course, other complicating factors 
2. ', lle sera peete darn cinq minutes 
involved in the semantic analysis of these two prepositi. 0135 and their domains of application overlap to a large extente 
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with : the information that B is contiguous -with C, then 
the going 
out of existence of A loo 13 wil. 1 be the coming into existence of 
A loc 0 since the middle conjunot on-the right stipulates that A's 
leaving of B, is in the direction of Ce If these two events are 
one and the same, then so are their tempcral 1003, tiOm arld her'015 
225, reduces to 256. below. This# of course# is a contradictorY 
256a 
z xi loo XIT (T loc Lt 
xi into EXi out 
structure since it states that X. both comes into existence aný goes 
out of existence at the same moment ti# Howevers this is Just 
what we mean when we talk of instantamous'evdnts as having only 
one phases as beginning and ending at the same moment, Thus$ the 
contradictory nature of 256. can simply be regarded as stating 
that ideal border-crossings have no inceptive and cessative phases 
and that to predicate such of them leadm to an anomaly. However, 
456o 
although 256o as a whole is anoma, 10ust the embedded structure 
urder Zt i is not and# in fact, is the representation we have given 
for a border-cr03sing in 213- 
It is quite likely, hoffevers that in ordinary usage# such a 
degme of mathematical precision or idealization is not observed 
and-borderso lines,. thresholds of rooms, etc. are perceived amVor 
conceptualized as having some extenti hoffever minute. This is 
particularly true in static aituations or *slow-motion' dynamic 
ores, as in 257. and 258. In such imtances we are departing from 
257* Fred is starAing on the border between Perthshire anLI 
Argy3-l 
258. Jim had his foot on the finish' lira first 
our wcrking assumption that A as well'4s B ancl, o be conceptual or 
perceptual points. In the next -section we will briefly discuss 
how our characterization of a journey can be generalized so as to 
aocom, nodate other than the idealized situations we have been 
concerned with so far, 
Before concluding this section, harever, we may point out hair 
4 
the notions I source I/tablativel 9 'goal#/tallative' and *Path's 
postulated as 'deep cases' by the case grammariam (cf. Fillmorev 
1968; Bennett, 1972; Anderson, 1971b), - can reoeive an explicit 
definition within the pre-sent framework. ' Informallyq an entity 
X is the source of a JourneyJ involving A as the moving object if 
J begins with A loo X going out of existence, The goal, of the 
Journey J' is the entity Y such that J ends with, A loc Y coming into 
existence. Seen in this light; the notions sovroe and goal depend 
457- 
on the notion of a Journey for their definition ando convc! rsely 
the characterization of a Journey incorporates that at taource and, 
goal. This istnually the case with relational elements: compare, 
for example, the interdef inability of 'husband'/'wife' anI *be 
marriedt, 
an "'a can therefore auggest the followirgdefinitiom in 259* d 
? 60# where S( ) ani G( ) are fur4tion3 specifying the 3ourde and 
goal of their argumento-, namelya Journey. we will symboUze a 
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Turning no-. 7, -tp the =tion 1path' with respect to A's journey 
from B to I., wo can defim this irformally as-the ect of placcs or 
points with which A enters into a locational relation during its 
journey. In more precise terms, it is the set of all points Pi 
such that for some tim, -. ti at which the Journey JA is in existeme# 
&44 A is located at P. i* In the more familiar set-notationg this 
is represented as 261. and# within our, own, fr=ewcrks as 262. 
- 261 . V(JA) a de: r
ýPi I (3ti), (100- ti (in r, (j., )) vr 
100 t (in n-, (A l6a-Pi)))j 
262# 
def 
x P, ('TA) 
loo Il, 4T( 
6p. ii 
in 




A 100 ly, 
iA loo 
x1 100 INT p- in B. 
(I-S. PAC-F, ) 
x 
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-in areAhe '&I ani 'only, (conjunct' 
262'' 
dlauses,, respectively, implicit in the set notation in 251. ) 
7.6 A more peneral conception of 'Journsyl 
7.6.1 General reniarks 
In the preceding discussion we have restricted our attention 
to sentences describing journeys which J=Ive the movement of an 
object A# treatec! by the speakerý'as More or less a'point, from'One 
point B to another point 0 -or# equivalently, across a stretch 
beginn. ing at B ancl endirg at C., we also, comidered the limiting 
case whore B and 0 are contiguous points, J, ev 
'whare 
there -is no - 
space between them. Howeverp there,, are many -situation3, 
ju which 
the moving less likely tobe treatea. as a ppint-for 
example, vhen it is a linear object with a considerable extent# - 
as in 263t, when.. it, is, an aggregate-of objects, as in 264*p or when 
'2636" ýThe freight' 'train'crossed -the border in a couple of - 
minutesý ' 
(cf, The train took a couple of minutes to cross the 
ýwas 
a couple of minutes in crossing 
rI 
border 
- the borderl) 
264. The battalion crossed the border in five minutes . 11 
the object is moving slowly,, such that its physical extent cannot 
" 
be idealized to a point, as in 265. It is to the urAerlying 
structure of such sentences as thesep and their more abstract and 
existential counterpartag that we win be directing our attertion 
in this section. 
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7.6,2 " Borcler-crossin; ri'where"A"is 'an'object with an- extension 
7.6.2.1 Statement of th6 problem 
If we comider the following four sentenoesq we find that 
ý66, The mile-long train crcssed the Porth Bridge in five 
minutes 
267- Jim ran across the Forth Bridge in f cur minutes 
268. The mile-long train crossed the border in four minutes 
269, Jim drove across the border at 5: 00 
between the two extremes of the most general case of Ian 
object 
with extent traversing a stretch of space (266. ) and the limiti rig 
case of a point -apprehended object moving across a dimensionless 
border (261. ), there are two intermediate cases,, one which involves 
a point traversing an expanse and one which involves an object with 
extent crossing a border. Novv, the interesting fact is that the 
logical structure of these two situations must be such that the 
adverbial 'in so much time' is applicable to both* So far we have 
discussed only how it applies to the structure underlying 267- 
It turns out that there are phenomena in everyday-life in 
which these two sub-classes of a journey are instantiated_ in a 
logically equivalent manner. Consider, for example, the kinds of 
devices we use for measuring the weight of an object, Besides the 
balancing scales, there are weighing machines such that the weight 
of the object causes an indicator to move across a fixed scale and 
others which cause a scale to move across -, ý 
fixed indicator., 
The former device involves a Journey of a point across an expanseq 
the latter a Journey of an object with extent across a border. 
4619, 
Bothp, however, achieve the same results the ý iýdicatcr and A Point 
on the scale come to be superimposed such that, the -weight Of 
the 
object can be read ofTo 





The relevance of this simple example to the problem3 conwcted 
with discussions of the 'spatial metaphors' unaerlyirE the 
directionality or movement W time makes it wwthwhile to digress' 
somewhat at this point to take up (mr earlier remarks regarding 
the totion of $temporal journey' or that of edynamict as applied 
to the temporal axis. 
11- Clark 0 973: 50) #f or, exaVle,, nuggests thaV "time can 
be 
viewed as a highway comisting of a succession of discrete events* 
We humans are seen in ow af, two ways with respect to thi's hi&waYl 
either (1) vie are movirg alonjý itj, with future time ahead of us anLI 
the past behind us; 'Or (2) the, highmy is moving past us from 
front to back. - These two metaphors migbt be called the roving-ego 
and moviM time tataphoras respectively" (cf, also Fillmoreg 
197ib; Traugott, 1974). Philosophers, who have been at wcrk on 
the problem of 'time travelt for a much longer time than the 
linguists,, hive fourd many other analogies from the spatial sphere, 
William (1951t 104), p in his critique of the 'myth of pazsagel, 
gives the following resume: 
So far as Ono can interpret these expres I sions iI nto 1. a' 
theory,, they have the same purport as all the itmemorial 
turns at speech by which we describe time as movim, with 
respect to the present or with respect to our mindst Time 
flows Cr flies or marches, years roll, hours passo More 
explicitly we ray speak as if the perceiving mincl were 
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-stationary while time f lows by like a river, with the flotsam 
of events upon it; or as if presentness were a fixed pointer 
under which the tape of happenings slides; or as if the time 
sequence were a moving-picture film# unwinding from the dark 
reel of the futuret projected briefly on the screen of the 
presentp and rewound into the dark can of the past* Some- 
times# again, we speak as if the time sequence were a 
stationary plain or ocean on which we voyage, or a variegated 
river gorge down which we drift; or,, in Broad's analogyp as 
if it were a row of house fronts along which the spotlight of 
the present plays, "The essence of nowness, * Santayana 
Says, "runs like fire along the fuse of time. " 
What the philosophers soon became' aware of, is that if one attempts 
to apply the logic of movernent to the analysis of time, one 
commits oneself to postulating a meta-time cr hyper-time in which 
the movement of time takes place since motion involves a temporal 
dimension, and then to a meta-meta-time for the meta-time to move 
in, and so forth into an infinite regress, As'williams puts it 
(1951: 104), "the most remarkable feature of all this is that *ile 
the modes of speech and thought which enshrine the idea of Passage 
are universal and perhaps ineradicable, the instant one thinks about 
them one feels uneasy# and the moat laborious effort cannot oon- 
struct an intelligible theory which admits the literal truth of 
them, " 
This findirr, of the philosopher's, and in particular this 
statement of Williams' regarding the literal meaning of such 
metaphors, cannot be ignored by the linguist. H. Clarkq fcr 
example, gives no justification for his claim (19730.5a) that 
"because time is required only for events with dynamic propertiess 
time ought also to be described by expressions that involve motion 
through space". He then goes on to given examples of 1,: tiglish 
expressions, which rePlect either the 'moving ego' metaphor or the 
463, 
$moving time I metaphor without stopping to consider what any of 
these actually mean, either literally or metaphorically, 
Coraider,, for examples such sentences a3 those below with which 
270, Noon crept upon us 
271. Friday arrived befcre we knew it 
272. Thursday rushed by 
Clark illustrates the moving time metaphor, The key to under- 
standing the semantic content of such sentences as thesev which if 
interpreted literally are tautologous or involve us in the infinite 
regress mentioned above, is very likely the existence of the two 
temporal axes--the absolute and the relative--which we operate with 
ard which we from time to time put into correspondence with each 
other by equational sentences such as those in 169., 17O-j, 173. 
Thus 271-, for example, could be interpreted as "the measure of 
the time between the last time we looked at the calendar (Le. 
making an equational statement) before our making the statement 
" 4ý1 twIle af-tLis 4CRey. SUtOW44 
'Today is Fridayltwas short according to our subýective (private) 
time. ruler"--i. e. we were very busy, ise. too busy to notice the 
time (ise, to make equational statements between "now" and the 
calendar)o The opposite situation pertains when someone utters 
such sentences as 273* ard 274,, Thus,, what is peculiar about these 
273 - The days dragged by 
274.1 thought Priday would, never coma 
'moving timeietaphors is that ýhey are used not to say atvthing 
irformative about the temporal specification of observable situations 
but rather to express mental oremotional conditions, such as 
464. * 
preoccupatiobt having'lots to think about or do, forebodings# 
boredom (eogo 273*), arA anticipation (eg. 274. ), Thuss vbat 
we are in fact doing when we talk of time dragging or flying by, 
as if it were going past us with a low or high velocityp i. e. as 
covering a temporal extent in a longer or shorter length of 'some 
meta-times is expressing the relation between the length or time 
between two events (of calendar or clock checking) as measured 
on the absolute scale and as measurea-subýectively. If time 
flies, then the length of time seems sborter than it really is; 
if time draga on, then it seems longer than it really is. - 
If we =v look at, the so-called 'moving-ego' metaphors 
exemplified by sentences 2754, to 278o (from II. -Clarks 1973)t we 
fird 
275. Trouble Lies 6ead 
276. 'We are just comirg into troubled times 
277- 1 look fonvard to Mondýy 
278- John will be here from' MondV on(ward) 
a somewhat different situation. Either everts or states of 
affairs are being located (here, in the future) or being measured 
and, as we have suggested earlier, neither of these requires a 
dynamic spatial model for their explication (cf. t 7-4.2), This 
view is also held by Williams, vjho formulates it in a rather clear 
fanhion (1951: 1059 107): 
True motion then is motion at orne in time ard space* 
Nothing can "move" in time alone any more than in space alOnes 
ard time itself cannot "move* any more than space itself, 
"Does this road go anywhere? " asks the city tourist* "No, 
it stays right along here, " replies the countr7nan. Time 
"flows" only in the serse in 'which a line flows or a landscape 
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"recedes into the west", That is, it is an ordered 
extension. And each cf us proceeds throuEýi time only 
as a fence proceeds across a farm: that is# 
' 
parts of 
our being, and the fence's,, occupy successive instarts and 
points, respectively. There is passage# but it is nothirg 
extra, It is the mere happening of things, their exist- 
ence strung along in the manifold. 
the mere further-along-ness of successive segments# 
either of a spatial or of a tempcral stretch,, can quite 
logically be conceived as a degenerate sort of changep as 
when we speak of the f low of a line or say that the scenery 
changes along the Union Pacific. 
Howeverg although the notion of moving time need not , or 
even cannot, be invoked to explain the meaning of these expressions# 
this is not to deny that the linguistic validity of such metaphors 
must be entertained if ow wishes to account not only f or the 
actual dynamic expressions which appear in such-locutions! (e*"g, 
'come/go', 'fly by', 'creep up') but also perhaps for the opposing 
ways in which directionality or polarity is assigned to the 
temporal axis. Thus our use of 'before' and 'after, which one 
would expect to correlate in i6ir polarity with 'in front of I ard 
'behind', do so if the 'highway of events' is conceived as moving 
through the ego's 'now' into his 'past' such that the end of each 
event which 'leads the way%ise. reaches the ego first (cf. J3.3.0p 
is the 'front' and thus events in front of it are before it aril 
events behind are after. The expression lahead'q as Ho Clark has 
astutely observed,, can be used with both polarizations-in 279., 
279- We'll be in Paris in the days ahead cyf Chris I tms 
the 'moving time I metaphor is relevant) in 280, j the 'moving ego' 
metaphor. 
280. Vle Ill be in Paris in the days ahead (of now) 
11 
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7-6.2.3 A partitive analysis of border-crossings 
Let us return now to our investigation of the *concrete' 
ourney described in sentence 268., which is like that of a moving 
scale past a stationary indicator, We notice, first of alls that 
there are alternative ways of expressing different stages in the 
progression of the train across the border: 
281, a, The train is part-way across the border_,, 
be Part of the train is across the border 
,- . 
282* a* The train is half-7ay acrosp the border, 
ýb. lialf of the train is across, the border.., 
283. a. The train is mo3t of the way ý-Jacross, the 
J'almost 
all of the way 
border 
b, Post of 'cfýýthe train is across the border Almost all 
284, ' a. The tr . ain is'(all'the way) across the border 
b. (All of) the train is across the border 
only the a. type of sentence is possible with su6h a journey as 
described by 267---cf. 285. 
285. a. John is half-way across the Forth Bridge 
b. "Half of John is aerms the Porth Bridge 
This suggests that we mist introduce a partitive. structure -- 
into, our oharaoterizaýtioa of a border-crossing such-that the 
minimal, case of a point passing between co nt iguous -,, 
locat ions results 
only when A,, the. movingýdbjeot, is conceived of as a pointl. e, 
with, m partas ard this will. dependt. at least partiallyt,, upon an 
interaction of the actual extent of A and its velocity# i. e. 
ýf-- 
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esse at Wly -pragmatio -fact orl, Thus,, forA to cross a border iss 
most gonerally, for all of A to cease being on one side of the 
border and for all of A to co-m to be on the other side of the 
border* In between these initial and final looational relatiom 
will be thaV of part of A being on one side of the border and part 
of A being on the other side of the border, This corresponds to 
A being located between B arxl 0 in the case of the kind of exteriled 
Journey discussdd in the previous sections. That there in# in 
this type of borler-crossing as won, an ittermediate locational 
relation betwq6n, the initial qfid fiml, ones is also'-reflected. by 
the fact that tho verb's Of aktio, marten can be inserted in such 
sentences as 268. --ie* such bwder-crossings have, tihases: 
286* The train bagan crossing the border 
287* The train contirued e'rossirg - Ahe border 
288., The 'train stopped croading the border 
289*_ The train finiahed crossing the border 
Althouk, 11_ there are other vacre mathematically precise or 
satisfabtor. y ways of treating the, compositional mture of objects 
let Us, Work on +he simPlifYina assumption that a bounded objqct 
such -as, -a- traýin can be conceptualized as, consi3 ting'-cf .af inite-, 
rumber of parts vhichs for the purpose of crossing a border, are 
minilaally thin cross-sections such that we can say that the, train' a 
cro5sing of the border involve3 tha sucoessive crossings cC its 
cross-sectiorzt which can then be treated as minimal border- 
crossings were treated in I 7*50o Letting the symbol e, < represent 
*is a part cfwq we can now propose (CI03t tentatiVelY) 291. as an 
468* 
underlying structure for 290.9 where At for examples is a train. 
290. A's crossing (of) the border between B and C 
291* 
%X 
'T T) Xi loc IE 
loc t at in loo Ztk 
zn 
c
of x into E loc txi out of tk 
in F out of Et tI 4tk into E 
in 




xi iný, & 
Yj4* A in yi 4ýA 100 tyi ejrA in 
yi loo-B & Yi 100 a 
out of E nto, E 
yi loo B Yi 100 a 
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In 291. we have let B standfor "on BOs side of the border between 
B and C" and C for *on C's side of the border between B and C"* 
This structure can be glossed as "the X such that it is in time and 
such that it begins with it ceasing to be the case that all of A is 
at Do it ends with it coming, to be the case that all of A is at 09 
and at all times at which it is in existence,, it is also the case 
that there is a part of A which crosses from B to C"9 
In the case of sentences such as 264. (repeated below), in 
which a collective noun phrase identifies the moving objecto it 
264* The battalion crossea the border in five mirutes 
is not a part-whole relation which is involveabut rather one cf 
class inclusion or class membership. That is, the journey begins 
with all members of the battalion on one side of the border, ard 
ends with all of them on the other side and while the journey is 
in progresss members of the battalion are crossing the bordere 
Hasever, given the similar ities which a part-whole logic aril a 
logic of classes display at a. higher level (: f abstraction (cf. 
Feys&'T, itch, 1969; Goodman, 1966),, that these'two, types of 
construction should behave analogously in such structures as 291 
is not surprising (cf* also Dik, 1972)o 
7-6.2.4 A Partitive-analysis of exterded journen 
Having generalized our characterization of a border-crossing 
to accommodate a moving object with extension, it remains for us 
to generalize in a similar manner the structure we have -proposed 
for an extended Journey between two non-contiguous pointsq Leo 
470* 
across an expanses Consider in this respect, sentence 266., 
repeated belcm for conveniencee The jourmy, which,, iz described 
266. The mile-long train crossed the Poýth Bridge in five 
mi riat es 
here is that which begins with all of the train on one side Of 
the bridge and ends with all of it on the other. Thus there is a 
potential ambiguity in a sentence such as 292. which turns on the 
292. The train. is half-way across the Forth BrIdSO 
-pragmatic facts concerning the relative -lengths. of the train: arAý -- 
bridge, 292. could be equivalent either. with 293* or with 2%, 
293. The train is mid-way between the start anithe end of 
t he br id ge 




Rather than going into details of the elaborated structure required 
for this most general conception of a Journeyj which will simP17 
involve the irnertion of partitive (or clazs-membership) configura- 
tions into 225. in a manner analogous to the way in which they 
were added to the characterization of a border crossing, we should 
like now to take up again, in slightly more informal ani program- 
matic terms, the application of the framework we have developed for 
concrete Journeys to the analysis of sentences whichs we would like 
to claim,, describe Journeys of a more'abstraot kindo 
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7.6-3- Sentence types-_describinR Journeys of a less concrete nature* 
7.6-3-1. Consuming, expellingi I fillinR upand emptying out. 
The sentences to be discussed in thiis seciJou'are niot"'really 
any less concrete than thone we have investigated above (although they 
do have abstract counterparts) since they all involve the movement of 
a physical object'eiiherAnto/onto'o'r out of/off of'somi location 
object* Howeveil their superficiil"etructure' Jýs`such"that the parallel- 
ism in obscured* This is partly due to the fact that the verbs in 
such sentences, as with Icross#9 lexic. 1lize elements of the directional 
structure (cf* Gruber', 1965)- Also, since 6aniy'of, th'e`se'are causative 
sentences which describe situition's i'n- which the"igent" and' the' moving 
object are distinct from eachA nt &r', `th'e noun, phrase ide- ifying the 
moving object tends, in-such instances, to be' displaced from subject 
to direct-object I position I or$ in the case of verbs offilling/covering 
and emptyin&/uncovering'p to'a yet mo re paripheral'position. ' At the 
same timep the nou Ia phrase-Identifying, the gýil 'or iourta'of the move- 
ment may be subjeotivized'or objectivizeddepezidiiii upon theverb*-- 
Finally# as in the case' of sentendie'de I scribiýg simple journeys, ' to/ 
into or out of/away from some place (cf. 'arrive'/lenterit Ileavel)q 
the goal or source. respectively, is usually left implicit or unspeci- 
fied* These various possibilities are illustrated in the following 




295-a-, The sponge 
ýoakeaup 
bsorb dS 
the spilled ink in a few 
mop seconds, 
b, -Tom mopped up the spilled ink. (with a sponge), in 




Ievoured the cheesecake in half an hOur 
consumed 
472s, 
297* Fred ed 's, pint of lager in'týirty seconds 0 
-do: n V 
298, The attendant filled (up) thetank (ifith patrol)., 
in a c6uple of minutes 
299. JamGa blow up the balloon (with hydrogen) in a few 
seconds 
300. Harz7 loaded-(up) the van (with eggs) in half an hour 
301. Mary stuffed the turkey (with breadcrumbs) in five 
Minutes 
302. Fred covered the board (with deep structures) in 
a matter of minutes 
303. B, ill aprayed-the wall, (with paint. ) in half an hour 
304, ýMy ýeye expelled,, the particle of-, cand in a few minutes 
-305* The dentist-extracted the tooth-in a second- 
306. John exhaled the toxic, fumes quickly- 
307- The gland secreted an overdose ofAhe hormone 
308. Peter emptied the box (of'its. contents) in a flash 
309* - The children deflated, the tyres in a fewýminute$' 
310- The men unloaded the, Vaa, ý. (of-its goods) in half an hour 
3119 Uary unstuffed the pillow (of its feathers) in, half 
an hour 
3129 Fred cleared the table (of the dishes) in a few seconds 
313- Bill stripped the wall (of its paint) in a couple of 
days 
-I The-adjective-o'lempty"and'Ofull*t anaýtherelated, verbsj cani- 
be given partitive interPretationsAnvolving netative ('none') incl 
universal (_$alV) e*istential structuress if something is (completely) 
emptyt then there is no part of it (or of its interior) which contains 
somethingg if it is (completely) full# then there is no part of it (or 
of its interior) which doesnOt contain-something#- Similarlye if 
something is (completely) coveredq there'is no part of it (or of its 
473* 
surface) which doesafthave something on n6wiverp the an re doe It 
appear to be any single or neutral negative existential Oxprescion" 
correspondirte to OcovOred' but rather a-eat of contextualvarianta: 
fbareOp Onaked', 'uncovered', 'clearit $clean'. 
Now, the relationship between such--ssntenýei ai-36! *#'363'*g' 
310*p and'313- and'thcme' below' (iihi6--are'duiative'conitiuciions) has 
314. Marv-otuffed bresAcrýmbs into, the turkey'(f6r five*mtnuteg) 
315- Bill spraved paint onto the wall 
316. The man unloaded goods out ofthe"4in" 
317- Bill stripped paint off-ot thi"wall 
given consternation to come linguists, especially thosi (cf. Halle 19651 
Fillmore# 1968) who would like to see-ihe'tiwo sits''is iransformationallY 
related. (: For non-transformational treatments and discuesion cf* 
Andercont 1971b; S. Andersong 1971i'piaverg'19711ý- Veatersaard, 1973; 
Mellema, 1974) AlthouZh both variants appear to involve the same 
case relations and major lexicil itetspý iheiir iiterpietations diff6i 
in a clear-cut fashion, one reflection thereof being the different 
ranee of temporal adverbials which can occai'iwith"each"cet. (Howeverl 
'this is connected with the unbounded nature of the object identified 
bX the direct object (#breadci=bs#/'goodbVire indefinite plural noun 
phrases# 'paint* a c=s noun): if we replace theae with boundect 
nominale-au below-they can then be interpreted in an accomplishment# 
318. kary stuffed the breadcrumbs into. the turkey (in five 
minutes) 
319. Bill sprayed the paint onto the wall (in five minutes) 
320* The men unloaded the goods out of the van (in five 
minuten) 
321* Bill stripped the paint off of the wall (in two days) 
i-of a sincle joumey Gense. But they are otill not equivallsat tO 
474* 
the first set (301-t 303-9 319#1 313* respectively))e,,.,, - 
in the. 
-former 
case all of the moving object reaches-ite, goal whereas in the latter 
all of the goal becomes filled/covered or all, of the source emptied/ 
uncovered. ) 
What we should like to point out, is that each of the former 
VIDAV 04 but rmt-atl the latter set of sentences implies the correspon4ing-, 
sentence with the verb replaced by one of, ffill', 'cover$f ýemptylj 
and '(? )uncovered', reapectivelys 
322. Mary filled the turkay with breadcr=bs 
323- 
ý 
Bill-covered the wall with pain't 
The men emptied the van (of (its) goods), 
3250, Bill uncovered. the wall (of (its) paint) 
( If, I 
^' II 
pty' an -, 
#uncover z, I'I 
tend to prefer, either Ahe objective case -r 
that of the, moving object - ýo be, absent or#-at least# to involve 
a possessive construction in which the moving object "belongs" to the 
source, of the movement*),,: Iýurthermorej. we can make explicit the nature 
of the -the former set , 
h, olisticO interpretation of the senteapee of 
by means of the paraphrase relation which exists between them and the 
following elaborations of the latter set of . sentenceae 
all of the turkey 326* Mary stuffed breadcrumbs into 
ithe 
turkey 
until it was 
full ýfilled 
327,, Bill sprayed paint on all of 
the wall' Ithe 
wall until it was covered 
328. The men unloaded goods out of all of 
the van ýthe 




329, Bill stripped paint off of 
ýall of týe wall 




This suggests the possibility that the process of object- 
ivization which appears to be the tranaformational relation 
differentiating the two sets of sentences in question could be made 
to depend upon the presence of some ouch structure as that under- 
lying the universally quantified partitive I structure vrj'iquivalentlY 
the *until$ clauses in the sentences above (cf. f8-4 for'detailed 
discussion of *until*). Such an atalysis would account'both for the 
case-relation identities and the meaning differences* 
Nowp as I we have seen in our discussion of extended journeYs 
and of border-crossings involving aýn object wiih: an extens"iOno there 
is a parallelism between movement'towards come place (ioes successive 
border-cros sings resulting in the object coming closer and clo'eer to 
ijO'me place) aýd an ad&itive (or substractiv's) process (i. e. more and 
more-or less and less-of an object coming to be located somewherO. 
Stuffing and stripping org more generally$ putting (in/on) and taking 
(out/off)p are of this latter types ' But consider now the following 
centences. (Examples of modes of locomotion haVe only been added to 
on akis 
330-ae Carl went to the post-office on foot 
on a bicycle 
skiied 
bo Carl walked to the post-office 
cycled 
on skis' 
3319ae Carl moved towards the post-office on 
, 
foot 
on a bicycle 
skii: d 
be Carl walk d. towards the post-office 
cycled 
on okis 
332*a* Carl moved towards the post-office on foot 
on a bicycle 




332. bo. Carl 
. 
4alked owards the post-office-until-hG-, 
cc 
, yoled 
was at theýpost-office" 
highlight the, -parallelism between types of putting/taking and types 
oý dirooted, movement, ) What-emerges, is. -that--Imove towards'C intil 
C is reaqhedl is to 'move/go., to CO. asý-Iput-(something) into C 
until C is, fulli is, to 'fill -, C (up)* or #take (something) out of C 
until. C is emptyt in to 'empty C (out)'* Whereas movement to 
a place C involves an indefinite number,, -of, border-.; brossini; s-in, the'ý, 
direction of- C,, ending with that border-cronsing which constitutes 
the reaching of C# filling (up), a, space, C with'some. substance or set 
of entities, A involves an indefinite number-oý, journG. Ys, Of, Part8 or 
subsets of into Cl ending with that journey which constitutes the 
inception of 0 having no part which doesutt, contain (a part or-subset 
of) A. 
7.6.3.2 AeM! isition and loss of knowledge 
In rather crude terms, as eating or drinking is Causing something 
of a tangible nature to go into one's stomach, so learning involves 
the passage of something of an abstract mture int o, one *a head, To 
learn something is to incorporate it (as 'knowledge") within oneself 
just as to forget something is to allow it to escape from one's mind, 
The salience of the idea of something being inside one in the case of 
such 'affective' situations as knowingg believingg understarding,, etc. 
(and of being taken inside in the case of their inceptive counterparts) 
is revealed by the number of figures of speech pertaining to these 
which are based on some kind of concrete journey into a bodyt in 
particular, ones based on eating? 
477* 
333. John swallowed the tale whole 
334. Fred ate it up without the slightest hint of suspicion 
335# Vary took in the news of the death of her husband without 
a word 
336* The lecturer put the theory into an easily digested form 
337- Bill crammed all night for the exam 
338* Thatts food for thought 
339. Jean lives on gossip, 
340# I'm so tired I couldn't sbýorb another-, -faot 
if-X, wanted to 
341- His name escaped me 
However, more important than such metaýhorical ev! Aence'p are the 
semantic and syntactic parallels which we have already'noted Wo'l 
4.2,, § 7,2) and which have been discussed in detail in Anderson ' 
(1971b) between such sentences as those below, all ofwhich inrolve 
a subjectivized locative (or part thereof--of* 357. iiot 358-ii-)t 
342. io The book contains many illustrations 
ii, The book has many illustrations in it 
343 - i. The book contains the solution to the problem 
ii,, The book has the solution to the problem in it 
344. io John's exercise book contains the solution 
ii. John has the solution in his exercise book 
345.1. John knows the solution 
ii# John has the solution in his head 
Whether the locational relation being described in these sentences is 
a concrete or abstract one, this latter being either one of simple 
possession or of knowing, depends on a number of faotcrat the nature 
478s 
of the object beirg located, the semantic properties of the verbs 
involved, arA the animacy of the location object. The minimum 
requirements fcr interpreting the locational relation as one of knowing 
would appear to be that the object being located be ultimately pro- 
positional in nature (at least for the 'savoir" interpretation, with 
which we, are solely concerned) and that the location cbject be at 
least animate if not animal. 
There are hosts of thorny philosophical problems conneotea with 
the semantic analysis of expressions such as 'know# Ourderstandly 
'believe* p etc* which " cannot become irvolved in heree floweverg 
I: C " a35't'me the cOrrectrass of a locative, analysis, of these, then 
it becomes possible to apply, in principlet our characterization. of 
a, journey to the elucidation of' tho semantic structures unlerlying 




I In-partioulars we noted iný. 2 that the 
Journey paradigm for learning something and forgetting something 
tends to be 6. partitive one rather than one of movement towards. 
This suggests that, informally, the abstract jourrmy described in 
346, below is that which begins with it ceasing to be the case that 
346. Mary's learning of the poem 
Mary knows none of the poem ard which ends with it coming to be the 
case that she kwvs all of it v and., is such that all the while 
it is in 
progress, there is some part o: 
lr. 
the poem which Mary comes to know. 
Cf a also De Rijk (1974) who adduces, a number of -f acts --int erpret- 
ation potentialq seleational. restrictions and co-occurrence 
relations--in support of a semantio analysis of 'forget' in terms 
of the semantic representation beimy: 
ECCAIE 
x KNOU y 
However,, 'he observes that there is a problem with such a represent- 
ation as 1. since it predicts (given the apparatus of predicate 
raising and lexical insertion of generative semantics) that 'forget' 
should be synorWmous with 'cease to know', However,, in view of 
the fact that 2. below is ambiguous whereas 3. is not, this 
2., 1 have ceased to know the names of my students 
3.1 have forgotten the naim"es of my students 
prediction is found to be not borne oute Although we cannot 90 
into the details of his discussion here* it is interesting to note 
that De Rijk suggests, following a proposal by Dean-Podorp that an 
ultimate resolution of the problem will reside in treating B113-COME 
as a complex semantic predicate derived from a conjoined structure 
essentially equivalent to that which we have assigned to into T"- 
480o 
If what is being learnt is, learnt az a WhOlý, just as an obJect 
crossing a border may be treated as a points then the journey is a 
simple minimal border-crossing ass for examplep learning a name or a 
word* (But -again,, 
this Is a variable: one may knovr only part of a 
name or only part of a word. ) Forgetting something would be the 
passage from knowing &3.1 of somethirg to knowing none of ito 
Hcmever, if we are to suppose that 'A learn XI ani 'A fcrget V 
are similar to 'A enter C' and 'A leave Olt i. ej in describing trans- 
itions from a positively specified location to its complemento Or vice 
versa, we fird ourselves faced with the ýrcblem of accounting for the 
'from' expression which occurs with 'lliarnl- and vhlýh we would expect 
to identify the starting locatiodofý the Joýrnoy-cf, 347-''-The 
31+79 a. Mary learnt the poem from i)ýul 
b. Mary learnt the poem from a book 
situation here is similar, we would suggest, to that in the settences 
in 348. What is involved in all of . these ii'the location cf an 
348a a., Mary ate her clinner 
from the pot 
ý 
out orl 






c* We left London from King's Cross 
d, John is sitting outdoors on the veranda 
object inside or outside of an object cr plaoef or a. transition 
between the twol supplemented by a more precise identification of the 
object's (initial) location within this place, In 348. d* John is 
first located outside of some buildingard then a specific location 
within the "outdoors" is added. In 348* co Ia tramition between being 
in London and not being in London is primarily iwolvedq but then 
additional specification is given as to the precise place in London 
from 'which the transition begins, 
481- 
Similarlys *out of a mug' in 348. b* specifies more particularly the 
place at which the journey of. -the coffee from outside to inside Fred 
begins. Note in this connection that the French equivalents to 
348. a. and 34-8. b. contain a locational rather than a scurce 
expression: 
349-a- Marie a mangS son diner -dans le casserole 
of b. Fred a bu son oaf e dans un verre 
Thus,, we appear to have two descriptions' of the 9&, ne Journeyp one 
more specific than the other, The less specific one is realized 
essentially by the verb plus its object, the source of the more 
specific one being realized by a Ofroml or $out of* phrase. In 
lly if 350. below,, both the source and the goal of the more fu . epee 
ied. 
journey receive overt expression: 
350- We crossed the Channel, from Dover to Calais 
The two descriptions of the same journey are separated in the 
fonowing sentencesi 
351. a. We dro: ssed the Channel -=ý-'we went from one side of 
the Channel to the other 
be We went from Dover to Calais 
In generals it would seem to be the case that locational. 
relations and journeys can be superimposed upon each other* In the 
cases above, the mcre specific journey is superordinated to the more 
general and this latter is encoded primarily by the verb. The 
reverse embedding is, of course, also possible but this %ill# in 
such cases as 351-P prevent incorporation and,, as Gruber (1965) has 
10 w2e 
observed, the more general s6ýrce and goal specifications tend to 
be realized as simple locationalst 
352, We went from Dover to Calais across the Channel 
tAcross the Channel' in 352. is ino3t naturally interpreted in the 
static locational (as opposed to the static extensiOnal--cfe 
7.3.2) sense of "on the other side of the Channel (from Dover)"* 
There is also a third possibility whereby *on one side of' and tOn 
the other side* are (appositional) modifiers of 'Dover' ard 'Calais's 
respectively, Since the two expressions are, in such cases# no 
longer co-constituents# there is no possibility ar lexicalization 
to 'across': 
353. We went. from Dover, on one side of the, channelt to 
Calais, on the otber side of the Cbannel- - 
Returning rm to 347. a. ard 347. b., we can assume that these 
also represert the conflation. or two simultaneous,, 'compatible' 
journeys. The more general one,, realized by 'learn the poem'-f 
in7olves the (extended) borderý-crossing between the complementary 
states of knowledge of (all of) the poem not being at/in Pary and 
knowledge of (all of) the poem being at/in Vary. The more specif ic 
journey# partially realized by Ofrom Paul, /the-bookl involves the 
passage--or, more accurately, perhaps the, extension or srreading- 
of knowledge of (all of) the poem from Paul or from the book to -- 
Ma ry,, This latter journey, allows for, but does not requires that 
Paul was responsible in an active sense for Mary's learning the poem. 
That is, whereas 354. implies 
4.83o 
354. Patil taught the poem to Mary 
347. a-9 the con7erse does not necessarily hold- Fcr the same reasonso 




book taught 1.1ary the poem 
7.6.3.3 Grcwih. ' transformatiowý translationsý performanc6s, and 
instantiations 
Our remarks. in, this arA the f ollowing section will3 again$ be 
mainly of an observational and programmatic nature., Time and space 
have not permitted a deeper investigation into the problems connected 
with the semantic description of the sentence types to, be discussed 
below. However,, it is felt. tbat all of these repre se ýit ,, part 
icularlY 
interesting manifestations of the logical constructs we have invoked 
in our characterization of a journey ard that the framework developed 
and outlined in the preceding sections will ultimately be able to 
accommodate them all. 
Comider first sentenoes describirg growth and extensionp i. e. 
increase in the size of some entity. Sentences 356. ard 357- can 
both be paraphrased in terms of an increase in the measure (along 
356* as John grew two inches during the summer 
b, John grew to a heipýt of six feet during the summer 
357. ao The steel rails expaxided two inches during the heat wave 
b. The'ste6l rails expanded'to ik. let)gth Of twOntY feet 
two inches &ring the heat wave 
one or more dimensiom) of the object or the reaching of a point on 
a scale which is further from the origins the zero mark.. than befcre: 
1A, r--vo 
35R* a. John's height increased (by) two inches during the 
summer 
b. Johnfe height increa3ed to six feet during the summer 
359. a. The length of the steel rails increased (by) two 
inches duri% the heat-wave 
b. The length of the steel rails increased to twenty 
feet two inches during the heat-wave 
the natural increase in the extension of an objecty which 
is ultimately a journey into a state of greater extensiong is often 
accompaniea by a charfe in the object's structure or form and hence 
15 a change in the class, of entities to which it is a member. Cr, 
the state of greater extension may itself require a change in its 
classification. Compare the following sentencess 
360. a., The, baby grew into a strapping youth 
b. The acorn grew into a magnif icent oak tree 
a* ýhe town grew into a city 
There are, in aaditionp abstract counterparts to these sentences, 
as illustratea in 361, 
361 * a. The fighting grew into a full-scale war 
b. My dislike of him grew into hatred. ' 
What is distinctive about the sentences in 360. and 361 . is that they 
involve a uge of 'grow' which is consistent with both its basic, 
concrete sense as exemplified in 356- 'and its extended usage as 
more or less equivalentýto Ibeco"Me' (but see belov7). That isq each 
of 360. and 361 . imply a sentence describing -simply growth az well 
485. 
as one describing simply entry into a new class: 
362., ao ie The baby grew 
ii. The baby became a strapping youth 
b. i. The acorn greve 
ii. T he acorn became a magnificent oak tree 
0.1. The town grew 
it. The tOWn became a city 
363, a. i. The fight ing 'grew 
it* The fighting became a full-scale war 
b. to My -dislike - of him grew 
iii My dislike of-himlecame hatred 
(The verb 'develop$ behaves in a similar fashion. ) In contrasts 
the sentenoes below# which exemplify 'grow' in its purely inceptive 
meaning, 'imýly only a 'become$ sentence. 
364- a. i. Vary grew into a bitter and cynical spinster 
ii. Vary grew 
iii. Mary became a bitter arA cynical spinster 
These examples are probably deceptive in that 'Vary', 'Fred' and. 'Shaun' are quite likely subjectivized possessors of some 
emotional or mental condition Which latter is what grows or, 
more neutrally (cf. below), increases or decreases ia intensity 
or degree--cf. the following 
16 a. Mary's idealism grew into cynicism 
b* Vary's idealism decreased 
2* a* 3haunts contentment with his job 'grew into 
dissatisfaction 
b. Shaun's contentment with his job decreased 
4-86o 
3(d+. b. Fred trew tired, of our company 
. -iio' Fred grew ', ý iý, II 
iiis Fred became tired o: r'our company 
cot, i. - Shaun grew, dissatisfied with his 'Job 
Shaun, grew 
Shaun became dissatisfied with his job 
bf particulir 'interest are the following pairs of sentencesi 
3 65 Joan has I gr'own 
Joan has grown thin 
Joan has grovin 
b. io Uy býother has grown taller 
ii. My grandmother ha, -gro, ter wn shor, 
iii. Ify grandmother has grown 
In these, the iii. seatenýe describing' simple gr6Ah is not o nly 
not implied by the ii. sentence but is inconsistent with it - 
What, in fact, appears to be involved in the extension of the 
meaning, pf Ogrow, is the, loss of a positive polarity or directional 
element,., In its basic and concrete application,, 1grCrq1 indicates 
aý Positive development or moyement--i. e. an, increa3e in the physical 
size of an, obýeot (cf- 360. ). In its basic but abstract application 
an increase, in degree or intensity is ArAicated (of - 361. Used in 
its extended sense, however,, 1grawl inlicates-either positive or 
negative development or movement--i. e., the distinction between an 
increase 'and a decrease in size,, degreeg intensity, etc. is lost 
(of- 364., 365. )* Vevertheless, the element of continuous or gradual 
e. development through different dogree3, or stages of a particular 
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condition or property is maintained and distinguishes larmvl in its 
extende4. sense Xrom the simple inceptive 'become'# which -latter 
focusses solely on entry into a particular state which need not 
represent the possible culmination of a (positive or negative) 
development, Turthermore, 'grow* would appear to imply a lack of 
wilful control. whereas 'become' does not. Compare in these two 
respects the sentences in 366* 
366. a. i. Mary became a completely different woman after 
leaving her hu3barxl 
ii.? x Vary grew into a completely different woman after 
leaving her husband 
I b. i. John, became a farmer imtead, of. &, businessman 
ii? x John grew into a farmer instead of a businessman 
Naws the difficulty with the semantic analysis of sentences 
such as 360. b. (or its equivalent in 367-) which# as we shall find, 
367- A magnificent oak tree grew out of the acorn 
is similar in nature to that of existential causativesp is'that the 
entity which functions as the moving object in the journey being 
described does not remain the same kind-of object throughout the 
entire journey, for that Is the very essence of the passage. The 
object undergoes a change in its class-membership, ' Thu39 368. is 
odd in the same wav as 370- while both 369. ard 371. are acceptableo 
368. Mat happened to the oak tree? It grew out of an 
f 
did the oak tree do? 
I 
acorn 
3 69. What happened to the oak tree? j It fell on top of the 
[did 
the oak tree do? 
house 
488 
-370* 7-What did Jack do to his house? He built it 
'371. What did Jack do to his house? He painteA it 
In other words, in 360. b. 'the acorn', identifies both the moving 
object and its original class location ard likewise 'a magnificent 
oak tree' in 367. identifies, both the, moving object and its final 
class location. 
This situation is in contrast to the -tramformation described 
in 372. ancl'373. in 372., the fact that_the entity urdergoing 
the transformation has a proper name makes, it possible to refer to it 
independently of its class, In 373., on the other hand, it is tho 
existence of a superordinate ierm 'house" of which Imarsion' ancl 
'hovel' are co-hyponyms that again enables -the object 
being trans- 
formed to be isolated from and identified indepenlently of either 
of its initial and final class locations, Such sentences conform 
to the characterization of a Journey we have developed so far. 
Sentence 373., for example, describes the Journey which begins 
with it ceasing to be the case that the house is a mansion (i*ee 
in the class of mansions) arxl ends with it coming to be the case 
that the house is a hovel (i. e. in the class of hovels), Sentence 
360. b., on the other band, requires that the parameter identifying 
the moving, object include or comprise its initial class location: 
the Journey begins with the entity which up till then has been an 
acorn ceasing to be an acorn and ends with it (i. e. the entity 
which UP, to "the beginning of the journey was an acorn) coming to be 
an oak tree. 
Let us turn our attention'now to somewhat different kinds of 
YM. -XCýK trew ýQVA a 4; o%vi 5otk+L ; A4 a mi-LIess killev. 
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trans formations or mappings,, namely those illustrated below. The 
as sentences are their locational. counterparts. In view of the 
written, 
374o ao The instructions were spoken in French read -, , 
transmitted 
b. Peter translated the instructions from French into 
B ngl ish 
itten 
375. a. 'The concerto was performed in C major 
played 
bo Michael transposed the concerto from 0 major into 
D major 
376. a. The letter was 
ýwritten` 
in shorthand (_taken downý 
bo The secretary transcribed the letter from shorthand 
into longhand 
377. a. The text was (written) in Cyrillic 
b, Jim transliterated the text from Cyrillic into Roman 
implicit or explicit journey involved in each of the ao sentences 
(i. e. the 'writing of the instruct iorz,, the performing of the 
concertol etoo--cf. below), the locative phrase could plausibly be 
related in its semantic function to the locative-instrumental function 
of lin, a Fiat' in 378sa. Compare 378. with 379- If such an 
378. a, i, John travelled-to, Mosoow in a Fiat 
Us 
-ý 
The trip/journey to Moscow was carried out in a Fiat 
b. John used a Fiat to travel to Moscow (in) 
379. a. i. John encoded the directions in Morse 
ii. The directiorA were encoded in Morse 
b. John used Morse to encode the directions (in) 
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analysis - iscorreat i then French-, 0 Major,, shorthand, Cyrillic in 
374- to 377- aLre, in some sense, 'vehicles' or *means of transport' 
for various kirds, ýor abstract journeys. 'Howeverp whatever the 
ultimate' nature 'of these locatives-, it is lobvious that they 
function as the initial, or final locations of -the other abstract 
Journeys described by the bo sentences. It appears that in the 
semantic analysis, of these (as well as in the simple locatives) 
it will be necessary to treat. such entities-as instructions# 
concertosp letters and texts as-abstraot entities which have a 
definite structure which is independent of any concrete manifest- 
ation (e. g. realizations within different 'codes$), - - That isp 
the same abstract structure can be ýmapped into different concrete 
structures; and, linguistically it, is this a1straot structuýe which 
is treated as tbe, object which. journeys out of one concrete 
encoding,. into another. 
However, 
- 
there is yet another dimension to. the be sentenoes 
in 374* to. 377- which must be takep into account in their semantic 
debeription-mmely, 9 that of the existential causative* Sentences 
380. to 383. below reveal that these sentences enter into a double 
relation of consequence (of, f 8.2.2). one in which the consequent 
is a locative sentence like the a. sentences in 374. to 377, - aril 
one in which the consequent is an existential sentence. What 
380. a. Peter has translated the instructiors from French 
into English 
b. i. The instructiors are (written) in French 




381, a* Michael has trarsposed the concartoTrom 0 major 
into D major 
b, i,, The -concerto is'(vritten) inD major 
U. There is aD ma4or transposition of the concerto 
382* ae The'secretary has transcribed the letter from 
shorthaid into longhand. 
b. i. The letter is (written) in longhancl 
iis There is a, longband transcription of the letter 
383* a* Jim transliterated the text from Cyrillio into 
, Roman 
b. i., The text is (written) in Roman (script) 
There is a Roman trans literatioa_ of the text 
is brought into existence is another version, ioe. another and 
different concrete manifestation of the abstrict structure* 
Because cf this one-many relationship, the same abstract entity 
can be located simultaneously in different ancoaings. ' Thus 384. 
is not'cottraaictory as is 385*,, which latter involves concrete 
locational relitionst 
384. The instructiom are in both French and English 
3859 John is in both Paris ard London- 
somewhat similar 13 the process of ccpying whichs although 
involving change of physical location rather than change of code# 
executes this change by causing another more or less identical 
concrete imtance of the entity ooncerwa to come into existence- 
of. 386., and 387, The existential'causatives implioit in all of 
492s 
386. a. John has copied the diagram from the board into 
his note-book 
b. ie, The diagram is in his note-book 




387, The figure U both on the board and in John's note- 
'book 
380-a- to 383*a. and 386. a. cano of cour3es be made explicit as in 
the folloNing (cf. 
lbqlow): 
380. a. Peter has made 
1producedi 
a French translation of the 
instructions 
381 . a. Uichael has 
C made a D-major transposition of the Lýroauced? 
concerto, 
382. ce The secretary has made 
jproducJ 
a longhand transcription 
of the letter 
383. c. Jim. has made a Roman transliteration of the 
fproduced> 
text 
386. a. John has 
5 made the diagram in his ? 
-ProduJ 
a oc'PY of' 
note-book 
Finally, let us return to the kind of mappings which we made 
brief allusion to in the discussion of the sentenoes in 374. to 
377., that is, those 'realization processes' such as are describea 
by the following sentences: 
387.. Fred wrote out the address (three times) 
388. Jeff read (out) the directions (three times) 





-390- ., Sally recited the poem 
(three times) 
Cperformed 
'391- -,. -, The army V'ý; the manoeuver (three time4) t executed 
3 
392* The couple executed the dance step (three times) 
The complex mappings from an abstract to a concrete structure 
involved herd -are compris ed lp! ý it bounled series or sequence of 
simple mbLppings or journeyss starting with, 'that from the beginning 
of the abstract structure to the begiiiAng of the concrete structure 
and'eiAing with*thit from the etd of the abstract 'structure to the 
end ot the concrete one. , Compare the graphic representation in 
Pigure XY of the simplest case of a serial one-to-one mapping of a 




linear abstract structure onto a linear concrete one, This Is what 
Verkuyl appears to mean by -"temporalizing" an abstract linear entity 
(cf. f 6.3.4.5). These sentences are also existential in nature 
since, in perhaps oversimplified terms, a 'token' Of a 'tYPe' is 
brouEý%t into existence, Again, the followipg type of Sequence is Oddl 
3939 What did Fred do to the address? He wrote it out 
3%. Mat did Sally do to the song? ' She iarg it 
395, What did the army do to the manoeuver? They executed it 
Possibly these performances differ from basic existential causatives 
(cf. below) only in that the former involve the prior existence 
'in the abstract' of the physical object to be created; that is, 
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a., Iblue-print' (or 'recipe' or 'pattern' or *model') for carrying 
out,. the existential journey ýalready exists, Thus p in 396. to 399* 
396'. PredOs contracting company has built that house many 
time a 
397. I've baked that cake before 
398. jary has jmade3 that dress for many customers sewn 
knitted that sweater3 
399o Peter has painted that landscape over and over again 
the direct object does not identify an 'object of result's as it 
does in 400. to 403. below, but rather the model or template,, 
400. Fred's contracting company has built a house 
401 . I've baked a cake 
402. Mary has sawn a dress 
403. Peter has painted a landscape 
i. e., in some sense, the starting point for, (past) existential 
journeys ending. with such objects of result. Let us now give some- 
what more, explicit attention to existential journeys in their own 
ri&ht, i. e. sentences describing the coming or bring-ing into 
existence (or the going or taking out of existence) of some entity. 
7.6.3.1+ Creation and 4, estruction 
Although sentences describing causative existential journeys 
appear to be the more comnons non-causatives also exist. Por 
examples, there are those like 360. be/367. involving the growth Cf 
an entityp this resulting in & new (kind of) ertity coming into 
existence, There are also the sentenae types we considered in 
17.4.3 concerning the coming into and going out of existence of 
dyi-07 5 4, 
species, geographical phenomena, 'and irAividxial animates. 
Consider-also the, following sentence'typest 
"A snoi drift built up beside the house overnigbt 4040' 
405. A'blister formed on my hand 
4o6s 'a., 'John developed a rash on his chest 
b. A rash clevelopea on John's cheat 
Of particular interest is 406. a., which illustrates again the 
tendency for the animate argument to be subjectivined, 406. a. and 
1+06, b,, are dynamic counterparts of' the existential locatives in 1+07. 
407. a. John has a rash on his chest 
I There is a rash on JohnOs cheat 
The range of possibilities is much greater in the case or 
existential causatives and there appear to be several subclasses 
of verbs which participate in describing such existential journeys* 
We have already discussed the various $trans'-verbs and verbs Of 
copying and performanae, all of which involve an existential 
dimension. In addition, there are what appear to be verbs of pure 
existentiai causation: #create% 'composes' 'concoct"j, 'construct'/ 
'Compose' has as hyporWw such verbs as 'write'/Ipaintf/fdrawl/ 
'sketch' and is perhaps different from 'construotl/lbuild' only 
in the 'artistic' rature of its object of result. Theve verbs 
do not occur in the sentence patterns in 409. to 419-ýbelowo 
Rather than in7olving a change in the form of an entity, 
sentences with these verbs describe a composition, arrangement 
or structuring of a number of elements, which latter constitutes 
the entity being brought into existence* 
496* 
$build'/ I fabricate Is 'producef, $make'/' form$/$fashion' ,, *destroy'. 
'kill! /' murder '/assassinate Is 'annihilate' p 'exterminate' 
(these 
latter three being causative counterparts of such predicates as 
Idie(out)1,, 1perish*s 'go extinct', etc. which we considered in 
7.4.3 'Make' is somewhat different from the other (positive) 
existential cauaatives and,, as we shall see, has a large number of 
hyponyms. 
Considers for examples senten-ces 408. a# ard'408, b., below 
408. a. John made a pumpkin out of the coach 
be John made the coach into a pumpkin 
(taken from Gruber, 1965--cf. also Fillmore, 1970; 'Sgallo 1972) 
which are causative counterparts to sentences 3_60. b. and 367. and 
are equivalent in the same way. Zhat has not been remarked upon 
is that there is a very large number of verbs which participate in 
sentences of the same structure as 408. a. an: 1 408. b. arxl that all 
such sentences imply the corresponding one with 'make* replacing the 
particular. verb. A selection of these are given below: 
409, a. Pred whittled an arrow out of the branch 
be Fred whittled the branch into an arrow 
410. a. John chiselled a canoe out of the tree trunk 
be John chiselled the tree trunk. into a canoe 
4110 a, Peter chipped an aiTcxvhead out of the stoma 
be Peter chipped the stone into an arrowhead 
412* a. Viry twisted a rope out of the fibres 
be Mary twisted the-fibreslinto a rope 
413. a. Bill hammered a shield out of the metal 
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b. Bill hammered the metal into a shield 
414* a. Freda mixed a martini out of the vermouth and gin 
bo Freda -mixed the vermouth and gin 
into a martini 
415- a- Paul rolded an aeroplane out of the sheet of paper 
b* Paul f olded the sheet of paper into an aeroplane 
416# a. Jim rolled a cigarette out of the tobacco 
b* Jim rolled the tobacco'into a cigarette 
417- a. Tom sculpted a figure out of the marble 
b, Tom sculpted the marble into a figure 
418, a, Sue sewed a quilt out of the scraps of material 
b, Sue sewed the scraps of material into a quilt 
419. a. Katinka knitted a sweater out of the wool 
b. Katinka knitted the wool into a sweater 
If the 'out of' ana 'into' phrases are omittea in the a. and b, 
ept' sentences, respectively, the resulting sentenced are*still'acCý 
able but only the a. variants continue to have an existential 
causative interpretation. ' (An lobjet 6ffe6t-ef-, I interpretation 
also becomes possible but can be eliminated by introducing a 
beneficiary (Ihims'elfl/lhers'elf'. 'Harry') after the verb--of* 420s) 
Also# the b. variant no longer implies the corresponding sertence 
420. a. Jim rolled (himself) a cigarette 
b. Jim rolled (Nbimself) the tobacco 
with 'make$-. 420. a. "'implies 421. a. but 420. b. does not imply 
1+21 . b. Furthermore,, in general, it is only in the a, sertence-type 
4.21 . a. Jim made a cigarette 
b. Jim made the tobacco 
498. 
in 408. to 419. that'the other verbs of pure existential causAtion 
can figuref as demonstrated in 422, to 423.423. a. is implied 
by both of 416. ý a. and 416 * b. Furthermore, the a. and bo 
422ý, aý Fred 
built 
a house (out of the logs) 
Iconstructedl 
b NPred built 
d3 the logs into a house corstructe 
423. a. jim produced fcreated Ia cigarette (out of the tobacco) 




sentences in 408. to 419. all imply the corresporiling sentences with 
the verb replaced by Itransformt (cf. 424), suggesting that these 
are essentially sentences describing change of form and only 
424. Jim transformed the tobacco into a cigarette 
co-incidentally existential causation. 
All these observatiom suggest that a sentence such as 416. a. 
is semantically composed of three related propositions as expressed 
separately by the sentences in 425o -The triple 423. a. (with its 
tke +, r, 'VIe 'out' phrase), 425. a, and 425* b. can then be seen to parallel tbPA- 




b. Jim caused a cigarette to develop out of the tobacco 
ýathe 
tobacco to develop into a cigarette 
C. Jim rolled the tobacco 
below which was discussed in * 7.6-3.2o That is 4.23. a. 
4.26. a. Vary learnt the poem from Paul 
b.. Vary learnt the poem 
c. Knowledge of the poem went from Paul to Mary 
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represents a conflation of a basic existential journey (the sheer 
cbming-into-existence of an entity) and a compatibleg simultaneous 
but more specific journey of an entity between classes based on 
form. 416. ýa. represents the further conflation 6f 423. a* with 
425. c, which describes the activity by means of which the trans- 
formatior4/creation was accomplished (cf. our discussion in j 
7.6-30 bf the conflation of verbs of moaes of locomotion with 
#move/go/come to someplace* and verbs of moaes'cf putting (3omething) 
into/onto (something) with 'fill/cover something with something'), 
If one decides to regard sentences such as 425* a* as 
describing a border-cr03Sing between non-existence and existencal 
i. e. sheer genesis,, and not simply as eliiptical or unspecified 
versions of seitences such as 423. a., then the basic problem in 
their semantic description is that this would seem to commit One 
to accepting the notion of movement cf non-existing entitiesp which 
Aristotle,, as we have seen (cf* j 6.2.2), found objectionable., 
There are of course substantial philosophical difficulties involved 
here, which a fuller investigation would have to take into accounto 
However,, as linguistically it appears entirely appropriate to treat 
'genesis' and 'perishing' in a fashion analogous to more concrete 
border-crosAngs and as such a treatment is naturally accommodated 
within our framework, we see no reason not to analyze them in tuch 
a manner. 
A -somewhat similar problem presents itself, hovever,, in 
actually applying our analysis of an extended border-crossing-- 
i. e. a border-crossing by an ob I Ject with extent-to sentences 
500s, 
describing existential Journeys 
. 
which tend to follow the partitive 
paradigm, (cf. 427-)- The relation "is a part of" which figires in 
none 
. 
1+27. Iýatinka has knitted part of the sweater half 
most 
the rppresentation in 291. is well defined, at a particular moment 
only if both arjUments are in existence at that time; and in 428f , 
for examplet the (whole) sweater exists only at the moment the 
428. Katinka. knitted a sweater 
existential Journey is finished. However, there is no problem 
here if in the analysis of sentences such as 1+28. to 431 * the 
existence of the sweater at some time (past, present or future) is 
429. Katinka'will knit a sweater 
430, Katinka is knitting a sweater 
4.31.1 expect Katinka to knit a sweater 
asserted (or predicted, promised, etc, ) and the*f-xistential journey 
defirrd retrospectivelyq so to speak, from that, time, Thus, for 
example, sentence 430. wot4d have a semantic representation which 
could be glossed (with much simplification) in the following manner: 
"In existence at the moment t is the process X such that there is a 0 
time t at which there exists a sweater S such that X begins with it 
ceasing to be the case that there exists no entity 12 such that at 
is a part of S and such that X enIs with it coming to be the case 
that all parts 12 of S exist". Since the journey as described in 
I. ItO. is not finished will necessarilY follal lo ard 
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since the happening or existence of events and situations in the 
future of a given moment cannot be guaranteed but only predicted, 
promised, Judged as being likely, etc. ,a modal element is introduced. 
However,, this, we claim,, has nothing to do with the journey itself-- 
forýexamples such an element is completely absent in 428*--but rather 
with the interaction of tense and aspect with the inherent bounded- 
ness of a journey and the fundamental asymmetry between the lclos6d 
past' and the *open future'. Accordingly, sentence 432. below 
432ý Katinka was knitting a sweater when I visiteaher last 
week 
asserts only that the process which ends with a sweater coming into 
existence is in progress and is non-committal as regards whether or 
not the sweater actually comes into existence, the process thereby 
finishing, But the (coming into) existence of the sweater is 
nevertheless criterial in making the process 'the kind of process it 
is. Hence, we find in such cOntimations as those in 433. land. 1 
occurring when this criterion is satisfied and 'but' when it is not: 
she f inished it ancl 
Imshe 
gave it up 
)4-33. Iýatinka was knitting a sweater 
but 
Kshe finished it I 
she gave it up 
The same observations and Conclusions are valid for other kinds of 
journeys, including the most concrete ones--cf., for example, 434* 
below. 
and 
it got there [Xit 
stopped short 





7.7 Duration, frequency and iteration 
There are virious topics in the description of temporal 
expressions which we have nort yet dealt with and which we can only 
touch briefly upon here. one is the question of sentences 
describing the repetition of bourded situatiOmt that ist sentences 
containing expressions of frequency or iteration. Another# which 
we shall deal with first, is the existence of a particular element 
of vagueness in the use of 'for' durational adverbial*s and of 'in' 
expending adverbials. 
Comidering first the case of durational adverbialss we notice 
that a sentence such as 435, below is vague as to whether the 
435o The students demonstrated for five hours 
period orfive hours involved is a contimous or a non-continuous 
stretch of time, This vagueness between a 'consecutive' ani a 
'total' reading can be eliminated by the addition of various 
modifiers, as illustrated in 436. and 437- (Hamever, the addition 
(*five consecutive hours 
436. a. The students demonstrated for five hours straifýit/solid t 
five hours without stopping 
be "Tho Otodents demonstrated continuously for five hours 
4.37. the students demonstrated for a total of five hours Ifive hours in all 
of 'a total of I in 437. does not,, perhaps,, rule out a consecutive 
reading--cf. 438. ) Leech is mistaken, thereftre, when he states 
The disc jockey won the mrathon by broidcasting for a 
total of om hurdred comecutive hours 
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that "expressions such as. three weeks referring -to a period of 
time must be analysed semantically as 'a period (consisting) of 
three weeks Is otherwise there is nothing to indicate that the 
three weeks are consecutive" (Leech, 1969: 130). First of all. 
the use of a (relative) semantic system #CON ("consist of") 
does not capture the distinction Leech is after since a period 
of time can bo construed as consisting of disjoint sub-periods 
of time as well as of con3ecutive sub-periods, A sentence such 
as 439. below, for examples does not necessarily imply that the 
439* John ha3 spent a comiderable, period of time abroad 
period of time spent abroad was-a, 'contirmous one, Ifore partioul- 
arly, we have just seen that the,, period., of _time 
inlicated by an 
expression such as Othree weeks' Leed not, contrary to Leech's 
claim, have only a comecutive reading. , 
The"example given by 
Leech--440. below-tends to favour most naturally the consecutive 
440. I've lived here (for) ten years 
reading because of the presence of inclusive tense and, more 
particularly, the presence of the deictic expressions III and 
'here' (cf. fn. is P-657). but a total understanding of the 
sentence is far from ruled out, as demonstrated in 441. 
441. I've lived here for (a total of) ten years-three 
years before the war and these past seven 
The potential for this type of vagueness, already exists in 
the kind of semantic representation we would assign to sentences 
wch as 1+35o 
. 
Disregardir*, r the element of boualedness in 435. 
504- 
(of -4 7-4.4) o the relevant part of it can be represented as 
in 
442. below. All that is required of Tj is that it be a subset 
of points in-T such that at each point the situation described 
16 rk 444 
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is in existence* But this does not exclude the possibility that 
Ti is itself comprised of possibly disjoint sub-intervqLls. What 
such modifiers as 'consecutive'# Istraight19 $solid' do is make it 
clear that such sub-intervals of Ti, if there are any, are not 
disjoint. In other wcrds, they guarantee that there are not two 
points in Ti between which there is a point at which the described 
situation is not in existence, ie. a point which is nota member 
of Ti* On the other hancl, 'in all' and 'a total of' emphasize 
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theýpossibility that the sub-intervals of T. are disjoint: 
linýa. lll suggests that a reference interval containing several 
sub-intervals is involved (cf. below) while $a total of' implies 
that r- involves a summing of measures of sub-lAtervals. 
The situation is so6ewhat similar'ihoU& not identical in 
the' case of #in' expendiM adverbials., Here the vagueness 
resides in whether in a senteme such as 443. bblow, for examplej, 
Solly is unlerstooa as having been busy the whole three hours in 
443, lolly wrote the essay in three hours 
writing the essay or not. All that the expending adverbial 
indicates is that it was three hours between the time at which 
SoUy commenced the writing of the essay and the time at which 
he finishea writing it* Sentences 441+. and 445- inustrate the 
444* 80117 sPent asolid three hours writing the essay 
Ljlq Tý. Os Solly -wrote the essay, in three bours eVen though 
be had to stop several timesýto attend, to his sick mother 
two possibilities. Again, we have already provided for this 
dimension of vagueness in our characterization of a journey in 225. 
(cf. P. 445). The central conjunct on the right of the structure 
within the scope of the iota operator binding Xi represents the 
condition that Xi is in existence only when the directional 
process of A moving toward 0 is also in existence, That is$ it 
is not necessari3, v in existence at all times between the time of 
its (initial) inoeption and that of its finishing* Sentenoe 445* t 
for examples explicitly states that there were times within the 
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throe hours when X. (here, john writing the essay) was not in 
existence, Sentence. 4J44-, on the other handp adds to 443. - 
the 
information that there was no time within the three-hour stretch 
when, X was not in existence. 
The phenomenon we have been discussing here is not to be 
oorXused with the problem encountered when the situation being 
described by a sentence is one which is often interrupted by 
physical needs, such'a's sleeping and eating, or culturally 
determine d 'praot ices, such I as working' an eigbt-hour dayt taking 
the weekend offt etc. 'o which the users of a language in a 
particular sooio-cultural community are'iware of and take into 
account when,, for example, someone says that'John has been 
working for ten days or that Bill read War an Id Peace in a week. 
How such facts are to be dealt with in a semantic descriptiont 
if they are within the realm of semantics at ant is not clear, 
It should be pointed out* however, that this parameter of vague- 
ness,, if it is such,, is independent of that which we have been 
discussing. For example, sentence 446. would not be an 
446. Bill spent an entire week reading War and Peace 
ýfive 
consecutive daysý 
inappropriate utterance even if, ard as is most likely, Bill took 
time off to eat and sleep. This problem is, in fact, also 
relevant -to, 
the of sentemes describing iterated,, 
situations, as-we shall see. 
Let us, theng turn our attention to the topic of sentences 
describing. the pluralization or repetition of situations within 
and throughout a given interval of time. We shall restrict 
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ourselves to sortirg out some of the data and to making only 
some inrokmal -proposals comerning their descriptiono We can 
begin by d6miderin&, ýý following two sentences: 
447, Vary watered the lawn three times today 
LIA Vary watered the lawn (for) (a total of) five hours 
today 
Both "7,, and 448'*- in7olve a ref ereme interval (that, identified 
by Ito(LVI---cf. ý 8.2.1 for some -'disau6sion) within which -are 
sub-iniervals which are temporal projections of the process of' 
Mary watering the lawn, ' Howevers whereas in 448. 'theýe sub- 
intervals are measured, in-447, they are counted. And -these two 
ways of deali'ng with a, set cf subsets & points are not mutuallY 
exclu3ive: 447. ani 44 8, could both be used to descr ete S&MO 
(se"quence of) situatioh(s), '-as'is demonstrated bY-tbe'PO-Isibility 
of 'coýbining-tfiem into a sentence such, as 449.. Graphicallyt 'No 
449., Vary watered the lawn three times tcday f or a total 
of five 'hours 
could have the following temporal configurationt wbere blacked-in 
I 
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(Tie have let fM stand for the cardinality, ie. the number 
of wmbers,, of *a- se't, ') 
circles represent those times at which the process of Mary watering 
the lawn is in existence. (We have let each circle starxi for a 
4-hour unit*) Thus, in 41+9. the existence of a set cf three 
temporal intervals (ii. ) within the temporal interval TODAY 
and having a total measure of five hours (i, ) is assertea such that 
each temporal interval is a temporal projection of the process Of 
Mary watering the lawn. 
Comider now-the fOllOwiýgýtwo senternes'which differ from 
447. and 44Z*, only in that what appears to be an expending 
aaverbial, -identifies the reference interval rather than a lboational 
aaverb ial: ý 
450. Ifary watered the lawn three times in (the I sPace of) 
ten and a half hours 
451. Vary watered the lawn (for) (a total of) five hours 
in (the spacý of) ten and a half hours 
There are (at least) two ways in which these sentences can be 
interpreted. Pirstly, 'Mary water the lawn three times' and 
'Mary water the lawn for a total of f ive hours I can be analyzed 
as describing Journeys or, at leastq as describing bounded 
processes, In this case, the eiýpending adverbial has its normal 
Aa not ion. That is, 'in ten and a half hours' indicates, in the 
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case of 450., the measure of time between the inception of the 
first instance of watering the lawn and the termination of the 
third instance of watering the lawn. In 451. it imlicates the 
measure of time between the beginning and and points of an 
interval such that the watering of the lawn begins at the beginn- 
ing point and ends at the end point of the interval ancl such that 
the total measure of the sub-intervals of times in between 
throughout which the watering of the lawn is in existence is five 
hours. Urder either of these interpretations, the interval whose 
measure is ten ard a half hours is non-specific: it is not 
precisely located on the temporal axis. Accordingly, rather than 
property iii. in Figure XVI above, we have iiiI. below: 
iiil. 141ti 9t2*****t22st23 
I= '*HOURS 
1 
1-1 Let us now consider the alt - ermtive reaaing of 450. and 451. 
In this case,, the interval whose measure is ten and a half hours 
specific intervals having implicitly 0r explicitlY a Precise 
location on the temporal axis. ' For example, the 'in' adverbial 
in both sentemes could be elaborated as ýin ten and a half hours 
beginning this morning at ninel or such inCor I mation could be 
retrievable from the context., Accordingly,, the'interval is 
functioning as'a proper 'reference interval within which the counted 
or measured repetitions of the'desCribed situation are located and 
not as the speoif ication of ýthe time, expanded by these processes* 
Supposing 450*, and 451., are elaborated as suggested above, ,, 
property iii. in Figure XVI is replaceable by iii". below, the 
second conjunct of which serves to locate the interval on the time 
axis3 
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It is unier this latter interpretation that the adverbial 'in 
(the space of) ten and a half hours I in 1+50. 'and 1+51 - can be pre- 
posed to sentence initial position, 
Rather than having a 'constant' reference interval, such as 
that identified by ttoday' (disregarding the deictic variability 
involved here) or by Ion Monday* . the reference interval may be a 
bound variable,, This possibility is'illustrated in 452. and 453. 
452. Vary watered the, lawn three times some days 
ýevery 
day 
Mary watered the lawn (for) (a total of) five hours 
some days 
every day 
below 'Every', for example$ realizes a universal quantificational 
structure whose domain is the set of day sub-intervals of the time 
axis, It is'usually'the case$ however, 'that such-sentences as 
these contain an aaciitional'temporal adverbial, essentially 
locative in. funotion, (e. g. 'last year', 'during this past, summer, l) # 
which, can be, interpreted, in either of two ways according to its 
position in the sentenceo. , Compare,, for, example, -454. to 456, below, 
4549 Every-d4 last year Mary watered the lawnz1hree times 
455. Mary watered-the lawn three times every day last year 
456o Last year Mary watered the'lawn'three times every day 
In 454. Ilast-year, is'interpretea as specifying more precisely 
the domain of the universal quantifier binding the interval 
variable identified by Od#yO, In-456., on the other hand,, 'last 
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yearl ispegifips the ipt9rval of time durinawhich it was true that 
Mary's watering. bf the lawn took place three times every day* 
Sentence 455. can sustain-either interpretation* The two, readings 
will, in general, have the same truth conditions; but they 
represent different structurings of the informational content* 
Sentence 454. states that for each day, of last year it was true 
that Mary watered the lawn three times on that clay, Sentence 
456. states that last year Mary, carried out a regular (vizo daily) 
activity of watering the lawn three times. 
It is this latter informational structure which appears to be 
relevant to the idea of 'habitual activity'. Consider in this 
respect the following'sentences, which differ from those above 
only in the fact that the locational adverbial is one identifyirg 
an interval imluding top hence the appearance of non-past tense: 
457* Uvery day this year Vary waters the lawn three times 
458- Yary waters the lawn three times every day this year 
459* This year Mary waters the lawn three times every day 
(457. can be given a ýfuture-as-scheduledl interpretsýtion--cf,, t 
8#2.1--but we shall disregard this possibility here. ) The nuance 
of habituality becomes stronger when such an adverbial,, as 'this 
year' is not present: the regular activity being described then 
appears to have vunrestricted generality (at least within the 
existential limits of the person(s) involved): 
460i Ifar7 waters the lawn three times' every day 
However, such a sentence as 460. can plausibly be accounted fCr in 
the same way as 458. by invoking some such notion as an #extended 
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present's Ite. an interval of indefinite, contextually dependent 
measure around t 0* 
Restriction of the truth of Mary's daily 
activity of watering the lawn three times to the times within such 
an interval would then be implicit in 460- 
1 
Returning now to the fevery! -versions of 4,524 and 453, ps we 
find that the step from them to -sentences such as 461. and 462* 
below is the same as that from a sentence such as J+63# to one 
such as 464. --ioeo from a universally quantified structure to a 
461., Mary watered the lawn three -times 'a day (last year) 
461, Ifary watered -the lawn (for) (a total of) five hours 
a day (last year) 
463. Every Canadian is a British'subject 
464- A Canidian is a British 'subject " 
generic one (or, since both 'Mary' and 'the lawnO are r, eferring 
expressions, a semi-generic one-of. Arxierson, 1973e)o If we 
analyze generic statements in terms of an implicational structure 
(cf. f n. I, p. SZ+), then'the dif ference between 463, and 464. 
might be brought out by the following paraphrases:, ., 463# states 
that there is no member of the class of Canadians such that it is 
not the case that he is a British subject; 464. states that if 
There is, of course, the possibility of the progressive form 
occurring in such sentences as 457- to 460., which m3kes the 
first three, at least,, somewhat more natural. However, we 
have not been able to inrestig4te the relationship between the 
semantics of the progressive and non-progressive form of such 
sentences nor between this use of the progressive form anI its 
occurrence in sentences describing single (i. e. unrepeated) 
situations. 
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someone is a Canadian, then he -is a British subject. In as imilar 
fashion, 455, (urder one reading) states that last year it was the 
case that there was no day interval such that it was not the case 
that it contained three temporal projections of the process of 
Mary watering the lawn whereas 461. states that last year it was 
the case that if a temporal entity was a--day interval then it 
contained three temporal projections of the process of Mary 
watering the lawn. In, the cases at hand,, the logical consequences 
of the difference between these two formulations is minimal; 
baffever, this is not always so (cfe Dahl, 1973cs for Some 
discussion). As far as expressions- of frequency are comerredp 
we may note that the generia, variant is possible only when the 
reference interval is a (single) unit of time not precisely 
located on the temporal axis* If either of these, conditions are 
not satisfied, then only the universal quantifier structure is 
possible: 
465. Mary watered the lawh three times 
Jevery two days 
'a two days 
466. Mary watered the lawn three times every 
Monday Pa 
Monday' 
Let us turn now from the various kincls of expressions of 
frequency we have been discussing to sentences involving iteration. 
Iteration has in common with duratio -n the fact'that the same 
adverbials are re-levant--i. e. adve'rbials'indicating a (universally 
quantified) interýA,,, 6f time, whether specified"by 'a measure 
But compare the sentences below, 
I. a. Wary watered the lawn three times on Mondays 
b. (On) Vondays, Mary watered the lawn three times 
2. a. Wary watereathe lawn three times on a MorAv last year 
b. Last Year Mary watered the lawn three times on a Monday 
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(e. g. Of or ten hours I) or by beginning ard end points (e. g. 
Ifr6m noon to midnight#) or by a named interval (eoga, '(all) 
during the afternoon). On the other hand,, iterative'stýuctures 
have in common with frequency structures the fact that the sit- 
uation being described is repeated and hence in a-bounded (i. e. 
countable) one, Howeverv whereas frequency involves a specific- 
ation of the magnitude of the set of instances of the situation 
within a reference intervals iteration involves simply an 
unspecified number of such repetitions in (what theoretically 
approximates to) an end to end fashion;,, and ýit 
is this latter 
property of 'filling up' the reference, interval which makes the 
durational adverbials appropriate to it' 
L 
That iss the end to 
end repetition of a bourded situation congeptually approximates to 
the continuous homogeneous repetition of a point projection of a 
non-bounded situation (this being the essence of the, duration of 
a state) in that, in both cases, each point in the (reference) 
interval belongs to the/a temporal -projection of the situation 
being described. This isg of course, not a. nevr observation: 
Fijn van DratLt (1912: 166). for example, observes that *contin- 
uance... may be graphically expressed by a straight line. Nowl 
Just as a succession of points will make upon the mind the 
impression of a line, so a succession of detached events will make 
upon the mind the impression of continuance"., 
However, in actual usage, th%, bounded situation which is 
being described by a sentence need not be repeated in a strictly 
end to and fashion (such that no moment elapses between the end of 
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one repetition and the beginning of. the next),, in crder for It to 
be treated as iterated and for durationaý adverbials to be 
appropriate. This is where pragmatic facts again appear,,, tO enterh% - 
Consider, for example,, sentercqs 467- to 470- 'Whereas in the 
4671P ýRaindrops pelted the tin roof all morair)g 
468 * The ýpost man knocked ýou th e, door T or af ew -minutes 
a nI t he ný gave up 
469. Marymrote out invoices all day 
470. Fred telephoned Sarah all week 
first of these sentences the 'repetitions'of a raindrop pelting 
the roof are most Likely nearly end to and (and probably over- 
lapping), in the other three examples the repetitions, are likely 
to be interspersed with periods when'the described situation is 
not in existence, In the case of-468., the action described 
involves the bringing of one object into contact with another; , 
and a Journey 'undoing' this action, ie, breaking this contactsý 
is prerequisite to its repet#ion (assuming the same objects are 
involved). This my well be a semant 10 faoto inherent to the 
meaning of such verbs as 'knock', ttapl, $kicklp, etoof but 
pragmatic factors certainly enter into such cases as the third and 
fourth examples. It is not likely that Var7 didn't stop for a 
breather or break between any of the instances of her writing 
out an invoice nor that Fred re-dis. 3.1ed Sarah's namber as soon as 
he had finished one telephone conversation with her, This problem 
wI ould appear to be siAlar'in kind"'to that discus's-ea- above 
reUtion to sentence A46. 
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Returning to the relationship between duration and itcrationg 
we find that what we have observed i's a complementarity in the 
distribution of t6 semantic functiom of duration and iteration 
with respect to those aclverbials which we have been calling 
duritional adVerbials. ý' 'The durational-interpretation requires 
that the-Aescribed situation be non-bounded, the iterative inter- 
pretation that it be bourxIed, Acecrdingly, the fir3t sentence 
below sustains only a, durational interpretations the second only 
an iterative one: 
471 - Sally held Brian's hand for ten mirates 
472. Sally slapped Brian on the face for ten minates 
However, this statement of distribution of semantic function 
requires One' qualification; for there are contexts in which there 
is what appears to be free variation betweqn, the two interpretationse 
First of allq we must recognize -(at least) one. exception to the I 
above -formulation: 
if the bourded situation is a simple border- 
crossing, then the possibility arises for a durational adverbial 
to be interpreted as measuring, the 
'duration. 
of the final. -State- 
rather than as measuring the iteration of the border-crossing-- 
473. to 14-75. This is so beoause in order for the border-crossing 
473. The lake 
Ifroze. 
over for two months 
474. They opened the library for two months 
475. John left the party for a few minutes 
to be repeated, another border-crossing in the reverse direction 
must intercede--i. e. the ice must ! uelt, the library, be closed and 
I 
John return to the party, Purthermore, for an iterative rather 
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than simply a *number of times' interpretation the reverse border- 
crossing would haVe to be followed more cr less immediately by 
another instance of the described barder-crossing and so on; 
and this is pragmatically implausible in the sentences above. 
A 'number of times' interpretation is,, however, not ruled out- 
of, 476., for example. Consider now the sentences in 477o ancl 478. 
476o The lake frozeýover every night for two months 
477- Sally kissed Brian for ton mimýes 
478* John opened the door for three hours 
Under a non-iterative reading, 477. and 478, imply 479. and 4809 
479. IS'ally's lips were in contact with Brian for ten 
mimit es 
1+80* The door was open for three hours 
respectively., However, they may also be interpreted iteratively- 
ite. Sally gave Brian a series of kisses such that ten minutes 
elapsed, between the first and the last, and John opened the door 
continuously for three hours. Such a reading for 478,0 although 
less natural than for 477, # becomes more plausible considered in 
a context such as 481. below. And, of courses possibilities 
481. Guests arrivea one after the other all evening* John 
opewd the door for three hours ancl then Bill relieved 
him 
then come to mind for constructing contexts in which 473. to 475- 
might a136 be intirpreted iteratively. 
Looking at the matter from a somewhat different viewpointt we 
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have in such cases as 473- to 475- 9 477. ; ana, 478. a potential 
ambiguity in the"soopel of the durati6nal-adverbial- ' The non- 
iterative finterpretation of sentence 478.9 f cr example p- could be 
roughly glossed as 'John caused it to come to be and to be fdr 
three hours the-case'that the door is open" while the iterative 
inierprAation would Iýe (much abbreviated) "Foý-three houri John 
caus ed it (over and over, again) to, come -to be 'this case that the 
door is open". ' However, what we -, have be! en'trying to emphasize 
here is the role which contextual, and pragmatic -considerations 
play; in making one or other cf, th6 ihterpretations dominant* 
7* 8 -Proj5osition types 
ý Before, proceedi ng't o the analysis of, teme and-of -two 
different sets of temporal . adverb ii1s'ir! -the - next chapter# let us 
summarize, in rather schematic and speculative terms# the mture 
of-the'olassification of proposition: types which had evolved 
týroughout the preceding seotionsi At'the'basis of such-a. 
classification is aaynamio -principle -which might be likened to 
that of iolecular oompositiono That, iss 06mplex PrOPOsitiOn 
types are constructed out of-sequences of simple r ones which latter 
may, also be molecular in structure -and further decomposeblbý,; ýý 
into ultimately atomic propositions. -Whether a particular (non- 
atomio), situation which is to-beýdes cribed linguistically, is treated 
propositionally an a sequence, of atomic propositions, as a '" 
(shorter) sequence of relatively'simple molecular propositions# Or 
as a single. ' relati, ýely complex molecular proposition will: Aepend 
both on bag the extralingtAstic situation-is perceivWor 
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conceptualized and on the linguistic categories available to-the 
speaker (and these two, factors need not, of courses be necessarily 
indeperxient of each other). Let us sketch out'what we mean by, 
this. 
We begin with the simplest situation of a concrete cr 
abstract locational r6lation or, in von tfrightle terms (of *ý 
6,2.6), a states As an example of the corresponclirg class Of: 
locative-propositions, let us-take A loc B (of* 'A (be) at BI). 
(Such propositions will have 4'0sub-atomiol structure,, parts ocr 
Which may'eveti be ae-propositjorlý-'but, this does not affect the 
present discussion. ) flows if w6-have'two temporally successive 
locational relations, both involving A as the, object being 
located# then we have the choice`bý' lirguistically,, of either' 
encoding these as two atomic propositions (cf. von Wright's "and' 
then" birary operator T) or as encoding thet as a single but 
complex propositions -'i,, e, in terms of what we have'been calling a 
border-crossing (eog, X into p, ), Ilow consider an irAef inite 
humber cf successive locatioial relationa'all' involvirC A ani 
such that each successive locational relation, f irds A at a place 
successively closer to C,, There are now three linguistioýoptions 
available,, Again, we could encode each looational, relation 
separately by means'of alseries of "and then" oonjunationsl but 
this would be linguistically awkward in most cases. SecorAlys 
we could treat every temporally contiguous pair of locational' 
relations'as constituting a border-crossing (e, ge as described by 
'A become/get closer to 00) aid then express the entire sequence as 
an iterated border-crossing (of. tA get closer Ancl closer to C'). 
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Finally, we can treat such an analytic iteration of a border- 
crossing in a synthetic fashionj compounding it into a sirglep 
but interna3ly complexq proposition L(A)-+C (cf, "A move towards 
Clý !A approach 01), 
'Consider now a similar succession of atomic 16catiOnal 
relations the first of which involves A being aV B9 the last Of 
which involves A being at Cq, 'all others being successively ones 
with A located successively closer to ý1* Again,, we could encode 
this by-a'sequence of'atomic propositions, beginning with A'Ioc 13 
ard ending with A loc-Co Alternatively, the first two locatiOnal 
relations, and the last two locational'relitions could be collapsed 
into-two border-crossings and the intermediate ones either into 
an iteration of the border-crossing'. of'A getting closer to'C'or 
fully into a-directed process of A moving towards 0, That is, we 
would have something like 1A leave B and then A move'closer-ina - 
closer to 0 (or A'move twaras 0) and f irLilly A arrive at 01. 'Yet 
another possibility pow arisest namely to treat all of, this-as the 
singleg complex proposition; expresse'd by 'A moveg'fiom'B to C1. 
In this case the situation is analyzed as an extended journeyp a 
process which is inherently bounded by the two border-crossings 
which 'constitute its inception and terminitiOn. And, look I ing from 
the reverse point 'of Viewq'we found that the"'complex proposition 
constitutingan extended journey reduces to that of a border- 
crossing when its source ýand goal are spatially contiguous 16cations 
(cf. 'cross the ooeanl/tcross the border'), 
Extended Journeys, as well as border- cros s irgs -, can be iterated, 
Accordingly, in adcUtion to the process cf aireatea movemento we 
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have other processes which can be viewed as composed of such , 
iterated J6urneys. For example, walking involves the iteration of 
taking a step,, - chewing the iteration of biting something, talking 
the iteration of uttering a word, etas Correspondingly, the 
propositions representing these situations so viewed, will somehow 
have to reflect this internal structuring, The upshot ofthis is 
that we have the following kind, of clevelopment: (inherently non- 
bounded) atomic propositions participatq in the composition Of 
(inherently bounded) complex propositions-e. g. border-crossings- 
which latter partioipate-further in the composition of (inherently 
non-bounded) complevpropositiOns--e, g, directed movements* Inher- 
ently non-bouncled. propositions may,, of course. -be externally 
bounded by the assignment to them of temporal,, - 
limits (cf, 'talk 
for two hours every day' ) or by I superimposing' thei; upon pro- 
positions' constituting skeletal Journeys (cf. 'walk to the,, storel,, - 
'talk oneself hoarse I ). , But . the -important point is that sentences 
describing such processes as walking, ghewingg talkingl etc. are 
similar in some of their temporal properties to sentences describ- 
ing (atomic) locational relations, in particular, in their non- 
bound6dness anti their ability to be continuously projected onto 
the time axis* This-behaviour can be seen toýbe derivative of the 
fact that propositiors representing such non-bounded processes com- 
prise an indefinite number of theoretically ena-to-end repetitions 
of a bounded proposition. However, the fact that such propositions# 
like the bounded propositions of which they are oomposeds involve 
a heterogeneous temporal-existential structure--ite, that the 
situations they represent have phases-is refleotea in the fact 
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that in E, when predicated of them, is realized as the progressive 
form (cf. j 7.4.4). 
However, we are still left with the problematic cases where 
the progressive form appears in sentences describing seemingly 
static situationss i. e. ones which do not in any obvious way 
involve inherent phases* These are the troublesome set cf border- 
line sentences involving such verbs a's 'sleep's 'live's 'stand'. 
'wear', etc, What we would like to suggest iq that there also 
exists a class of situationss and a 'correspording class of pro- 
positions, which we might call ( inherently) bounded locational 
relations. Por examples the difference between the minimal pair 
'be asleep' ai-d 'be sleeping' would be that-between a simple 
(abstract) locational proposition (I asleep$ 4 'at/on sleep') and 
a complex, bounded proposition based on such a locational relation. 
A sleep (eeg. as identified by serterce 482, below) is that which 
begins with John falling asleep, ends with him waking up and exists 
482. John had a good night's sleep 
all the while he is asleep. Sentence 483. therefcre asserts that 
483. John is alepeping 
such a bourAecl situation is in existence-cf 6 the structure given 
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(cf. 225s) in that, most crucially,, that which constitutes the end 
of the bourded situation is not an inceptive event but rather a 
cessative one (and a trivial om at that); and this in due, in 
part, to the fact that there is no directional co,, nponent in7olved. 
Accordingly, unless the subject is somehow programmed to be asleep 
for a certain length of time or from a certain point in time to 
another, then only $cease$ or 0stopI ard not 'finish' is appropriates 
That isp sleeping I-as only an arbitrary, not an intrinsic and* 
Recapitulatingo 'John be asleep' describes a non-bounded locatioral 
relation whereas 'John sleep' describes a conceptually bourAed. Ones 
And this conceptual difference can be related to the pragmatic fact 
that sleeping is a recurrent, temporally bounded phenomenon in Our 
xi in E X1111 AMSEP 
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daý-to-day life, 
Such an analysis could perhaps be extended to the pair 'be 
alive' and 'be living' (though the two are not entirely identical 
in their range of collocations-cfe fas 19p. 430), Again, life 
is for most of us a temporally bounded entity, beginning with 
birth (i. e. entry into life) and ending with death (i. e. exit out 
of life) and existing all the time we are alive (i. e. in life)* 
Carrying such a proposal still further, the difference between the 
static and dynamic uses of the posture verbs IsitIp 'stand', 'lie'# 
Olean' could receive a similar explanation although here there is 
no differentiation into adjective versus verb, In their use in 
sentences describing human, 'an-i other animal behaviourl these verbs 
participate in expressing temporary, i. e. temporally bounded, 
situations, ones which come into existence and are likely to go 
out of existence shortly. And this correlkt, 6s with quite obvious 
and -normal human and animal behaviour, Thus, underlying 485. 
485* John is standing at the door 
would be a structure similar to that of 484. whereas 486. would 
486o The Statue Of Liberty stands at the harbour entrance 
to New York 
have a semantic representation involving a simples noný-temporally 
structured locational/orientational relation. Speculating still 
further,, we might propose that,, on analogy with such pairs as 
these--lasleepl/isleepinglt 'alive'/IlivingI9 'stand'/tstandingl- 
the much less frequent use of the progressive form with stative 
corstruction3 such as tbelievel, *understand'. 'have a headache' is 
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understood in the same wayl temporal limits are introduced into 
the semantic structure, 
Vote finally that although the verbs 'wear' ard 'attend' at 
first glance seem to denote locational relations,, their natural 
acceptance of the progressive form suggests that they differ from 
Ohave on' and 'be at'. respectively, in involving some temporal- 
existential structure. This# in fact, would be providedfrom 
the(causative and) inchoative element(s) which appear necessary 
for their semantic description: wear'=Iput qn and have onIq 




TO THE ANALYSIS OF TENSE AND TEMPORAL ADVERBIALS 
8.1 General remarks 
It will be the purpose of this chapter to investigate, within the 
framew ork developed above, the semantics of a select set of temporal 
adverbials which reveal,, in a particularly instructive manner,, the 
interplay of proposition type with the temporal and/or existential 
structures which we have postulated for a spect, aktionsarteng negation 
and quantification. Our previous discussion has already led us to the 
examination of such temporal expressions as the point-time and interval 
locational adverbials 'at... 'in/on... 1, the durational adverbials 
'for.,, '# If rom... to... 1, 
ý'the-expending 
adverbial $in... ' and frequency 
adverbials; and it was found that the semantic structure of these expres- 
sions can be displayed naturally and perspicuously by means of our des- 
criptive apparatus. Here we wish to treat in considerable detail two 
III 0411A further sets of adverbials--that comprised by already'# still yet, k 
I 3&r ,4 
lanyvýqll, *ad.. LUyL and that comprised by 'until... ' and 'since... 
As we shall see, an understanding of the semantic correlate of inclusive 
tense is involved in a full analysis of the former set and also relevant 
to the elucidation of the semantic properties of the latter set. Accord- 
ingly, we shall begin with a discussion of the representation of tense 
within our frameworkj particularly that of inclusive tense. This will 
also involve us in a discussion of the simple and progressive forms of 
the verb. 
8.2 Tense and aspect 
8.2.1 Past versus non-Rast 
We do not pretend in this and the following sections to give anY- 
thing c- lose to a thorough analysis of the various tense forms and their 
uses in English. We are mainly concerned with establishing what infor- 
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mation must be included in the semantic representation of sentences 
with inclusive tense in order to reflect accurately the way(s) in which 
theyýare understood and in order to account for certain co-occurrence 
restrictions with temporal adverbials and certain semantic relations, 
in particular, that-of 'consequence' (cf. Lyons, 1963t 46.43; also our 
discussion in ý6.2.3). Furthermore, we are interested only marginally 
in the rules which would relate such semantic representations to the 
surface sentences (for some discussion cf. Huddleston, 1969; McCawley, 
1971bg-Anderson,, 19729, -1973c-, Anderson & Jessen, forthcoming)$ 
However, the-semantics of the inclusive tense cannot be fully 
appreciated in vacuol, -i'Oet-without some prior understanding of the 
semantic'correlates of tense'In general and of, theýbasic opposition of 
past versus non-past tense in particular. Hence it is to this latter 
that we must first direct our attention. -, Unfortunately* the uses of 
the simple'past and non-past"forms are not themselves without semantic 
complexities; - but ý it is-, more' than likely that many of these are resol- 
vable into a complex interaction of contextual factors$ among the more 
.II., -- important of which are the proposition, type, aspect, and the co-occurring 
temporal adverbials or lack of them (cf. ý5.2.2). (As we shall find, 
such interaction plays an equally important role in the semantics of 
inclusive-tense sentences. ) In what follows we will restrict our 
attention, for the most part, to the more straightforward uses of the 
post and non-past tenses--i, e. to that of locating the described situ&6 
tion wholly before the time of utterance in the case of the past tense 
and at or overlapping with the time of utterance in the case of the 
non-past tense (which is, generally speaking, its unmarked interpretation 
in the absence of temporal specification to the contrary). in particular, 
we shall not be considering uses of the non-past tense which require or 
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presuppowa special context (e. g. ýsports commentary, cooking 
demonstra- 
tions, narration in the 'historical prestnt's etc. ) nor of the past tense 
in contexts such as reported speech and those involving unreality or 
tentstivenessý (cf. Huddlestont 4969). 
Perhaps the-simplest case to begin with is that of sentence$ 
describing locational re Utions, both concrete and abstract. Theseq 
as we have seen, project themselves in a homogeneous and continuous 
fashion onto-the temporal axis, making it possible for them to be 
assigned both poLut-time locations and temporal extensions (ie. the 
sun of their point-time locations). Let us. first consider sentences 
with point-time revorbials which, describe'situationi; located in the 
past and, for contrast, in the future. In sentence 1, for examples 
t that moment 
1. Jim was in ]Paris 
at noon today 
the'locational, relation of Jim being in ]Paris is located at a specific 
moment of time which, as reflected by the post tense, is ordered before 
One of the outstanding problemc in any trea tment of tens* is how to 
represent the meanings of sentences describing general truthog habitual 
activity, and iterated action, the latter of which we have touched upon 
only briefly and inconclusively in the preceding chapter. There does 
not appear to have been any convincing and/or comprehensive analysis 
of these, and we will of necessity have to be rather superficial in 
our treatment of their interaction with temporal expressions. What 
appears to be the cases however, is that semantically these are ul- 
Umately locatLonal or, at least. mm-rbounded structures. Generft sen- 
tences describe situations defined or constituted by some general law; 
and these, if appropriately analyzed as conditional constructions 
(cf. Dahl, 1973c), can be interpreted as locative in nature (e. g. in 
terms of set-th*oretLc inclusion or in terms of possible worlds), In 
the cace of habitual sentences, a law-like or rule-lLke property may 
also be Lavolved (cf. Dshlg 1973c) or the composition of a state-- 
L. e. an abstract locatLon--by a set of regularly repeated states or 
activities (cf. 'in the habit of). This latter possibility is 
explored by Itech (cf. fa. I p. 322). IteratLves behave asrmibounded 
processes due to their being comprised by an indefinite number of 
regularly or continuously repeated bounded processes (cf. ý7.8). 
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the time of utterancet too In contrast$ sentence 2. associates the 
t that moment 
2. Jim will be in Paris 
at noon today 
same situation with a point-time location whichs through the illocution- 
ary force or modal, implications of 'will's is understood to follow to* 
despite-the fact that the overt temporal adverbials are identical to 
thosein 1. In the case of the anaphoric expression 'at that moment's 
we can assume, that the semantic configuration underlying it (or the 
expression with which it is co-referential) contains the information 
that the time being referred to is before to (in sentence 1. ) or after 
to (in sentence 2. ). Following Anderson (1972), the former specifica- 
tion is that which is eventually, spelled out as the past-tense marking 
on the verb (cf. ý5.2.2; also McCawley, 1971b; Dahl, 1971). The latter 
specification, on the other hand, is more appropriately viewed as satis- 
fying a well-formedneas constraint associated with the propositional 
structure'wiihin_& _siopeof a' modal such as 'will'. We can represent 





JIM loc INAPARIS) t< to f(t) 
loc It Z 
E 
JIH loc INT(PARIS) t'>to f(t) 
(We, have, let jU stand for whatever information in addition to its 
ordering relationship to to is relevsnt to the unique identification 
of t. ) 
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If we now consider' the variant of 1. with 'at noon today' 0a 
slight problem presents itself. Although the adverbial isq like 'at 
that momentIp deictically ambivalent out of context# it does neverthe- 
less identify a unique point on the time axis and, in this sense, the 
ordering relation between this point and to cannot be considered to be 
within the scope of its iota operstorg as it is in 3. That ist dis- 
regarding the tense for the moment, both 1. and 2. are in this cast 
associated with the semantic representation in S. below. (We have lot 
loc it 
EA& 
JIM loc INT(PARIS) n(t), t loo 119T IT) 100 j, 7  
d(T) 
n(t) abbreviate the semantic information that t coincides with a 
clock-point labelled $noon$ and IM the semantic information that T 
is an interval whose beginning and end points coincide with two conse- 
cutive clock-points labelled 'midnight'. i. e. that it is a calendar day 
(cf. Bull, 1960; Uech, 1969; and ý7.4.1). The configuration within 
the scope of the higher iota operator'can be read as "the time such that 
it is (a) noon and is included in the day interval which includes the 
time of utterance". 
At least two possibilities present themselves for the represents- 
tion of the semantic structure which in realized as the past tents form 
in the variant of L under consideration; and these correspond to two 
possible arrangements of given and now informatLon. The first of these 
involves simply the conjunction of S. with a structure such as that in 
530. 




n(t) t, 10c IN-T(IT) 
d(T) to loc INT(T) 
Ume which. at to, happens to be before to. Such a conjunction pre- 
vents all the temporal LnformatLon Ln 1. as new., -ThLs would perhaps 
be approprLate Ln such a dLalogue as that Ln 7. below# Hourevert a 
Does anyone know where Jim is? He vas in Paris at noon 
today, but I don't know if he is still there 
second and perhaps more natural alternative for the information structure 
of 1. in-that in which it is presupposed (i. e. the information is assumed 
to be already available) that Jim is in Paris (at some unspecified point 
of time-in the-past). In such a context, the now temporal information 
expressed by 1. is simply that the unspecified time is noon (today). 
What is involved is therefore an equational structureb such as S. This 
ti< t loc ti 
in E 
JIH loc INT(PARIS) 
2t 
n(t tj loc INT(IT) 
d(T) t0 loc IWT(T) 
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possibility suggests that there are Past-tO1130 sentenceg which simply 
assert the existence of a tim prior to to,, usually within a P&TticuIsr 
reference interval (such as that identified by 'today')* at which the 
situation described is-in existence* Such a tentence is that in 9-v 
9. Jim was Ln ParLs (today) 
for vh.. *ch. the semantic representation in 10. in postulated. 
100 
(s t La E 
ZLý 
10 t 
t4 to t loc INT(sT) E 
dT to loc INT(T)- 
Similar obs*rvations and proposals can bt made for the following 
sentences, which differ only in that it in a t*WPOr&l iutOrv&l rsth*r 
than a p*Lnt vhich the doscrLbed aLtuatLg)n La assocLated wLth and whLch 
Ls located wholly before or after"t 0, 
dependLug upon whether the past 
tense or the modal auxiliary, respectively,, is present: 
for the duration of 
a. 'Jim was in parLs all during that time 
., 
hout throug 
b. Jim was in Paris from 11: 00 this morning to 5: 00 this 
afternoon 
Jim wait in Paris for ton hours (today) 
efor the durstLon of 
12. a. Jim wLll be Ln ParLs all durLng that tLm 
throughout 
b. Jim will be in Paris from 11: 00 this morning to 5: 00 
thLs afternoon 
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12. c, Jim will be in Paris for t*n hours (today) 
We will not go into the details of their semantic ropr* Bents ti*nB 
1: 
We have not been, able'' to* investigate in any detail the meanings of the 
pair of expressions 'during' and IthrouShout' nor to precisely deter- 
nine the restrictions on the object of 'for'. Howeverg a few relevant 
observations can be offered. First of &III it would appear that& in 
generals $for$ (in its durstLonal applicatLon-cf, Ifor the first times) 
must be follcowed, by a noun phrave which identifies the measure of a 
temporal interval, either directly in terms of a number of temporal 
units (0,1:, 'ten hours') or indirectly in terms of a particular (located) 
interval (e. g. 'that tlmel)f'or situation (e, g. $the meeting') plus *x- 
pILcit reference to the measure of that interval or situation by means 
of"the duration of'. Zxcoptions to this statement involve sentences 
expressing the duration of Ischeduled situations' in the pasts present 
or future (cf. below) in which case such noun phrases an 'the wookelmd's 
'the afternoon'# 'the exhibition', etc, are acceptable as the obJect 
of Ifor0o Howevers with the aecond-order'aciLualso an additional nuance 
of "purpose" or "reason" is introduced,, and this becomes the predominant 
semantLe function when the'scheduled situation to a momentary ons: 
tht *xhibitLon 
1. Jim vat in ParLs for the meatLng 
the arrLval of the Que*n 
In contrast to 'for$ , 'during' and $throughout' reject as objects noun 
phrazes which identify simply the measure of a temporal interval: the 
interval in question must be precisely located on the time axL@--cf. 
sentonces 2. and 3. 'During# on its orn doeo not imply duration but 
(the Sumer 2. Jim was in ]Paris ýduring ýthose five days 
[throushoutAthe time of the occupation 
3, *Jim was in Paris durina weekend ýthroughoutj ýftve 
days 
Only the existence within the interval identified by its object of one 
or =To times at which the described situation is in existence. A 
duratLonal (or 'universal') interpretation can be guaranteed only-Lf 'all' is Insertedt 
Jim was in Paris (somtiow/on &*verat cxcas Lou /severs I times) 
during the sumer 
5# Jim was in Paris all during the sumer 
'Throughoutl(cf. 'all through') p on the other handq appears to b* 
strictly durstLonal in its interpretation. (por a wro detailed 
discussion of a similar set of expressions in Dutch ('tLJd*nslt 
tgedureadel and I-lang') se* Verkuyl, 1973--cf. also fa- I p., 192. 
Further observations on the difference between $for$ and 'during' 
can be found in Sandhagen, 19564 
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these can be derived in a more or less straightforward manner from 
,, ones given in 
ý7,4 and from the above considerations of the distri- 
bution of given and new information. 
If we now turn our attention to sentences which still express a 
jocatLonal relation of some sort but which contain a non-past rather 
than a past tense form, we find that an asymmetry arises according to 
whether a point-time adverbial (identifying the time of utterance) is 
present or one identifying either the extension of the situation being 
, , described or. the interval within which it is located. With poLnt-tLme 
adverbials referring to the time of utterance$ there is no essential 
difference from the past tense cases: the situation is asserted to 
be in existence at too as in 13. beiaw,, for example. 
now 
13, Jim is in Paris at the moment 
at this very minute 
However, whereas an interval of time can be located wholly 
before to or wholly after to--i. e. in the past or in the future--it 
cannot be located in its entirety at or within the point of time to* 
Hence, if a non-past tensed sentence describing a locational relation 
is accompanied by an adverbial which identifies such an interval, 
either with an existential interpretation (e. g. '(sometime) today') 
or a universal one (e. g. $all this weekI9 #for these three hours', 
etc. ), then the sentence must be interpreted in a special way. One 
possible interpretation in that whereby the sentence describes an at 
least partially or possibly future situationt as in the examples 
in 14. and 15. below. However, such a reading requires that the 




15. Jim is in Paris from 11: 00 this morning to 5: 00 this afternoon 
for ten hours (today) 
situations involved be, in some sense, predictable or capable of 
being scheduled or decreed. Hence, sentences describing states which 
one generally does not have control over do not usually accept such 
an interpretation: 
(a 11 week 
16. Uim has a headache from 11: 00 this morning to 5: 00 this Ifor 
ten hours (today) /afternoon 
When the temporal interval identified is one which recurs cyclicallY 
or one which is not specifically located on the time axiss then 
another kind of reading is possible. In 17. what is described as being 
17. Jim is in Paris from 11: 00 to 5: 00 (every day) (now) ýfor 
ten hours (today) 
in existence at to (or throughout the extended present EP(to)--Cf. ý7.7) 
is the complex state of affairs constituted by the regular repetition of 
a temporally bounded simplex locational relation. Such a composite 
state can itself take part in a 'future-as-scheduled' sentence like 
those in 15. --cf. 18. below. That this second interpretation is distinct 
18. Jim is in Paris from 11: 00 to 5: 00 (every day) for the 
next two months 
from the 'future-as-scheduled' interpretation I is evinced by the fact 
There two interpretations are also possible in the past tense though 
the 'future-as-scheduled' interpretation appears to require implicitly 
or explicitly a reported speech context: 
1. At that time during the summer Jim was in Paris from 11: 00 
to 5: 00 (every day) 
2. When Fred phoned the office at noon, he was told that Jim 
was in Paris from 11: 00 that morning to 5: 00 that afternoon 
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that situations which cannot be scheduled may still enter into the 
composition of such complex states, as illustrated by 19. The scheduling 
19. Jim has a headache from 11: 00 to 5: 00 (every day) 
of this resultant state is again, however, not very natural: 
20. Wim has a headache from 11: 00 to 5: 00 every day for the 
next two months 
This 'same overall pattern is, in gener3l, true of sentences in 
the past and non-past tense describing dynamic situations as viewed in 
progressive aspect since these too involve anýexistential locative 
superordLnate to the basLc proposLtLon whLch, withLn certaLn pragmatLc 
constr&Lnts renders them poLnt-wLse contLnuously projectable onto the 
temporal axLs. AccordLngly, we have the same range of tense-adverbLal 
combLnatLons wLth the same range of interpretatLons: 
21. Fred was weeding the garden at that moment fat 
noon today 
22. Fred will be weeding the 'garden at that moment ýat 
noon today 
These have mainly to do with sentences describing journeys: the closer 
these come to being minimal border-crossings (cf. §7.6), the more 
unnatural it is for'their progressive aspect to have a temporal exten- 
sion. Hence, although point-time adverbials remain appropriate, dura- 
tional ones do not: 
1. John war. crossing the field t that moment [for 
three minutes 
2. The Israeli jet was crossing the border into Syria 
when its engine failed 
*for two seconds 
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11 during that time 
23. Fred was weeding the garden from 9: 00 this morning to 5: 00 this 
for ten hours (today) /afternoon 
now 
24. Fred is weeding the garden at the moment 
at this very minute 
25,1 Fred is weeding the garden today Ithis 
week 
*a 11 day 
26. Fred is weeding the garden from 9: 00 this morning to 5: 00 this Ifor 
ten hours (today) /afternoon 
all week 
27. '? It is raining from MO this morning to 5100 this afternoon 
ffor 
ten hours (today) 
28. Fred is weeding the garden rom 9: 00 to 5: 00 (every day) (now) ýfor 
ten hours (every day) (now) 
What we should perhaps point out is that although a process (or 
state) which has a specified temporal or spatial extension (i. e. an 
extrinsically bounded situation) behaves in some respects like an in- 
herently bounded situation, especially when not encoded in progressive 
aspect--cf. 29. and 30. below (cf. also fn. 1 p. 318)--in sentences 
29. Bill practised for two hours every day 
30. Paul read a book, Tested for an hour, and then ate dinner 
such as 31. below,, progressive aspect must be understood as within the 
31. Bill was practising for two hours 
scope of the durational adverbial and not as superordinate to a bounded 
propoAtion characterizable as "Bill practise for two hours"o 
In such a sentence as 32. s on the other hands which describes an 
inherently bounded situation (i. e. the existential journey constituted 
32. Bill was drawing a picture 
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by Bill bringing a picture into existence), the progressive aspect is 
superordinate to the proposition representing the bounded situation. A 
-ýurther superordinate durational adverbial giving, once again, the temporal 
bounds of the "being in existence" of the journey can. of course, co-occur 
as in 33. Hence, most generally, a situation whichis bounded only by 
33. Bill was drawing a picture for ten minute's 
arbitrary, external, temporal (or spatial) limits cannot be viewed in 
progressive aspect--cf. 34. and 34. --and this constraint appears to be 
34. *Fred was sleeping for ten hours when we walked in the door 
34. *Jim was running for a mile when he twisted his ankle 
operative in Russian as well. 
1 
The prefix $pro-', which combines with imperfective stems such as Istojet" 
C'stand') and 'Zit" Clive') as well as dynamic imperfective stems, is 
used (in its 'perdurativel sense) only when the temporal or spatial exten- 
sion of the described 
-situation 
is epecified. Although the derived verbs 
are formally like perfective verbs, they do not form secondary imperfec- 
tives (at least not in the "ongoing" interpretation of this latter), and 
are unlike perfectives in other-, veys (cf. Hiller, 1970bj 1972*j Forsyth$ 
1970). However. their semantic affinity to perfective verbs must also 
be reconciled. Miller (1972: 222) points-out, following Isaeenko, that "forms like 'prostojat" and genuine perfective forms like 'napisat" 
('write') are semantically similar in that limits are set to the states 
or actions denoted by the verbs. In the case of 'prostojat" the standing 
is limited to a specificatretch of time; in the case of Inapisat" the 
action is limited (better, 'perhaps, 'delimited) in that it bag a begin- 
ning and an end". Form lly perfective verbs formed with another prefix# 
I Do_$, which indicates that the action denoted by the stem is in existence 
for a short time, behavej similarly to the 'pro-' verbs in not allowing 
secondary imperfectives with an "ongoing" interpretation. 
Notel however, that there do appear to be sentences expressing propositions 
which are inherently or internally limited by a measured temporal or spa- 
tial extension; and the progressive form of these are considerably more 
acceptable than 34. and 34.: 
is ten hours 
Fred was working 
rhis 
shift at the time of the robbery 
t he midnight shift 
(see next page) 
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This brings us finally to a consideration of the past and non-past 
tenses in sentences describing journeys and processes in general but lacking 
progressive aspect. We shall claiim that, again, the past tense is simply 
a superficial or overt reftection of a "before now" ordering relationship 
of the temporal projection of the described situation and the non-past 
tense that of a "not before now" ordering relationship. The real diffi- 
culties, therefore, are not so much with tense but with the semantic 
correlates of the progressive form and its absence. The problem resides 
in whether the presence versus absence of the progressive form is to be 
regarded as a formal opposition (with the presence of 'be -ingý being 
the formally Imarked"form' its absence the funmarked' form) which is 
matched by a semantic oppo: ition (often characterized in such terms as 
"imperfective "Pincomp Is te "/"partitive "/"ongoing" versus "perfective"/ 
"complete"/"holistic"/"sytioptic') or whether to view 'be -ing' simply as 
2. Jim was running a mile when he twisted his ankle 
Again, there appears to be a correlation between objectivization of the 
locative expression and-an accomplishment (i. e. journey) interpretation 
(cf. §7.6.3.1; S. Anderson, 1971) as illustrated in 3. and 4. below. 
3. Jim ran a mile in four minutes 
4. *Jim ran'for a milei in four minutes 
Although we have not given explicit attention to sentences such as S.. 
5. Jim ran for ,a mile 
we can informally characterize the difference in meaning between Lt and 
6. in the following manner. In 5. the existence of a spatial extent 
6. Jim ran a mile 
measuring one mile is asserted such that Jim began running at the beginning 
of it and stopped running at the end of it. In 6. the beginning and end 
of the same stretch constitute the source and goal, respectivelyp of an 
extended journey: Jim ran from one end of the one-mLle stretch to the 
other end of Lt. That is, in 5. 'for a mile' LdentLfLes the spatial exten- 
sLon of the process of Jim running; in 6. lamilel identifies the stretch 
of space traversed by Jim 
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an additional constituent of the verb phrase (cf. Chomsky's (1957) aux- 
iliary rule) carrying its own semantic content over and above that of the 
simple form of the verb. The former view has the inconvenience, especially 
if the semantic opposition is regarded as a privative opposition with 
"perfective" the marked member, that formal and semantic markedness do not 
correspond. Since it is more natural for formal and semantic oppositions 
to correspond in markedness, if a choice must be made between an analysis 
in which there is such a correspondence and one in which there is not, 
then, other things being equals the former kind of analysis is the more 
desirable. 
In fact-, it has not generally been the case that the so-called formal 
opposition of simple versus progressive (cf. Jespersev's (1924) Lntroduc- 
tLon of the terms lunexpanded' and 'expanded') has been correlated with a 
privative semantic opposition of opposite markedness (e. g. "Complete'l 
unspecified for. "complete) although this is what is maintained by Allen 
(1966: 219) and in the similar though not entirely comparable case for 
Russian by Lyons (1968a: §7.5.6) and Forsyth (1970) (cf. fa. 1 p. 280). 
Rather, it has been more common to associate the formalýdLstLncfton with 
on equipollent semantic, contrest, by which we mean that both semantic 
specifications are"positive$ in that they each correspond to the presence 
of some element4or configuration in the semantic rppresentatLon of the 
sentence, even if these are notatLonally represented simply as the + and - 
specifications of a semantic component (as, for example, Macaulay's (1971) 
use of + PERFECTIVE). (However, the assignment of the + specification 
to represent "perfective" and the - specification to 'represent "imperfective" 
is a convention which is always open to being interpreted as suggesting 
some sort of primacy for the + (i. e. 'positive' in a second sense) speci- 
fication. ) This type of analysis, therefore, need only reconcile the fact 
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that whereas one aspectual semantic configuration is overtly realized 
(by the progressive form), the other aspectual semantic configuration 
receives no formal marking. Unless this discripancy can be justified, 
however, it behoves us to give serious consideration-to the alternative 
analysis, i. e. that whereby the progressive form correlates with an - 
optional semantic element or configuration-and 4-ts tibsence tsimply with 
the absence of this semantic structure. 
There are, in fact, common-sense reasons for adopting such a view 
C-which has been implicit in our approach in the preceding chapter) in 
addition'to the desirability, of matching semantic structure (or the lack 
of it) with formal structure (or, the'lack of it). Intuitively, such ele- 
ments of meaning which have been characterized ', 11iiaperfective", "incomplete". 
"Partitive", "ongoing"/ "in progress" re'quire for their explicit description 
an understanding of the notions "perfectiVell, "Icomplete", *"holistic"o' 
"synoptic" and not the other way around. Before one can describe a situa- 
tion as being incomplete or imperfectivel one must be able to define the 
complete or perfective situation. 
What we are suggesting is simply this. A situation described by a 
sentence or clause in the simple formt regardless of its tense or moodq is 
presented as a whole. By this we mean-that all of its phases, if it has 
more than one, are included in the presentation. The situations described 
by such simple-form 'sentences as those below are simplex locational rela- 
tions or states and as such have no inherent phases. Hence, in a trivial 
36. Michael is a production manager 
37. Douglas was in Victoria 
sense, the described situations are presented as complete or whole. Of 
more interest are sentences describing situations which do have inherent 
r'Li .,.. r. 
phases--i. e. a temporal-existential structure. The simplest cases are 
border-crossings which, as we have seens are definitionally equivalent to 
two successive locational relations. Such situations have only one phase 
which is simultaneously its inception, termination and essence. Thus, in 
a somewhat less trivial sense, the situations described by such sentences 
as 38. and 39. are again presented as complete or whole; but this is simply 
1 
38. Fred lost his wallet 
39. John found a two-penny piece 
part and parcel of the realization process and nothing to do with some 
additional semantic configuration such as "complete" which is manifested 
es 0. 
Likewise for extended. journeys. - To say. that the journey described 
in any of the following sentences, each of which contains the unexpanded 
40. Simon crawled from Jane to Brian 
41. Simon will crawl from Jane to Brian 
42. Tell Simon to-crawl from Jane to Brian 
43. Someone forced Simon to crawl from Jane to Brian 
form of the verb 'crawl'. is presented as complete, or perfective, or 
as viewed as a wholes is no more than to, say that for a particular 
semantic structure to be lexically and oyntagmatically realized as 'Simon 
crawl from Jane to Brian', -, then it must contain all the relevant elements 
and configurations essential to representing the particular journey which 
is constituted by Simon crawling from Jane to, BrLan. That isl all the 
semantic structure corresponding to its beginning, its end, and the middle 
component between the two must be included. This, it must be stressed, is 
not to say that underlying 'Simon crawl from Jane to Brian$ in each of 
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40. to 43. are semantic configurations parts of which could be realized 
by such structures as those in 44. to 46. (which would roughly correspond 
44. Simon began to move from Jane to Brien 
45. Simon was moving from Jane to Brian 
46. Simon finished moving from Jane to Brian 
to Miller's (1972) analysis of perfective aspect in Russian). This would 
be postulating more semantic structure than is justiftedl the point being 
that each of 44. to 46. incorporates a structure corresponding to the 
whole journey and not vice versa. 
Nevertheless, we cannot deny that a sentence such as 40. can be 
maintained to imply each of 44. to 46. We should like to claim, however, 
that these are not straightforward entailments but-rather involve a bit 
of 'computation' or 'deducing'. - We shall attempt to explain what we mean 
by this. The following'set of sentences are, we suggesto straightforward 
implications from 40.: 
47. Simon left Jane 
48. Simon was crawling towards Brian 
49. Simon reached Brian 
Recall that we characterized a journey of A from B to C as a process which 
begins with A ceasing to be at B. is in existence all the while A is moving 
towards Cl and ends with A coming to be at C. What this amounts to is that 
such a journey is an ordered set of situations the first of which is A's 
leaving B and the last of which is A's arriving at C and all of which are 
instances of A moving towards C. Thus, the semantic representation of 40., 
including the specification which comes to be realized as the past tense, 
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is something like that in 50. Nowt given such a semantic representation 
50. 
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and the fact that it eventuallyýconverted into the syntactic structure 
'A move from B to C' and our characterizadon of 'finish (Y)I, where Y is 
a journey of the typi 'A move from B to CO. we can derive the more complex 
entailmenti of 44. 'Eo 4C 'Thus, the simple form of a sentence describing 
a Journey simply reflects the fact that'all components of the journey are 
to'be found or intended to be found on the time axis; and this is just a 
trivial consequence of the realization process. Whether this composite 
temporal projection'is wholly befOre'or, wholly after the time of utterance 
will determine the'-tense form or satisfy-a iýodal requirement, respectively. 
If, -however, it is overlapping with tog all that can be asserted at to is 
that the complete journey is in progress--Lieý; the whole situation is viewed 
in progressive aspect (cf. structure 232 . p, 449)--or the IýAovement towards" 
component is asserted to be in existence (again, this will invoWe'progres- 
sive aspect since 1! movement towards" is a temporally-existentially struc- 
tured proposition). 
The situation is not much different in the case of inherently bounded 
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relatLons such as that descrLbed Ln 51. below. ThLs sentence has the 
51. Mranda slept thLs afternoon 
sLmPle entaLlments Ln 52., 53. apd 54. whLch follow Urectly from the 
52. Miranda fell asleep this afternoon 
53. Miranda was asleep this afternoon 
54. Miranda woke up this afternoon 
internal structure we have suggested for a sentence such as 51. in 67.8. 
Purthermoret it has the derived implications in 55. to 57. which can be 
MLranda began sleepLug 
56. Miranda was sleeping 
57. Miranda stopped sleeping 
'computed' from 51. and the characterizations given for 'to sleep'# the 
verbs of aktionsarten and progressive aspect. Since there is no final 
location to be reached by, means of a directional process# 'finish' is not 
applicable but merely 'stop'. 
Processes which we. have, so far treated as inherently non-bounded-- 
e. g. movement towards, walking,, talking, singingo working, etc. --appear to 
present a counterexample, to the kind of, anslysis of the. unexpanded form 
which we are suggesting since a sentence. such as 58. has what we have 
Fred talkedý during the lecture 
been calling the derived implications in 59. to 61. without, apparentlYP 
59. Fred began talking during the lecture 
60, Fred was talkLng durLng the lecture 
61. ". Fred stopped talkLng durLng the lecture 
QL; 
J-P. e el 
having simple ones comparable to 47. to 49. and 52. to 54. This might 
be taken as suggesting that an analysis of the simple form as involving 
semantically a superordinate conjunction of entry into, location in and 
exiti-from existence of the described process as, in fact, was proposed. 
in ý7.4.4 must be accepted after all. 
1 However, there is an alternative 
which, though speculative in nature, would enable us to retain our analysis 
which has been workable for all the other proposition types. let us sup- 
pose, as suggested in ý7.8, that all such processes involve a sequence of 
one or more journeys of some kind in much the same way as'movement towards 
C was found to be analyzable as a succession of border-crossings in the 
direction of C. Whether such sequences have special lexicalizations-- 
'become successively closer to'/'move towards', 'walkYtake (some) steps's 
'talkYutter (some) words'--or not will be arbitrary facts of the lexicon. 
Although the number of repetitions or constituent journeys is indefinite, 
there will be a first and a last one and the inherent beginning of the 
first will be the beginning of the whole process and the inherent end of 
the last the end of, the whole-process. Accordingly, such processes could 
be considered to. be quasi-inherently bounded by virtue of the inherent 
bounds of their constituent journeys. However, such proposals must, be 
regarded as extremely tentative. as it is difficult to see what kinds of 
linguistic evidence could be brought to bear on the question. We must 
perforce leave it very much up in the air. 
Before turning to the analysis of inclusive tense, let us consider 
once again sentences describing border-crossings. Since these are defined 
I 
And note that, although a privative opposition is not involved, Such an 
analysis leads to the correlation of the more complex semantic configura- 
tion (i. e. X into H&X in E&X out of E with the simpler formal struc- 
ture (i. e. 0) ad the simpler semantic configuration (i. e. Xin with 
the more complex formal structure (i. e. the progressive form). 
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as having I point-time locations, one might expect that, unlike extended 
Journeys, they could be located-at to--ioes that non-past tense sentences 
could describe a border-crossing whose temporal projection is simultaneous 
with the time of'utterance. However, in addition to the fact that the 
semantic representations -40, r border-crossings are derived struc- 
tures from two consecutive locational relations, and hence vot strictly 
momentary, there is the problem that a significant discrepancy always 
exists between the time of perceiving (or conceptualizing) a situation and 
the time taken to encode and produce the sentence describing that situation 
(cf. Bull, 1960). Hence, 'even those situations which are ideal border- 
crossings cannot be located at to"in a natural, stylistically neutral 
fashion by means of'6e simple non-past form. - Sentence 62. would be 
62. ý iohný'catc'has th - eýbsll 
appropriate (in a non-habitual reading) only in such special circumstances 
as a sports commentary, Among the alternatives are (1) use of ProgrOsBive 
aspects (2) encoding simply the final state, letting the context provide the 
inceptive force (i. e. the information that immediately preceding to the 
final state was not in existence) and (3) use of the non-past inclusive 
tense, (again depending on the context,, 
_such as 
the presence of particular 
adverbials, to indicate that the event is minimally close to Q. These 
possibilities are illuetrated-below. 
63. John is catching the ball 
64. John (now) has the ball 
65. John has (just) caught the ball 
8.2.2 Inclusive tense 
The 'perfect', or what we have suggested be called inclusive t8116et is 
a linguistic device which has long intrigued and troubled linguistst both 
from a diachronic and a synchronic perspective. This prolonged interest has 
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consequently led to an enormous literature butj unfortunatelyl to no gen- 
eral concensus as to its semantic correlate(s) or even, more generallys to 
its semantic function. Some scholars maintain that it is a tense, some an 
aspectual category, others neither of these (cf. Bauerts (1970) 'status'. 
Joosl(1964)-and Macaulayý's (1972) 'phase). We have already given our 
reasons for treating 'have -in' as a tense (cf. 5.2.2) but have also 
recognized its secondary status as such and the fact that it has aspectual 
implications in a certain, well-defined set of contexts. Central to the 
analysis of 'have -en' as a tense is the observation that it involves the 
introduction of, #, secondary (and often indefinite) temporal reference point 
prior to that established or reflected by the primary tense specification. 
These two reference points together delimit a temporal ref9rence interval 
which, for convenience, we will refer to as the 'inclusive period'. In 
recent discussions in syntax, this dual-time-reference interpretation of 
thý,, Ipresent perfect' and, the 'past. perfectl has taken the form of treating 
'have' as the realization of a past tense specification embedded within a 
higher non past or. paýt tense specification, respectively Wop for exampleg 
Huddleston, 1969; McCawley, 1971b; Anderson, 1972; 1973cl), '. There &rep 
Anderson's (1973c) analysis of inclusive tense does not, strictly speaking, 
treat 'have' as realizing an embedded past tense but rather as being inserted 
as a $secondary predication' into certain syntactic configurations: "In 
certain languages, typical IT above transitive verbs, the presence of a per- 
fect configuration, i. e. a -past temporal predication immediately above a +pastb entails the introducItion above the lower temporal W secondary 
predications) of a 'have' structure above a 'dative of interest' locational" (p. 98). Although such an analysis might have the appearance of being 
unnecessarily complex when compared, say, to that of McCawley (1971b)t it 
has the distinct merit of enabling one to show and explain the relationship (synchronic and diachronic) between this use of 'have' and its other uses 
in locative and possOssive constructions (e. g. The material bgs a flaw in 
ýLtj Fred has a MGB) as well as its relationship to passive constructions 
(cf. John has repaired tile watch. The watch is revaired, John has the watch 
repaimd we ca; not go into the details of Anderson's . 
D* Unfortunately, 
proposals regarding the syntactic machinery involved in capturing these 
relationships and, in particular, converting such derived configurations 
into surface sentences. 
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of course, historical antecedents for this view of the non-past and past 
inclusive tenses as involving two time references (cf. Sweet$ 1900; 
Jespersen, 1924; Poutsma, 1926; Curme, 1931; Kruisinga, 1931). The Simi- 
lar but, as we shall find, less comprehensive notion of reference to a 
period of time including as its end-point the primary temporal reference 
point, as currently exploited by such linguists as Ota (1963). Palmer (1965) 
and 1, eech (1969) 
1. 
appears to have been first articulated in a precise 
fashion by Bryan (1936). 
It has been customary to recognize at least two apparently distinct 
uses or functions of inclusive tense forms: theeo-called Iresultativel 
or Iretrospectivel and the 'inclusive' or 'continuative'. (We shall 
adopt the term luniversal"for the latter in order to avoid confusion 
with 'inclusive tense' and with 'continuative aktLonsart'. The import 
of this term will become clear below*)- Poutsma, le characterization of these 
two uses is one of the more precisely formulated: 
i0 this tense in its primary application [i. e. in its resulta- ive use] expresses a blending of two elementsp viz-9 it states 
a) that the action or state referred to belongs to the Past time- 
sphere, b) that this action or state produced & result belonging 
to the present time-sphere'. Thus I have written a letter places 
the action of writing in the past time-sphere$ but at the same time 
implies the finished state of a letter in the present. 
(Poutsma, 1926: 209-10) 
function of the perfect Ui. e. its universal use3 is that of ; 
e@p"r'esenting an action or state as continuing from a point of time 
in the past to the moment of speaking or writing. The sentence 
then contains an adverbial adjunct or clause denoting the length 
of time; e. g.: I have known him two years (alMdy). 
(ibid.: 212) 1 
How , ever, reference to the inclusive period figures only in three Of the 
four uses of inclusive tense recognized by Uech. 
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It will be observed from this quotation: that Poutsma regards the resul- 
tative use 
1 
as primary or basic. This view is also upheld by Kruisinga 
(1931) and, most recently and explicitlyt maintained by Bauer. (1970), 
who regards the universal interpretation as strictly a 'combinatory variant' 
of the resultative. However, such attempts of this nature to give a unitary 
description of the inclusive form rest on the somewhat dangerous assump- 
tion that such a 'Grundebedeutung' corresponds to one of the manifested 
interpretations. However, the alternative and preferable approach of 
seeking a basic meaning each distinct manifestation of which is contextu- 
However, Poutsmals reference to states producing results is symptomatic 
of the general confusion between logical implications and pragmatic infer- 
ences or conclusions which still finds its way into current discussion 
(cf. Palmer,, 1965; McCawley, 1971b). We will be touching on this matter 
below, but for now we can illustrate the problem with another of Poutsm&IS 
examples of the resultative use of the inclusive tense which no doubt mo- 
tivatod his inclusion of 'result-producing states' in the quotation above. 
He states (1926: 256-7): "It has been observed... that one of the functions 
of the perfect is to describe an action or state of the past whose results 
or consequences extend to the present; e. g.: I have written a letter; 
result: I have a lett2r in a finished state. He has received a good 
education; result: lie is a well-educated man. I have never been in 
London; result: I am strange in London ... * 11 The first two examples (each involving sentences describing journeys) represent valid logical 
entailments (cf. our discussion of 'consequence' below). It is different 
in the case of Poutsma's third example. Ignoring the fact that I am 
strange in London 
, 
is a rather unlikely sentence in colloquial English, 
there are two ways in which Poutsma may have intended it to be understood, 
and neither of these allows it to be treated in the same way as his other 
two examples. First, 'to be strange in' could be interpreted as "to be 
unfamiliar with'"/"to not know one's way about"/etc. In this case I am 
strensve-in London is only a pragmatic or 'common-sense' conclusion to be 
drawn from I have-never been in London: contexts could be imagined in 
which the latter is true and the former false. In its second possible 
interpretation, 'to be strange in' means simply "to have never been in". 
That is, it would be a lexicalization of some such structure as underlies 
'to have never been in' just as 'to be a virgin' isq as we shall argue 
in §8.13-3, a lexicalization of some such structure as that underlying 
I to have never had sexual intercourse'. Although the relation between 
the two sentences in this case is logical rather than pragmatic# it is 
one. of equivalence rather than of consequences 
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ally conditioned can also run into difficulty if one begins with a 
characterization which is so general or inexplicit that all interpreta- 
tions can be accounted for without having to consider the interplay of 
contextual elements. This appears to have been the fate of Waddell's 
(1960) notion of 'current relevance' and Sirensen's (1964) application of 
$accomplished fact', which latter is not so much vague as semantically 
loaded. Bauer (1970: 191). for example, adopts SOrensen's notion of 
faccomplished'factl and sees the basic function of inclusive tense as 
follows: "the action. anterior as such to a certain point of reference 
(frequently, but not necessarily, the moment of speaking)g is viewed 
as being, at this 'point of reference. -an accom, plished fact". Howevers 
such a characterization simply begs the question as to what a fact is and, 
in particular, what it could"mein for a fact-to be accomplished. 
- Before pursuing this problem further, however, we must point out 
some of the other uses of-inclusive tense which have been'distinguished 
by various linguists in addition to or within the resultative and the 
universal. Leech (1969), for example, makes a distinction within the 
universal (or what he calls the durational) interpretation of inclusive 
tense between the continuation of a state throughout the inclusive period 
and the duration of a habit, i. e. of a set of repeated events, throughout 
the inclusive period. The two are illustrated in 66. and 67., respectively. 
66. John has loathed hypocrisy all his life 
67. She has made her own dresses since she was a girl 
leach rightly points out that these two uses are paralleled in the non- 
inclusive non-past tense: the relevant examples are given in 68. and 69. 
68. John loathes hypocrisy 
69. She makes her own dresses 
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He fails to observel however, the same correspondence in the non-inclusive 
past tense, exemplified in 70. and 71. below. Thusi there is nothing 
70. John loathea hypocrisy all his life 
71. She made her own dresses from the time she was a girl 
peculiar to inclusive tense about these two interpretations or uses; and 
we can safely disregard the distinction in the present discussion. 
lAech also, recognizes an lind4finite past' interpretation charac- 
terized as "happening at least once in a period leading up to the pre- 
sent" (Leechl 1969: 155). This appears to correspond to McCawley's 
category of 'existential-perfects' which "indicate the existence of past 
events" (McCawley, 1971b: 105). Furthermore, Zandvoort's (1932s 1966) 
$perfect of, experiencel which"lexpresses what has happened once or more 
than once, within the speaker's or writer's experience" ('1966: '62) can be 
regarded as a special case-of the indefinite past interpretation. Examples 
are given below from each of Leech (1969). McCawley (1971b) and Zandvoort 
(1932), respectively: -- 
72. John has been to the Scottish Highlands 
73.1 have read LT_incivia Mathematica five times 
74. When I have asked a London policeman the way, I have 
invariably received a polite answer 
Finally$ we may mention McCawley's claim that there are also sentences 
which involve a 'hot-news' use of inclusive tense: "it is clear that the 
status as news of the thing being reported is essential to the accept- 
ability of the sentence..,. & person reporting hot news presupposes that 
his addressee does not yet know the news that he is reporting" (MCC&wleyo 
1971b: 109). As an example of this uses McC&wley gives the following 
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sentence which, he maintains, would be a normal thing to say to a person 
who had been out of touch withcivilization since 1960: 
75. Kennedy has been assassinated 
However, we see no justification for distinguishing this use of inclusive 
tense from-that of $indefinite past' or 'existential'. All that is in- 
volved is that the inclusive period of reference is established in terms 
of the addressee's circumstances (cf. OSince you were marooned on that 
island... ', ODuring the time you've been lost... 1) rather than the 
speaker's (as in the perfect of experience); and this information will be 
derivable, in general, from the textual context. McCawley-ts reasons for 
wishing to treat this a,, s distinct from the existential interpretation 
includes his contention that the constraint or presupposition that the 
subject of a non-past inclusive sentence must be alive or in existence 
at to (cf. leech, 1969; Anderson,, 1973h) or " -as HeCawley would 
have it, 
that "the present is included in the period in which the designatum of 
the propositional function in question can happen or be the case" 
(McCawley, 1971b: 107), is relaxed in the 'hot-news$ perfect. He states 
(ibid.: 109): "if the addressee does not know that Malcolm X has been 
killed, then for him the period in which Malcolm X might be killed extends 
indefinitely far into the future and thus includes the present". However, 
in the examples given by McCawley, such as 75. above and 76., the relaxing 
76. When I arrived in Vew York, Malcolm X had just beon 
assassinated 
of this constraint has nothing to do wLthftir status as hot news but rather 
with the fact that both 75. and 76. s for examples assert a change 
in the 
existential status of their subject. As Anderson (1973e: 49) has observeds 
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"it follows from a very general constraint on semantic representations 
that an existential status is not attributed to an argument of whom an 
existential status is also predicated: otherwise, a tautology (The late 
president is dead) or a contradiction (The late president is alLve) 
arises". Accordingly, although McCewley's other example-77. below-- 
77. Khrushchev-has been deposed 
would have been appropriate as an existential perfect (andq as a particu- 
lar case, as a hot-news perfect) at the time of his wrLtina the articles 
it is no longer appropriate even in the particularized context of hot news 
since thruahchev has died since that time. The sentence is not concerned 
with a change of his existential status, and thus the constraint on the 
existence of the referent of the subject noun phrase would have to be 
satisfied for the inclusive form to appear. Sentence 78. would, instead, 
78. Khrushchev was, deposed and has since died 
be the appropriate comment in the hot-news contexts which McCawley has 
in mind. Accordinglys it, -cannot be maintained that a hot-news 
inter- 
pretation can be used-in contexts where the existential interpretation 
-got It 
would be inappropriate andtmust therefore be distinguished from it. 
This leaves us with three uses of the inclusive tense to reconcile-- 
the resultative, the universal and the existential. Although such poly- 
semic approaches as those of Leech (1969) and McCawley (1971b) may im- 
plicitly regard these different interpretations as somehow contextually 
determined and hence ultimately'relatable to a single semautic configur- 
tion', there has usually been no systematic attempt made tounravel the 
For example,, McCawley (1971b: 105) suggests that "all... these senses of 
the present perfect correspond to semantic representations in which 
something that provides the source of a past tense is embedded in some- 
thing that provides the source of a present tense". 
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elements involved in the contextual interaction. 
There are# of course, exceptions to this statement. An early as 
1936, Bryan maintained that inclusive tense can sustain a unitary semantic 
description and se, t, out to demonstrate that its various manifested func- 
tions or interpretations are the result of the interaction of this waning 
with various contextual factors. In fact, he explicitly specified the 
essential meaning of the inclusive tenses (i. e. inclusive tense in con- 
junction with the past or non-post tense) to be that which has found 
acceptance by many today, namely as involving reference to an 'inclusive 
period'. In view of the relevance of Bryan's proposals to the present 
discussion, it is worthwhile quatina his statement in full: 
It timo is represented by a line, the use of the perfect can be illustrated an a line which may stretch indefinitely into the Past 
and which extends fully up to the present. 
Past time Present 
i 3-- 
B 
The perfect tense merely places the occurrence of an action or the 
existence of a state upon a segment of this line bounded at 1 one 2 eitreme by the present moment and at the other by a point a. a 
aJ, which may be placed anywhere along the line. That in, the per- fect tense merely includes an action or state within certain limit$- 
of time$ and as a tense form it seems to me to do no more than this. 
(Bryan, 1936: 367) 
Bryan sees the universal interpretation of the inclusive tense forms as 
following In a straightforward manner from the above characterization and 
as requiring no further comment, However, he is tacitly assuming the 
correctness of the obsewations he quotes from Poutsms (lV6s 212) and 
Jespersen (1933: 241) to the effect that this interpretation cows to the 
fore in the context of an adverbial specification relating to th* lWasure 
or the beginning point of the inclusive period. This point is stressed 
by Bauer (1970) who suggests that such an adverbial is indespensable or 
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non-omissible for the universal interpretation. Although it would 
seem that such a contextual requirem. ent is, in general, necessary, 
we should like to stress that a universal interpretation is not 
thereby guaranteed, A sentence such as 79. below can sustain 
bath universal and existential readings. The latter interpretations 
79* . Fred has lived in Paris since 1950 
howeverp'is' ruled out if tever"As inserted, and it is this which 
we--'ma7, cofi6ider*as guarint eeihg'the -universal -ifiterpretat ion-- 
cf. sentence 80. An'existintial reading of 79- can be forced by 
inserting 'a counting (isee a"mimber-of-times) iiaverbialt as in 819 
804 Pred has lived in Paris''ever since 1950 
81 *,... Pr ed has - lived An,. Par is s eve ral time a, si nce 1950 
Similar observations can be made with regard to sentence 82. which 
82. Fred has lived in Faris for ten years 
can also sustain- both interpretat ions. The existential reading 
requires 'for ten years' to be understood as identifying the 
temporal limits of a situation, this bouncled situation then being 
located within the inclusive period, rather than as identifying 
the measure of the inclusive period,, throughout which the described 
situation is in existence. if one were to expana the adverbial 
with 'these past'. the existential interpretation would be 
considerably less likely, if not impossible,, since the durational 
adverbial would then identify the measure of an interval coincident 
with that implicated by the presence of inclusive tense* 
Bauer (1970) also claims that the verb must be latelic' 
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(of 693*4*1 ) in order, that the interpretation of the inclusive 
tense fcrm be a universal one*- However, we have seen that'it is 
not simply the verb but the entire predication or, as we should 
prefer to sa 9 the type - of proposition be' - 'expressed which Is y EUP 
telio or atelic (or, more generally, bounded or'non-bounded)s 
FVrthermore, 'we have noted above that a sertence expressing the 
iteration or the regular repetition of a bourded process behaves 
like om describing a single non-bounded situation as regues its 
paýtern of temporal modification. Accordingly,,, the indefinite 
plural 'dresses' in 83s. bplowq indicating an indefinite number of. 
83P Mary has made her own dresses ever since she was a 9ýrl 
repetitions of the bounded process'of making a dreast 'makes the 
557. 
univers4. interpretation, pos3: Lbleo 
192 
Before proceeding to -a discussion 
of the resultative inter- 
pretatipnq let us pause here to determine how the existential and 
universal interpretations can be represented within our frameworke., 
Consider, for example,, the, two, interpretations which. can be given 
to sentence 84* below* Under the existential reading of 84., 
John has been inlis room since "noon 
Sýrensen (1964). who is also vpry much-, oonoernea with the role of 
the context in determining how- inclusive-tense sentences are unler- 
stood, astutely observes. -that many p3eudo-problems arise, simply 
from an unfortunate choice Of examples. Thus, the U30 Of first- 
person subjects cr of 'Jaerel or of both in sentences capable Oft 
though not requiringt-a. Universal interpretation increases the 
possibility or even necessitates that it besq interpreted-ego 
as in the well-worn example We have lived here fcr yearn. 
S)ýrensen (1964: 77) remarks: "Suppose, for the sake of argument# 
that *I have been here for some time' necessarily refers to the 
situation in which the sentence is uttered, that, in other words# 
'have been' is a perfect'of inclusive time ff. e. has a universal 
interpretatior?. However, if that is so, then 'have been' in 
11 have been there for some time' is necessarily pL complete per- 
feotg a perfect of exclusive time ZI. e. has an existential inter- 
pretaticy, since it is logically impossible for the speaker (III 
to be vhere he is not, namely there. And that goes to prove that 
the question of inclusive time ... in one concerning the wcrds 
'here* 
and 'there', not one concerning 'have been*.. *" 
2 A recent attempt to make formally ellicit the contextual variants 
3 of inclusive tense is Dillon1s (197  study within a case grammar 
framework (that of Anderson,, 1971b), However, Dillon sets out to 
account f or everything in terms of (various combinations of) feature 
specifications on the verb (or clause). He postulates such feat- 
ures as C0TTPLRTM- 9 114CEPTIVRO DvSISTIVE, DURATIVE, and MCIMMARY# 
all of which, as we have seen, cannot be treated as semantic 
primitives if one wishes to account for the relationships betweeti 
them and the semantic relationships they enter into. 
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it is unlerstood that there exists some time (s)/occasion(s) prior to 
tb in the, temporal interval beginning at noon (today) and extencling 
up to and including (but not necessarily erding at). to at/on which 
the locational relation of John being in his room is in existence-, 
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subordinate to Ti being that unlý: r; ýyping $since noon'. The 
universal interpretation of &I., is identical to'65. except that t 
is universally quantifiedo That ist it is asserted that there is 
no time/occasion prior to t0 in the'period beginning at noon and 
extending up to ani including t0 for which it is not the case that 
John is in his room at that time. This information is represented 
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which 1. ý, presumably can be optionally spelled out as *ever'. 
Other adverbials besides-_Isincel expressions may occur in 
inclusive-tense sentences having both universal ard existential 
readings, the main ones being the deictio expressions identifying 
various intervals'which'c" be interpreted as including too such as 
'today'. 'this week', *this year', etc. In this caseq the 
universal structure in'86, is realized as 'all'-of. 87. 
879 John'bas been in his room several 
times today fall 
(to)day 
With other adverbials, however, only one or other of the two 
interpretations maybe poss'iblei"' , sentence 88o can be interpretea 
only universally, 89, only existentially. In the absence of an 
88. John has been in his-room for the past three hours 
89, p John has been in his room (once or twioe) in the past 
three hours 
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92. John has been in his room all this time 
The possibility of an inclusive-ten3e sentence having both an 
existential and a universal interpretation resides strictly in the 
nature of the situation being described,. only sentences describing 
situations which,. in general, are projectible onto the terporal axis 
in a homogeneous and continuous fashion can sustain both inter- 
pretations. As we have seen, locationai relations (states), 
processes viewed in progressive aspect,, and itierative structures- 
Le., situations which are non-bounded with respect to their most 
superordinate existential structure--have this prcpqrty* Cases 
where this generalization appears to- f ail--for example, in Leech' s 
(1969) examples below--are not semantically ill-formed but only 
93., Paris has stood on the Seim 
94. Elephartis have been the largest land-maimals 
pragmatically implausible in the existential reading (which is 
forced by the lack of an adverbial specifying an inclusive period). 
The oddness arises from, the fact that an existential reading does 
not exclude the possibility that there are also times in the 
extended present when, for example, Paris does not stand on the 
Seine or when elephants are not the largest land-mammals; and such 
changes cC physical location or of relative size are, in such cases# 
kn=n to be most unlikely, 
Accordingly$ sentences which describe (non-iterated) bounded 
situations notviewed in progressive aspect can sustain only an 
existential interpretation (or a resultative one--of. below). Even 
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sentences such in 95. to 97- . in which the bouriledness of 
the 
95* John has slept since tea time 
96. Jack has travelled sinoe 9100 this mornirg 
97* Catherine has worked since waking up this morning 
situation is minimal (leaving aside the question of whether it is 
quasi-inberent or due to some "perfective" element in the use of 
the simple form), are awkward under a universal interpretation*, 
This becomes more apparent vhen 'ever' is inserted--of, 98. to 100- 
below with their noa-bounded counterparts in 101 * to 103*: 
K 98. John has slept ever, since tea time 
99. K Jack has travelled ever since 9: 00 this morning 
100. K Catherine has worked ever since waking UP this morning ' 
101. John has been asleep 7 ever since tea time 
f 
sleeping) 
102. Jack has been travelling ever since 9: 00 this morning 
103. Catherine has been ý at work since getting up this morning CWOrking 
3 
Let us novr turn our attentiowto the resultatiVe interpretation 
of the inclusive tense, as illustrate4 (along with their logical 
'consequents') in the sertences below: 
104. Peter has gone to Paris =ý Peter is in Paris 
105. Fred has lost consciousness :D Fred is unoonscious 
106. Uary has received the instructions = Mary has the 
instructiom 
107. John has entered the house = John is in the house 
Although Bryan (1936) does not take into account the, proposition 
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type in the -case -of the universal interpretation$ he does observe 
its role in the resultative interpretation: "... the verb write 
*hen used tramitivelyg because of its character and meaning, 
normally implies a finished state just as much with the preterite 
"I: wrote a letter" as with-the'perfect'I have written a letter"o 
Receive, in "He has received a-good educationl'is of similar fcrce. 
*., whatever notion. there may be of results or, consequences, in so 
far as it is not purely a reasonable inferencet is conveyed not 
through the perfect tense-form, butthtough the character of the 
verb and the meaning of the Yýords composing the statemerts" , 
(Bryan, 1936,: 369-70)o Hovever, Bryan fails to observe that 
although the implicýtionof result is not pecu3Aar to tho use' of 
inclusive tense, the implication that the result is still in effect- 
at t0 is# It is this semantic property which Jespersen (19241 
264) is focussing on when he remaris: ""He has'become mad" means 
that he is mad now, while 'he became mad" says nothing of his 
present state"s 
Bryan's failure here arises from his confusion over (but not 
lack cf awareness of) the distinction between a natural cr plausible 
pragmatic result of the action describea in a non-past inclusive 
sertence which might, at too be the case an-I the state which is the 
logical result of the action described ant whicho by dint cC the 
inclusive tense,, is urAerstoocl as being true at too . This latter 
is the semantic relation of consequence (cf. Lyons' (1963) use cf 
the term in respect to Greek, in which a comparable relation 4olds)o 
Because of the conNsion,, this important jx-operty of inclusive tense 
sentences has tended to be ignored or overlooked in recent discussions 
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adverbial specifying an interval inclusive of toj the existential 
interpretation is preferred, ) perhaps because it represents 
the 
weaker assertiom The universal interpretation depends to a 
greater extent on contextual backing to specify a bounded intervals 
or at least'the beginning point of such an intervals which can 
function as the domain of the qiiantificational structure* Por 
the existential reading, on the other band, an implicit appeal to 
an interval inclusive of t0 but of indefinite extension appears to 
be sufficient. The actual extension of such an "extended present" 
will be determined by the context and setting of the sentence* 
Accordingly, we have the representation given in 91, for sentence 
90. below, which, without fv: rther 6xplicit, or'implicit temporal 
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modification, will be inter-pretea existentially, Perhaps the 
closest-parallel to go. with a strictly universal interpretation 
is a sertence such as 92. 
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or bas, lecl to the surmise thýtt vhatresuýt is intenaca., in such 
cases is unsystematic and depends, -Upon 
the whole, gamut of contextual 
facto rs and must even include nil reýult, ý' (of. Sýrensen,, 1.964*, 
Palmer , 1965; Bauer, 1970; Mccawleyo, 1971, b)IO 
Palmer'(1965: 73). for example, observes: *A opmmon explanation 
of such examples is that the perfect is'usea where the activity' 
has results in the present. , 
This is, however. 
- rather 
misleading 
unless we interpret results t'o include 'nil results' as is shown 
by:, 
I've hit it twice, but it's still standing up 
19ve written,, but they haven't replied" 
However,, whereas, the logical consequence of my, havina written 
(a 
letter to them) is that a letter to them exists# the possibility 
of them replying is a, pragmatio inference or. result which depends 
upon, amongst other things, the fact that such a letter exists. 
Accordingly, it seems that any systematic analynis of. suc4,, prag- 
matic inferences will presuppose an adequate treatment of con3e- 
quence* Palmer's first example Is also misleading since he would 
seem to be sugg , esting that the result of 
hitti something should  
be that it falls down. ý 'Hit hoqever, is a 
Ircky 
verb. and only 
in particular contexts does it have the 'inceptive force' (9f.. 
below) to eiiable it to' enter into a'relation of consequence* 
Otherwise, such inclusive tense sentences with 'hit$ =%t be 
interpreted existentially# 
As a further example,, we may"consider McCawley's (1971b: iOS) 
remarksi "However, ,*I am at a total loss to find, & detailed 
analysis which would correctly explain what effect the sentence 
refers to, for example, vhy it is that (55) refers to the effect- 
of John's not being here (not, ps is often erroneously supposedt 
the effect of John's bei at the office), -(56) to the effect of 
my wife's being in Jail. 
157) 
to the effect of my being sick with 
the flu, and (58) to the effect of your being in a position to 
inform me regarding the whereabouts of my slippem 
55) John has gone to the office 
56) The police have arrested my, ýfep so we can't come to 
your party 
57ý I've oaught the flu 
Have you seen my slippers? 
The oddity (noted by Leech) of Yes, six months &Z2 as an answer-t6 
(58) comes from the answer assuming an existential interpretation 
of a present perfect that would normally be intended as stative'*" 
(This footnote contimed on rext page) 
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One exception to this trend, howeverv is Leech (1969). He has 
attempted to delineate the class -of propositions which participate 
in this relation of"; consequence and has pr6posed a, -semantic analysis 
for inclusive-tense sentences expressing propodit ions, belonging to 
this class* In particular, he explicitly relatesthe resultative 
use of the inclusive tense to 'event predications* (cf- 
§ 6.394.3) 
which have "an obvious inceptive force". His analysis involves 
the downgrading of the inceptive structure and a present tense 
structure within the- medial cluster of the state predication 
representing the 'result' (cf. fn. 1, p. 28 for a characterization 
of downgrading), Fctý exa: tple, the representation in 1099 is 
given for sentence 108. below-(cf. Leech, 1969t 158-9)e This 
108. Fred has acquired some golf clubs 
109, (f"6-')h <et-<-%-PLUR O"> <00 . 
[-COU3-+TnI9O, +MiIS -4PERI)eg)l 
However,, we would claim that the 'effects referred to$ by (55) to 
(57)--i-o- JohnOs being at the office (and hence# by further 
implicationt not here), my wife's being in jail (orp less strongly# 
under arrest) and my having the flu (and heaces by implication, 
my being sický are logical consequences of the described situations 
which, because of the use of the non-past inclusive tense, are 
understood as being in force at t and that these interpretations 
can in'principle, be given a sys? ematic explanation., As fcr . (58% the oddity referred to by McCawley derives not from assuming 
an existential interpretation rather than a resultative one-we 
would maintain that I have seen your-slippers, cannot sustain a, 
resultative interpretation-but rather from misjudging the 
intended extension of the extended present implicit in the, use of 
the inclusive tense (cf. 91. above). That is, it results from 
interpreting (58) as asking have, you ever ("in your lifetime") 
rather than have you recently ("in a short period of time arouni to")e 
The effect referred to-i. e. the addressee in (58) being in a 
position to inform the speaker regarding the whereabouts of his 
slippers-will,, in this case, bo a pragmatic 'inference from the 
fact or the speakerls expectation that an occasion exists in the 
recent past on which the addressee paw the slippers and thatt 
hopefully, he rememberswhere, 
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structure'can be glossed$ as literally as possible, in the fo3. lcwing 
mannert (Fred (f") have (-*h)o he W) coming to be (*- 7* O_PLtTR) 
Iý TIM, 0 +IHIS so (01) and this (01) being (true) now '(' [_-COU 
-PERI), some 903-f clubs WW* More freelyp the gloss is "Fred 
having some Iplf clubs -both comes to be ard is, presently the 
case** 
Ile f eel that Leech is on the right track here but that his 
postulated semantic representation is deficient to the extent that 
the dual time reference which we would like to associate uniformly 
with the presence of the inclusive tense is not represented although 
it is necessary semantically, As, a resultq Leech must postulate 
a special rule of implication to ensure that the coming-to-be 
(cf. the first downgraded predication in 109. ) takes place before 
t 
00 
Furthermore, no provision 
11 
is made fcr the inclusion CC a 
structure corresponding to such adverbials as *since ... 'during 
the past... 1, as would be requirecl for the semantic representation 
of a sentence such as 110. Accordingly, we suggest that# in very rough 
110. Fred has acquired a new putter since you. last played 
golf with him 
terms,, the resultative interpretation of the (non-past) inclusive 
tense can be schematically characterized as "A state which came 
, 
to be is"* "A state" will be further specified according to the 
situation being described, which will be a journey of some kind 
since only this kind of situation is termirated by (as in an 
extended Journey) or consists solely in (as in a border-crossing) 
an inceptive event. The semantic configuration represented by the 
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non-past tense form is above that represented by the past tense form 
came in the above characterization win condition the insertion at 
'have I (of. f n. 19 p. 54+ and f n. I p- p. 
C53)a, , More precisely theng 
the semantic structure we would propose for sentence 108. is that 
in Ili. This can be glossed as "At present Fred is in a state of 
loo t0 
X., InE, 
x FRM HAS SOUE dti in E- 
GIOLP CLUBS 
ti 4t 0 
X into E 
having some Eplf clubs which (i. e. the state cf having seS OM 'Olf 
clubs) came into existence at some time previous to nw"* Such 
adverbials as 'since you last played golf with,, him' (cf. 110. ) 
would presumably have their'semantia source in a predication 
superordinate to Crt, 
--in 
F, specifying the domain of the quantifier 
in a manwr analogous to that in the existential interpretation 
568. 
represented in 85a 
1 
Such a structure as Mo a3-Iovvs the implication in 112. to be 
reaa off in a straightfcrward manner and hence enables Us to &000unt 
112. Fred has some golf clubs 
direotly for the relation of consequence. Furthermore,, although 
we have bat pursued the details of an explicit formulation of the 
relationship, it'should be relatively straightfcrward to derive an 
exis, tentiai" interpretation from the same resultative structure- 
Le. to account'for the fact that jo8. implies an affirmative 
answer, to the question in 113. -, Schematically# this relationshiP 
Such A'source for these I aaverbials-. i. e. as a configuration 
subordinate to rather than superordimte to, the ma-jor (arxl 
tensed) predication-would, perhaps account for the fact that 
they do. not occur ver7 frequently with the resultative use of 
the inclusive tense and when they do a certain amount of 
awkwardness is felt. It is as if a tension is set up between 
interpreting the sentence resultatively (because of the inceptive 
force of the proposition being expressed) anJ, interpreting the 
sentence existentially (because of the domain-specifying 
adverbial). This becomes clear in the folloring sentences: 
3tbut she's awake (again) now 1. Mary has fallen asleep 
im 
and she's still asleep 
2. Mar has fallen asleep since you last lookecl 
in , but shets awake (again) ww 
and she's still asleep 
It may be, in fact,, that the resultative interpretation requires 
the absence of such adverbials; ard such sentences as ilOo ana 
2. above are simply existential but compatible with the 
consequent of a resultative interpretatione We have not been 
able to resolve this problem. 
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8-3 113till II yet I, I alreadyl, - 4"*vN"- and 
8.3-1 , Preliminary remarks' 
The set of adverbs' comprised by 'still' $Yet'# Oalready' 
and 'anymore' (or 'any longero)"oonstitutes-, a, very, cohesive and 
interesting semantic subsystem -of 'Englishi and'it-will be' the 
programme fcrýthis section-to investigate, the, semantic' structure 
of these, expressionsý, --,, It will be, found in'the course of -the 
discussion'that analyses, 6olely'in terms of"sUPPletionl-or of 
I shared, presuppositions I -ire neither adequate nor altogether 
appropriate for, the spmantic description of this set of adverbs* 
Howeverp' attempts to. estiblish-a semantio'link -iith'inclusive tense 
and, in partioularg"to'relate both, to the, -presence of a dual'time 
referenceg win be given, support; -but the exact nature'of the 
relationship will turn out to be somewhat different than suggested 
in previous workýby others. Moreover, all the previous,. amlyses 
to be referred to'below'suffer from-the lack of an explicit - 
formulation integrited'or"integratable, within a, c6herent sýntactic 
1 
and semantic description of theý, languageý The concern here will 
be mainly with the semantic level; and the descriptiVe-framew6rk 
elaborated above wil-l'be found to accommodate easily and insight- 
fully-an alternative analysis' of these adverbs ihich, '-it -iý f elt,, 
displays more accurately thiirýsemantib conteht'and'allows! a, more-t, 
explicit formulation of the semantic relations holding between them. 
However$ the zemantio, representations proposed here are not without 
syntactic plausibility-and can be related in a relatively 
The one excppt. ion to this is Doherty's 0 973) study of the 
semartically and syntactically similar set of German adverbials tnoch* and Ischon's 
I 
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straightfcrward manner to the underlying representation3 of the type 
motivated syntactically in the various studies by Anderson listed 
in the bibliography. In particular, reference may be made to 
Anderson & Jessen (1973; fcrthcoming) for a syntactic description 
of much of YAiat is discussed or presupposed belaw. The basic 
elementst then, of the adopted framework are those of the 
classification of proposition typesq the exist ential-locative 
analysis of aspect and aktionsarten, the operation of quantification 
over times, and the preceding analysis of in3lusive tense. 
8-3.2 Previous approaches 
Before proceeding with the investigation of our set of adverbs 
within the present framework, it may be helpfNil at this point to 
briefly survey the general features of the other approaches alluddL41 
to ab ave. 
The most explicit account in terms of suppletion (cf. j 5.2.4) 
is that given by Traugott & Waterhouse (1969) for the adverbs 
#already' and 'yet': 'already' is said to be replaceaby 'Yet' 
when it is within the scope of a negative element in the same way 
as #some' is replaced by 'any', the paradigm case* Por example, 
consider the sets of sentences in -114. and 115. belovv. 0 14. C. 
is unacceptable without emphatic stress on hasn't or on already-see 
below). Under such an analysis, the two members of the suppletive 
8 
114. a, He has gone already 
b. Ne has gone yet 
c. mlie hasn't gone, already 
do He hasn't gone yet 
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M. as lie has some apples 
b. Ylie has any apples 
C. Ne hasn't some' apples-, 
do He hasn't any applds-, 
set are assumed to have ultimately the same underlying structuree 
Traugott A Waterhouse argue tnat semantically 'already'/'Yet', 
as well as 'still'. are aspectual rather than tempcral adverbso In 
particular# 'already' is claimed to be associated with the deep- 
structure aspectual element P-, -, RF= (semantically interpreted as 
wcompleted initiation of action or state" and realized alternatively 
as inclusive tense); arid still'o, it is, suggested, may be 
similarly associated with a deep. -structure feature PROORFZrIVC- 
(semantically interpreted as,, "continuing to be" and realized, 
alternatively, one is to suppose, as the prograssive form). The 
classification of 'already' and Intill' as,, aspectual adverbs# 
therefcre, seems to rest on their being associated with the same 
semantic correlates as those of inclusive terse anl,, the. pro&ressive 
form, respectively, which latter are assumed to realize aspeotual 
rather than temporal notions (cf. their semantic characterizationn 
eiven Whave). However# Traugott & Waterhouse (1969: 298) caution 
that ")FERFECT7 is realized as have -an, but not all have -en's have 
this origin, nor is PMFMT always realized as have -en, as is 
indicated by the interpretation of (28)Z"john already floats _7 
as It has come about that John can float, John has learned to float% 
And later, in their conclusion (po 302), they suggest that *alre 
should be specified as the realization of a feature or set of features 
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associated with PERFECT" but then point out that "until more is 
known about PERFECT, it is not clear whether alreaaY is freely 
available in all sentences with deep structure FERFECTv nor exactly 
what features are required to, generate have -en in the one irstance, 
and already in the other. Details of formalization must. await a 
study of the whole aspectual system. " 
However, having looked in some detail at the aspectual, 
system of English in. Chapter 7 and at 'have -an' in the preceding 
section. - we are now in a position to, see that the "set of features 
associated with MZSX" which Traugott & Waterhouse have in mind here 
is the corT iguration we, have associated with the resultative inter- 
pretation of inclusive tense (cf., the inceptive feature, in their 
characterization above). It is only this use of , 
inclusive tense# 
we argued, which could Justifiably be maintained to be laspectuall 
rather than or. as well as 'temporal', insofar as only it has idio- 
syncratio aspectual implications: the logical consequence of a 
sentence in the non-past inclusive tense (interpretearesultatively) 
is one expressing the existence (at td) of the state whose bringing 
into existence is the essence of the situation described by the 
sentence. Taking the term laspectUall in its broaa interpretation 
(cr. ý 6.4) as applying , to elements of semantic structure having to 
do with existential location or change or existential location, 
either internal or exterml to the proposition being expressed, the 
relation of coniequence is 'Been td-be 'squarely within the''class'of 
aspectual phenomena, Now, to the extent that there does exist an 
intimate tie between the resultative-i. e. aspeotual--use of 'have -en' 
and 'already' (and, as we shall see, the other adverbials in our set), 
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we are in agreement with T, raugott & WAterhousee However, we see 
the relationship as somewhat more complex than they envisage it. 
Furthermore, in the case. of 'still',, we will find that an 
association of it with some such element as PROGRESOVE is misleadings 
its relationship to progresslive aspect being simply an imPlicati0ml 
one 
Horn's (1970) study of these adverbs and Doherty's (1973) 
analysis of the corresponding set of German adverbs (Ischonl/lnooh 
(nicht)ý,, Inochl/O(nicht) mehr) Involve a presuppositional 
approachvbereby a sentence with 'already$ is said to have the same 
presupposition as the oorrespording negative sentence with 1yet0j 
andsimilarly for 'still' and 'anymore'. The two seýtencesj 
hmvever, will differ in their assertions, one asserting the contra- 
dictory of what the other asserts. For examplep 116. a. and iI 6*b 
l16. a. It is stin raining 
b. It isn't raining arqmore 
C* It was raining, earlier 
d. It, is. raining novr 
eq It isn*tlraining now V 
below are analyzed- as each having the --presupposition 116. as - and as 
asserting 116, d, -and 116. e., respectivelye Carryingýover such an 
analysis to 'alreadyl and tyet'. 
1 both 117. a. and 117. b. would be 
Horn (1970: 321) gives 1. below as the common presupposition of 
117-a- ard 117. b., but he would appear to be confusing presupposition 
to It will be raining sometime later 
with what might be called 'expectation* (cf. Leech# 1974: 31&. 23)- 
We have, instead$ followed Doherty's (1973) formulation. 
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aý It is already raining 
bf, It isn't ridning''yet 
c* it wasn'i raining"earlier 
d, 'It-is raining"ncw 
eq, ' It isn't r'aining now 
analyzed as sharing W. a. as their presupposition and as asserting 
117. d* arA 117. e.,, respectively. What a presuppositional approach 
such as this adds to a suppletive, one is (1) the fact that the 
negative element which conditions the suppletion from 'still' to 
tyet' and from 'already' to 'anymore' has a semantic effect only on 
part of the semantic structure of Istillt arxl 'already' and (2) the 
fact that the two pairs are related to each other insofar as the_ 
'positive* members of the two pairs- share the same (positive) 
assertion ard the 'negative' members of the two pairs share the same 
(negative) assertion. 
Separating out presupposed and asserted material in this way 
iii, *- ther'6fc&6", i -iiýeful-ýroce-iltwiie . a-ii(f ai--iEei-p-t6iiias --determining---- 
, %hat, kind . 'of iýf crmat-i(iii ý mist be 'incorj6ýit ed in'-the- s'imantic 
representation of a paiticular sentence, , just as the relation of 
consequence, for examplel'indicated, that the semantic representation 
I 
of particular inolusivý-tense sentences must have oertain properties. 
Cf. Doherty (1973: 154)'iý '"The lexicalization of negated schon 
by noch nicht points to some interior relationship betwee-n-schon 
aýý noch, -Di-stingaishing assertions and presuppositions of the 
meaning of a word by calling presupposition the part of its 
meaning which remains the same under negation, ore can say that 
the difference between the sentences with noch and schon is clue to a difference in their presuppositions. " 
5769 
However presuppositional analyses, in, general, have avoided the 
question of. how to give a principled account for the existence of 
presuppositions; proposed $semantic analyses' have usually not 
gone much further than presenting a simple pairing of a 'logical 
form' (i. e.. a semantic pepresentation, of what a sentence asserts) 
with a semantic representati, on of its presupposition(s) (cf. Lakoffq 
1971b), This is, in fact, the final form in which both Horn's, 
(1970) and Doherty's (1973) analyses are given* However, what 
should be sought are principles or rules, by which the presuppositions 
of a particular (type of) sentence, can be predicted from the form 
and content of its semantic representation (, qhere this latter- is 
not, of course, simply a pairing as mentioned above). That is 
given an adequately rich but motivated semantic representation, of a 
sentence, it should, be possible to derive its presuppositions by 
general rule in much the same fashion as its implications are 
derived, 2 Although we have not been able in this study to _pursue 
In addition to this general inadequacy of a presuppositional, 
approach, Iforn's (1970) andDoherty's (1973) analyses encounter 
difficulties of a more particular nature when confronted with the 
deviant sentences below-, 
I ý'Tau is not yet a virgin 
2: *Toter ist nöch alt m 3, Peter-ist schon Jung 
Doherty, for example, is forced to the unappealing conclusion that 
Inoohl (and Inicht mehr') presupposes not only that at a prior 
time the described situation was in effect but, also that at a 
later time it is not in effect P and the reverse fcr 
Ischon* (and 
Inoch nicht'). Porn, as we shall see (of- t8.3.2) proposes an 
equally unconvincing solution. 
Of, Leech, 1974, for some conorete and interesting proposals in 
this direction. Ofe also Keenan,, 1972, 
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the -- formulation of such rules, our aim throughout has been to 
motivate se? 6"tib-representations which are as comprehensive as 
possible, 6ohtaining as much information as is relevant ancl necessary 
to an account of the semantic properties of the sentences they 
represent', am6ng'Wýich willbe the relation of presupposed information 
to the mtaning of th'e sentence I as a whole, 
Let us. now turn to yet another approach to the semantia aralYsis 
of this set of adverbs., Morrissey's (J973) analysis of 'still' and 
#anymore' has elements in common with both that of Traugott & 
Waterhouse, (1969) and a presuppQsitional, approach although he does 
not invoke thelatter., notion. in his discussion. Vorrisspy begins 
by demonstrating that 'still' and, lanymorel,, aro akin to inclusive 
tense in serving "to establish a. secondary-time. of reference, , 
in 
addition to the primary one,, but, also,,. because of this, to ,, ZY 
make it possible for the predication of the verb to be seen in terms 
of its Itruth. valuel., with respect to either of these, times" 
(Morrissey, 1973t, 67), Thus, sentence 118,, a, below is analyzed as 
118. a, ý John is stin singing. -, 
b. John isn't singing anymore 
inclicating that' at' the prima I ry point of reference (the present) it is 
true that John is sinjin'g and at the secordary point of reference 
(sometime in the pasi) "it ý is also true that John is ýinging. On 
the other hand, iI8. b. iý-Ciiaimed to mean that at the present' John 
isn't singing abd that before (i. e., at some'timd in the past) he 
was. 
_ 
As in Horn's analysis (cf. sentences 46. a. to ii6, e- above)# 




However, Iforrissey incorporates a further element into his 
analysisi that of the distribution of new information (as discussed 
in Chafe, 1970). in order to distinguish bet-ween inclusive tense 
ard I still' Panymore I, particularly in relation to such sentences 
as 119*ao to 119. c. belowo The problem is to account for the 
a. John has been singing 
b. John is still singing 
o, John is not singing anymore 
fact that 119, a,, can be inserted either in a context vhere Ii9. b. 
is also true or in a context *where, 119. c, is true (and these two 
contexts are, of course, not oompatiblet omwith the other). 
Morrissey (19731 69) concludes that "the difference between the 
perfective,, whether it is ambiguous out of context or not, and 
still/aMore, is that the former means that the inrormation concern- 
ing the situation obtainina at the secorilary time of reference is 
vital, or I new' . to the communication, whereas the adverbial f orms 
mean that the situation at the primary time of reference is more 
important", However, once one begins to invoke 'notiOns such as 
new or vital information versus old or contextually self-evident 
inrormation in a sentence,, it becomes difficult to determine whether 
this is distinguishable, at the level of discourse, from what is 
asserted versus what is presupposed by a given sentence, Indeed# 
for a sentence to be inserted appropriately into a linguistio 
context, what comes before, i. e.,, the old irfatmation, must not be 
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in conflict-with the presuppositions of the sentence* vie have here 
a meeting of logIcal and pragmatic presuppositiOni 
2 It is quite 
likely that the way in which information is organized in a semantic 
representati'on--i. e. so is to reflect such distinction, 3 as 'givent 
and lww'-ý4ill be directly relevant to the formulation of such 
3 
principles for deriving presuppositions as were alluded to above. 
Cf. Ducrot (1968: 40-41): OLorsqu'un e"nonag comporte des 
prSsupposgs, il d4ploie aimi, entre les interlocuteursl un 
monde de repr4sentations considgrges come Svidentese Il institue 
un univers intellectual dont il fait la toile de fond du dialogue* 
Les presuppositions d1une phrase sont comme une sorte de contexteg 
non pas exterieur, mais immanent,, qua 118"nonce apporte an mSme 
temps qua ses informations proprement dites, * Elsewhere (Ducroto 0 1969: 35-36): *Pour de*crire ce statut partioulier du pre"suppose, 
an pourrait dire quIij est pr9sente comme une evidence, comme un 
cadre Incontestable A"' la conversation doit ne"oes3airement, , slincrire, comme un eltment de ltunivers du discourso,,, le pose se 
pr4sente comme simultanoo I Vacte de communications comme 
apparaissant pour la premiýre fois, dans lunivers du discours, 
au moment de cat acte ... quant au presupposte#. il essaie toujours de se situer dans un passS de la connaissanoe# Iventuellement 
fictif, auquel ]. a locuteur fait semblant de se rk6rer. " 
2 
Cf. Keenan (1971: 45-9)t "A sentence S logically presupposes a 
sentence SI just in case S logically implies SO and the negation 
ofq,, NS, also logically implies 31* ard "An utterance of a sent- 
ence pragmatically presupposes t-hat its context is appropriate"* 
3 For exampleg Leech (1974) would like to associate the presuppos- 
itions Cf a sentence with the downgraded configurations in its 
semantic representation. However, structures with downgraaed 
predicatidns can be 'reorganized', by a formal rule of semantic 
equivalence, into structures in which the downgraded ]predication 
becomes the matrix predication anI the former matrix predication 
a rank-shifted predication (cf. Leech,, 1969: § 4.3.3; Leech, 
1974: 265-8)o The semantic representation organized in terms 
of rank-shifting will not yield the same presuppositions. Cf* 
also our discussion of Sýructures 6. and B. in J8.2. i. 
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8.3-3 Co-occUrrence potential 
Vith the observations ard Proposals of these previous studies 
In mind, let us proceed to a fresh and detailed Investigation of 
the major semantic properties of these two pairs of adverbs# 
beginning with the more obvious co-occurrence restrictions and 
possibilities. It should be noted at-the outset that our concern 
is only with the purely temporal uses of these adverbs,, 
1 but it 
would be hoped that a more comprehC'nsive investigation would uncover 
elements of semantic structure common to both the temporal and non- 
temporal uses, 
2 
Cf. Traugott & 'Waterhouse (1969: fn. pg. 288) for other uses of 
'already', 'yet' ani 'still'. In our investigation we will not 
find it necessary or desirable to distinguish between lalready, 19 (PERFECTIVE) and lalready I (= 'as early as now/then's 'so soon, 
$right now/then'). I(Notj anymorel,, but not 'any longer's has a 
more fundamental use for quantifying over things or sfibstances, 
rather than over times: I haven't got anymore money/amlds- 
2 For example, the temporal and the non-temporal uses of '(not) 
arVmorel are surely related. Furthermore, the non-temporal uses 
of 'already' and '(not) yet' (if they are indeed non-temporal) in 
such sentences as 1. and 2. below (from Traugott & T. 'aterhouses 
I* Already 50% of the votes,, had been cast 
2, Rot yet 50% of the votes had been cast 
1969) may possibly be related to the quantifier expressions 'as 
many as' and 'less thanO in much ihe same way as non-temporal 
'always', Isometimes', susuallylt etc., as in sentence 3. below, 
are related to $all% 'some' s 'most's etc. 9 as in sentence 
4. - 
cf. Anderson & Jessent 1973). Doherty (1973) also discusses 
the relationship between temporal and non-temporal uses of Inochle 
3. Welshmen are always tall sometimes 
usually 
All 
4# Some Welshmen are tall 
illostl 
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8.3.3.1 Tense. aspect ard prop6sition t. YPe 
If we disregard, for the momento the role of negation (in 
particular,, the distribution of 'not'), then a very general pattern 
emerges as regards the co-occurrence potential of 'Still'. 'yet', ' 
'already' and 'anymore'Pany longer$/'(no) longer' with respect to 
tense, aspect ani proposition type, The following sets Of 
sentences illustrate the generalizations to be madet 
120. a. i, Dick is already 
I Sin London ý 
not yet S ýeating his dinner 
Dick was already 




iii. Dick will already be 




(whe n you call) 
be i. Mary already sews, 4er own dresses 
Idoes 
not yet sewl 
ii. Pary already sewed 
I 3 
her myn dresses (at the age did not yet sew 
of twelve) 
iii. Pary will already sew her own dresses (when she 
3 
not yet 
enters high school) 
121 *a, i, Ack is 
still *Z r in London 
no longerS Z eating his dinner 
ii. Dick was at"' 
'2 f 5 in London (when I h di -no longerS nner Zeating 
is 
called) 
iii. Dick will still 
F j be in London 
l j 
no lo nge r eating his dinner 
(when you call) 
be i. Pary still sews her own dresses no lor4., er 










122* 1. Fred has 
not yet 
ý 
fallen asleep during a lecture already 
bfeen asleep : rcr three hours 
already 
fallen asleep (when the phone 
'Pred had 
not yetj 
fallen asleep during a lecture 
been asleep for three hours 
rang) 
(when I first met him) 
(when the phone rang) 
already 
fallen asleep (when you 




have fallen asleep during a 
been asleep for three 
call) 
lecture (when, you meet him) 
hours (when you call) 
123, ie Fred has 
Or) still not 
fallen asleep 
fallen asleep during a lecture no longerl been asleep for three hours 
The existential interpretation becomes clearer in the context of 
'yet' if the underlying existential (cf. 'ever') is realized in 
combination vrith the negative element as 'never'--cf. 1. below. 
1. Fred has never yet fallen asleep during a lecture 
A similar observation can be made with respect to the examples in 
123. containirg 'still' and 'no longer',, only here it is the 
second negative (in the case of 'no longer') which incorporates 
the existential element--cf. 2 below. The role of this negative 
2. Fred ha4 still never fallen asleep during a (. no longer] 
lecture 
following 'stillt and 'no longer' win be investigated in the 
following section. 
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Fred had still not 
fallen asleep (when I called) 
no' longer3 fallen asleep during a 
been asleep for three hours 
lecture (after Smith's first class) 
(when I called) 
still 
(fallen asleep'when 
Fred will no longerl 
have not fallen asleep during 
been asleep f or three 
t. 
you call 
a lecture (after Smith's first class) 
hours (when you call) 
124. a. ýfi-)ick already signed 
7the 
contract (when I phoned 
ýdid 
not yet sign5 
him this afternoon) 
I 




I phoned him this afternoon) 
First of all, we find that the situation described by a sentence 
containing any one of these adverbs may be temporally located in 
the past, in the present, or !. n the future (cf. i- and iii* 
in each of 120. a. /b. , ýI 
21 a. Ao, 122. and 123-)- That is, there 
are, in general, no restrictions on their co-occurrence with past or 
non-past tense forms nor with such modal auxiliaries as 'will'. 
However, past and future contexts must contain, implicitly or, 
explicitly, a reference. to a past or future primary temporal 
Such sentences az-124.. a. ard Mob., -are marginally acceptable if,, 
Dick's signing the contract is construed as a repeatable evert-- 
eog* in the context of a play which has more thin one performance-- 
but then they fall within the same class of sentences as 12O, b. 
It is the more plausible, single-event interpretation which we 
have regarded as being unacceptable here# 
2 
We have included both a negative and non-negative variant here 
80 as to preclude the po3sibility that the uracceptability Of -' ý 
124* derives from the absence of a negative element (of, -r8.3.3.2). 
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reference points respectively# In other wcvdsjl a. Point Of time 
which functiom as a ! present' (a to) in the past cr in the future 
must be contextually established (cf. also Morrisseyj 1973). This 
requirement is identical to that for the use of ivolusive tense in 
past ard Aiture (modal) contexts--cf, 120. a. io and ii. with 125. a. 
a ncl b9b el oyr. This shared contextual requirement will be found 
125. a. Dick had arrived in London (when I called) 
b. '- 'Dick will have arrived in London (when you call) 
to be prodiotable from our analysis of these adverbs. 
Secondly, each of 'already', 'yet'. #still' and '(no) longer' 
may occur in both inclusive and non-inclusive teme sentences 
(cf. 120. /121. with 12?. /123. ). However, here considerations of 
aspect and proposition type (arid, as we shall make explicit in the 
next section, mgation) enter in. In the c, ase of sentences lacking 
inalusive tense (cf. 120. /121 . ), the situation' described by the* 
sentence must be a locational relation of some kind cr else be 
viewed in progressive aspect. The locational relation may be 
simplex (ego Dick being in London) or one constituted by the reg- 
ular repetition of a bounded process (e. go Mary making her own 
dresses), As we have seen In § 8.2.1 these three structures- 
simple states, bounded processes in progressive aspect and such 
complex 'habituals'--share the property cf being point-wise contin- 
uously projectable onto the temporal axis, which property we have 
assumed to be associated in their propositional representation with 
their highermost existential predication beitIv in 13 rather than 
some other existential configuration* And it is this which ambles 
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tlie'm to 'be located it a point -in time and, 'in particular, at t0 .'' 
I: r-, We noyr turn our attention to the class of nort-indlusive tense 
sentences which do not accept any of -our set of adverbs-i. e, those 
describing bounded processes not viewed in progressive aspect 
(cf. 
124#')---Nve find that this set is precisely that which can not be- 
located at t, . even if it is a minimal and ideal border-crossing 0 
(cf. 1 8.2.1 ). In a non-past sentence such as 126. (under &ýsingle- 
event and non-future-as-schecluled reading) 9 it could plausibly 
be 
ly sigru ýalreac the contract 126- ? does not yet signj 
argued that the adverbial plays no role in its unacceptability 
since, even in its absence, the sentence is somewhat dubicus--cf. 
27. This is because a stylistically marked context must be 
127. ? NDick signs' the contract 
irivoked--e, g, on the spot, minute by minute commentary6--in order 
to a9sig MP ,n it an acceptable interpretation as involving 
the te oral 
projection ce the entire event onto t of 
Howevers in the past 
tense (and also in modal/future) contexts# this is not nccessarY: 
the absence of the adveAials in'124. renlers the sentences II 
acceptable-of*, for example, 128. - -The interpretation is simply 
128. Dick signed the contract when I phoned him 
that the signing cf the contract took place simultaneouslywith my 
phone call or, more likely, just following the phone call ('when/ 
'then' being ambivalent in this respect but tending to favcUr an 
"and then* interpretation). Hence, the adverbialS in 124. make a 
definite contribution to the unacceptability CC the nentencesp and 
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this can be related in a relatively straightforward f4shioýz to the 
fact notecl above that they involve,, in conjunction here with the 
past tense, a contextually established primary temporal reference 
point in the past. This point displays the same temporal properties 
as t0 as regards what kinis of situations can be projected onto it* 
ýccordingly,, the past tense sentence which would partially corres- 
pond to 127* above and which is unacceptable for thesame reason as 
124. a. is that in 129. Still more pertinent is the fact that the 
129, w When I phoned him 0 it was the case that 
ýAt 
the tine of my phoning himý 
Oick sigmd the contract 
(cf, At the time of ýý phoning him, it happened that 
Dick signed the contract) 
same restriction occurs in the case of the resultative use of the 
inclusive tense in sentences explicitly describing the coming to be 
(or the ceasing to be) of a situation-cf. 130. a. ard b, This 
restriction again follavs naturally from the semantic representation 
130- a, ? %t has come to be that Dick signed the contract 
b, ? 3(lt has ceased to be that , Ack didn't sign the contract 
we have postulated for the resultative interpretation: it involves 
loc to as the most superordinate predication and hence only in TE 
can come immediately below it, As we shall see, 130. a. and b. are 
closely related to 124. a. and b,, 
Finally, we observe that if the sentence containing anY Of Icur 
set of adverbials is in the inolusive tenses then there are 
apparently no restrictiom on the proposition type, # this being 
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reflected by the fact that resultative, existential and universal 
interpretati6ýs are po3sible (cf. 122. /123. ). 
8.3-3.2 Nepatio 
'We were careful in the rreceding section to imert and omit 
negative elements where necessary so that this factor would not 
interfere with cr obscure the contextual roles of tense, aspect 
and proposition type, We must now reverse the procedire in crder 
to determine what restrictions there are on the distribution of 
'not'* We can begin by examining the alleged suppletive patterns$ 
with respect to 'already'. Oyett, $still' anI 'any longer'/' anymore', 
displayed by two types cf sentences--ones describing a simple 
locational relation in the non-past,, non-inclu3ive tense, and ones 
describing an inceptive border-crossing in the non-past inclusive 
tense, Comider, then, the following -Oentencest 
131. &, bi* Samantha is already asleep 
ii. K Samantha isn't already asleep 
b, i, Samantha. has already fallen asleep , 
ii* 9ý'Saamantha hasntt already fallen asleep 
132, a. i. K Sawantha is yet asleep/asleep yet 
ii. Samantha isntt yet asleep 
b, i, NSamantha has yet fallen asleep/fallen asleep yet 
ii. Samantba basn't yet fallen asleep 
133.,, a. i. Samantha, is still asleep 
" ii. 
K Samantha isn't still asleep 
b, i. x3amantha, has still fallen asleep ($still* nevertheless') 
ii. It Samantha hasn't still fallen asleep I 
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a*i- x Samantha is azleep any longer 
ii* Samantha Cisn't asleep any longer, z is no -longcr'asleep 
b. i, ! PfSamantha has, fallen asleep any longer 
ii. xSamantha hasn't fallen asleep any longer ý has no longer fallen asleep 
Assuming 'already'/'yet' and tstill'Pany longer' are suppletive 
pairs, we would expect 131. /132. and 133-, /134. to display the same 
pattern as 135. /136. below. However,, what immediately strikes the 
135. a. i. Samantha has some money 
Samantha hasn't 
doesn't havelsome money 
b. i. Samantha has made son, a money at the races 
ii. Namantha hasn't made some money at the races 
136, a. i, P9amantha has any moneY' 
ii, p Samantha 
hasn't 
a ny mo ney 
ý 
doesn't bavel 
b, i, ff Samantha has made any money at the races 
ii. Samantha hasn't made any money at the races 
eye is the unacceptability cf the non-negated sentence 133. b. i. and 
of the negated sentence 134. b. ii. --This destroys the suppletive 
pattern for, $still'/'any longer' (for inclusive tense sentences). 
In the case of lalreadyt/lyett, the suppletive pattern is consistent 
throughout, Furthermore, whereas i3l. b. ii. and 135. b. ii. become 
acceptable if, the negative element is stressed, causing the sentences 
to be interpreted as denials of 131. b. i. and 135. b. i., respectively# 
this is not the case with 133. b. ii. Again, this discrepancy 
pertains only, to the inclusive tense ientencesi all of 13liatUtt 
133. a. ii. and 135. ii. ii. are rendered acceptable if the negative is 
539-i 
stressed, These anomalies can be explained-and & suppletive 
analysis rescued--if we look at the interaction of negation in other 
constituents of the sentence, However, a suppletive analysis, even 
if feasible, does not take us very far in explicating the internal 
structure of this set of adverbials: it merely treats the members 
of each pair as contextual variantsm as having the same urderlying 
structure, but does not say anything about the nature of that 
structure. Accordingly, although we shall have occasion to refer 
to it again,, we shall not adopt such an approach as the basis of 
our investigation, 
Let us now see what happens in inclusive tense sentencea when 
we ensure that 'already' and tstill' are not in the scope of a 
mgative and that 'Yet' and 'any longer' are (ie. that the 
requirements of a suppletive analysis are satisfied) but focus 
instead on the effect of inserting a negative within the scope of 
the adverbial, such that the basic proposition expressed by the 
sentence is a negative rather than a positive one. Compare the 
following sentences in this light: 
fallen asleep 137. a. Samantha has already 
Fbeen 
asleep for three hours 
b. KSamantha has already not 
fallen asleep Ibeen 
asleep for three hours 
138. a. Samantha has not yet 
fallen asleep ýbeen 
asleep for three hours 
b. KSamantha has not yet not 
fallen asleep ýbeen 
asleep for three hours 
a. ýSamantha has still 
fallen asleep [been 
asleep for three hours 
b. lamantha has still not 
fallen asleep fbeen 
asleep for three hours 
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140.. a. Y-Samantha has no lon8er 
ifallen asleep , 
been asleep for three hours 
fallen asleep b. lamantha has no longer not 
fbeen 
asleep for three 
hours 
what semantio fact emerges from these sentences. is that 'already' 
and I (not) yet I pattern alike in that neither cf them can occur in 
inclusive tense sentences in which the proposition expressed is 
negated. Similarly, 'still' and t(no) longer' share the property 
of not occurring in inclusive tense sentences expressing a positive 
proposition. The basis for these restrictions ist as will be 
shovin below,, of a semantic or logical nature rather than being 
purely syntactic as, it might be argued, is the phenomenon of 
suppletion* In intuitive terms 137, b,,, 138, bel, 139-ao 
and 140. a. are all anomalous because each implies the possibility 
of obliterating events from the past, of undoing or cancelling past 
happenings. The fact that we operate with or are aware of a basic 
axiom to the effect that such a possibility does not existo is 
reflected in such everyday maxims as What's done is done, Vo use 
crying over spilt milk,, You canit charrc the past 
Having isolated this semantic restrictions we,; pan now see that 
the unacceptability of 133. b. ii. and 134. b. ii, (=139. a. arul 11+0. a., 
respectively) has to do with a violation of this restriction and not 
with a faulty suppletive pattern. If we now substitute throughout 
133. b. and 134. b. the compatible wgated predicate 'not fall asleep' 
for the ircompatible ýnoa-negated one 'fall asleep' g the suppletivO 
pattern is restored: 
133. b. i. " samantha bas still not fallen asleep 
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ý"Samantha hasn't still not fallen asleep 
134. b. i. 1 NSamantha has not fallen asleep any longer 
, (cf, 
M It is the case arky longqr that Samantha 
has not,, fallen azleep) 
Samantha has no longer not fallen asleep 
(Cf. it is no longer the case that 
fnot, 
the case any longerl 
Samantha has not fallen asleep) 
8.3-3.3 ýTore On prcrpoýition tytes 
We must now consider a further set of sentences which suggests 
that the co-occurrence restrictions on 'already' . 'Yet', 
'still' 
and 'any longer'/lanymoret formulatecl so far are still not fine 
enough, It will turn out, however, 'that the refinements to be 
made are related to the requirements uncovered in the preceding 
section pertairAng?, to the negated Cr non-negated nature of the 
expressed proposition, The kind'of sentences whose semantic prop- 
erties we wish to Investigate hore are Jlliýstrated in 141. to 141+- 
below. (The status cf some of the asterisk3 may be questionable 
i4l. a. i. Yllary is alreaýy a virgin 
ii. 
lVary 
is already a mother 
b,. i. 9ýfary is already young 
ii. ?. Iary is already old 
i. 3f'rhe loaf of bread is already fresh 
ii. The loaf of bread is already stale 
do i. Nit is already early I I- ,, I-ý 2'. 
"- 
It is already late 
142. a. i. Nary is not yet a virgin 
A. Mary is 'not yet a'mother 
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b, fo 3ýfary is not yet young 
iio Vary is not yet old 
a* io NThe7loaf'of bread'is not yet fresh 
11. The loaf' of br ead is not yet stale 
do 19, xIt, 16 not yet early 
Ao It Is'not yet late 
aýe` 16 "Alary is'still a virgin 
ii. " Nary'is atill'a'mother 
bý, io Vary is'6till young 
ii. " ý'Ifary is 'still old 
0. . i. The loaf of bread is still fresh 
ii* 5fThe loaf of bread is still stale 
do'io It is still early 
iio 'xlt is still late 
144* a, i. Mary is no longer a virgin 
ii. 'Yary"is 'no longer a mother 
b. A. , Vary'is'no longer young 
lvary'is no longer-old 
'co 10' The loaf of bread is no longer'fýesh 
ii. ý wThe-loaf of brýid`is no longer stale 
do i. It'd n6, l6nger'early 
'ii. x It's no-longer late 
if one is willing to ignore certain facts about and limitations of 
the actual world--i. e* if other possible worlds are also considered- 
but let us disregard this factor for the momert. ) 
Again# 'already' arxi '(not) yet' and 'still' and I(no) longer' 
pattern alike., The former pair cannot occur in a sentence 
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describing what might be called an *aboriginal* locational 
relation-i. e. a locational relation which does not come -to be but 
ratherýis to begin with (or, at leastg comes into existence at the 
same time as'the object, with which it is associated comes into 
existence)j, Such states cannot be re-entered once they are left, 
The 'latter pairi'on the other hands cannot occur in sentences' 
dascribing finterminablet or 'no-exits locational relations-Lee 
locational relations which cannot cease to be, but rather are until 
the 6rd (i. e. - until the time at whichthe object -with which they 
afe', associated goes out of existence). Such states cannot be left 
once-they are entered. 
Horn I "(1970)'discusses such, examples as-Wa. q 142*a,. v 143ia. ' 
and -IW+oa.,. (and points out" the kirdd -of cordition3 which -a possible 
world woitld have'to satisfy in orderUat, the starred sentence could 
be appzopriately used --to describe situations in, such a world), but 
his explanation of-, the, co-occurrence restrictions is unconvimings 
What he claimsAsA hat, the semantic, representation -of, 'mother! must 
contain the -representation of ý 'already'/' yet 9 and 'virgin' that -of -- 
'stilV/'anymore$.,, Al, much more natural-conclusion to be-drawn from 
the data is--that 'already$ arxl tyet' have to doi. -semanttoallyg with 
the coming-into existence, of a locational relationand-hence, cannot 
be used in sent e nces, describing locat ionalrelat ions which cannot, 
come, (ýapk) into existence. And., 
_pimilarl , 
*still' anI 'anymore' y 
have, to-do, semantically$ with. thegoing out of existence-of the 
locational relation described by the 'sentence and hence cannot be 




Before-making these suggestions more explicitp let us elaborate 
somewhat on the differentiation of locational relations introcluced 
above., What we will be seeking is an explanation as to why the 
states. described by IT-lary be a virgin', 'Mary be young', 'the loaf 
of bread be fresh9jlit be early' are ones which can go out of 
existence but not come into existence and, similarlyg, why the 
reverse hold for the states described by 'vary be a motherlp Nary 
be old'. 'the loaf'of bread be stale', 'it be late'. We will begin 
with the first of these sets: 'Mary be a virgin' and Tary be a 
mother% 
Consider'first a more typical locational relation such az that 
described. by 'Mary knows the answer'--more typical in that it can 
be-both brought into existence and taken out of existence and there 
exist, special expressions denoting the border-crossings which issue 
into and out of the locational relation, namely 'learn (the answer)l 
ard 'forget-(the answer)'. -The fact that it is possible to describe 
both inceptive and cessative border-crossings for the same locational 
relation and,, in particular,, the fact that the initial location for 
one is the final location for the other,, and vice versas means that 
these events are reversible (cf, Leech,, 1969)--eachp, so to speaki 
ualoes the work, of the other. Hence,, Mary can go into and out of 
Tesnlýere- (1966:, 77)-- recognizes the inceptive nature. of IdgJal (cf. 'alreadyl), and the cessative nature of Oenccreý (cf, 
#still#). 
Traugott, & Waterhouse (1969) observe that a relationship exists 
between *already', inchoatives and + Polarity adjectives and bet- 
ween 'Still* and, - Polarity adjectivess but they do not go on to develop any oowlus*iom trom this as to the internal structure Cf 
'already# and Istillf. 
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the state of knowing the answer an unlimited namber of times (cro 
more accurately,, the state of Mary knowing the answer can go into 
and out ce existence an unlimited mmber of times), which property 
we can represent as in Fijpre I below. 
Figure I 









described by 'Mary knom the, answerl is repeatable. (In the case 
of successive inceptions of this state, other factors will determine 
whether the border-crossing is described as oir of I (re-)learning' 
or one of I remembering' --we need not concern ourselves with thiý 
refinement. ) 
What is central to the semantic system sketched above for 'not 
know' (cf. 'be ignorant of'), Ilearnt, *know', and 'forget' ani to 
many other such systems as,, for example,, that of 'be asleep's, 'wake 
up% 'be awaket and 'fall asleept is a basic looational relation 
which may be located in existence or in non-existence and in terms 
of which the journeys described by the expressions 'learn' and 
IfOrget' and 'fall asleep' and 'wake up' for example, can be 
In the case of 'be asleep', fwake up0, 'be awakel and 'fill asleept 
One would probably wish to postulate two basic locational relations# 
rather than One,, which would be related in the following way: 
C AWARE 
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defined: Oforget something' is analyzed as "cease to know something" 
(of- 7.6-3.2 arrl De Rijk, 1971+),, *wake up* as 'come to be awake" 
and not the other way around (e. g. 'be awake' defined as "having 
woken up")., However$ the situation becomes somewhat more complex 
with other semantio systems; ani it will be useful t6 distinguish 
between expressiops denoting primary or basic locational relations 
ani those denoting secondary ones, A secondary locational relation 
is one that must be defined in terms of a more basic journey. For 
example, in addition to the interpretation of 'forget' as *cease to 
know", there is a stative interpretation as "have ceased to know", 
i. e. 'have forgotten". as illustrated in 145. 
145* a. I have forgotten the name of my teacher 
b. I forget the name of my teacher 
(This interpretation of $forget' occurs most commonly with first 
person subjects. ) Ifore straightforwar'a, perhaps, are the similar 
sets of e'xpressiom 'not be in (6. g., the house)*-,, 'go into/enter 
(the house)', 'be in (the house)', 'go out of (theý house)' and 'be 
out of (the house)' and Inotbe alive$, $be bornePbe conceived#, 
'be alive', 'die' and 'be dead'. Thi'meaning of 'be out of (the 
house)' is arjýmbly "have oeased"to be'in (the house)" and that of 
'die' "have ceased to be alive" (6f, +3.2), That is, Iforgetl 
(in its stative interpretation), ' $be out'of, (the house)' and lbeý 
dead' denote seconlary locationaVrelations depending for their 
definition on tbeýjourneys denoted by 'forget' (in its non-stative 
interpretation)s *go out of (the house)* ani 'die's respectively; 
and the definitions of these journeys depend, in turn, on the basic 
locational relations denoted by 'know$, 'be in (the house)' and 'be 
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alive', respectively. 
Consicler now a somewhat more complex semantic, system-that 
constituted by expressions having to do with marital status and change 
of marital status,, , We can begin-with the set of - expressions *be 
single'/tbe unmarried' . 'be-, married' . $be the wif e/husband arl and 
Iget. married to'/Imarryl/lwedl/Iltecome joined inviedlock to's One 
might wish to argue that be single'/$be unmarried' and 'be married' 
are comparable to 'not know' aid 1knowl or 'be asleep' and 'be 
awake' in denoting two basic complementary looational relations and 
that 'get married' is used to describe the border-crossing from 
that denoted by the former to that denoted by thelatter. Within 
such a system,, 'A be the wife oi BI could be amlyzed as- "A be the 
woman married to B", , Howeverp there are other possibilitiesg a33. 
of vhich serve to highlight the cohesiveness and interTelatedness 
of the variouz. ýerms in the. system. For example. 'be the spouse 
(=wife or husband) of somebody$ could be taken as denoting a basic, 
essentially posses3ives locational. relation the, coming into 
existence of which is denoted by 'marry'. @Be married' could then 
be regarded as denoting a secori. Lary looational relationwhose 
definition deperds upon the border-crossing denoted by., 'marry's 
That is, 146. a. would entail as well. as be entailed by 146,, b, urder 
a resultitive'(i. e. not existential) interpretation of the -latter 
and similarly for 147*ao and-147. b.: 
146ea, Sharon is tuLrried 11 . "tlx 
b. Sharon his married (someone) I 
147., a. Sharon is single/unmarried 
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bo I Sbaron has mt (re-) married 
Compatible with this alternative would be Anderson6s 0973o) 
suggestion (cf. 'f 4.2) to the e: rfect that 'A marry BI describes an 
abstract journey similar in rxxture to the cowrete jourrny 
described by 'A joiri/meet/come'together with Bl. To go into this 




can be reconciled and that, for instance, there is no contradiction 
in treating 'be married' both as denoting the secondary locational 
relation defined in terms, of the more basio, border-crossing 
denoted by 'marry' and as 'denoting a primary locational relation 
whose 
* 
inception is denoted by the more complex 'get married'. All 
this, of course, is not an isolated phenomenon entkv-r1j peculiar 
to this particular semantic system. There are many verbsg all 
inceptive in rature, which display, the same or similar pattern- 
for example,, Ichangelp lincreaset, 'finish', 1write'p 'tire% 
, close's 'tcooll, The problem is to unravel, in a non-trivial 
way, the synchronic semantic relationships between such sentences 
as 3. a., 3. b. and-3-0. The relationships become clearer when a 
verb with a somewhat more complete paradigm and a basic locative 
-3* a, '' John has written the-letter" 
bo The letter has Tbeen written 
C got(ten) written 
c. The letter is written 
counterpart (e. g. 'be larger') is studied with respect to the 
relations of consequence into which it enterst 
4. a. io The number of linguists on the staff has increased 
ii. The number of linguists on the staff has got(ten) 
larger 
b. -is The number of linguists on the staff is larger' ii. ? The namber of linEpists on the staff is increased 
5. as i* The number of linguists on the staff has been increased 
, :D ii. The number of linguists-on the ' staff has got(ten) 
increased 
io The number of linguists onthe staff is increased 
ii. The number of linguists on the staff is larger 
6. as i. The chairman has increasedthe number of linguists 
on the staff 
iie The chairman has got(ten) the number of linguists 
. on the. staff increased 
Footnote continued over page 
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question, further, however, would take us far beyond the aim of the 
present discussion which is merely to sketch out a semantic system 
illustrating the different ways, in which locational relations 
(states) may be related to Journeys (events). 
Similar problems arise when we turn our attention to expressions 
describing the passing out of existence of the state. (whether primary 
or secondary) of being mrried to someone or being the wifeAusband 
of someone. Con3ider, for example, the journeys described by the 
sentences in 148, and the locational, relations described by those 
148. a. Sharon divorcea Paul last year 
Sharon gota divorce from Paul last year 
a. Sharon got - aivorced from Paul last year 
in 14ý0 If we assume, for theý, sake of simplicity,, that the sentences 
b. i. The number of linguists on the staff is increased 
Us The number of 'linguists on the staff 'is larger 
The question, mark-in 4. b. ii. indicates that the relationship of 
consequence is'somewhat dubious in that it is only because of 
the existence of such-Pther relations of consequence as those of 
5o ani especially 6. (which is explicitly a entive) that 4. b. ii. 
can be interpreted as following from 4. a, i. 
ýii. 
This phenomenon is accentuated in cases where the antecedent describes a situation 
which it would be. somewhat difficult or pathological to attempt 
to bring about: 
suicides 
7. a., The number of miscarriage has increased 
cases of MB 
S 
suicided 
b. i. The number ci. miscarriages is larger 
casei of TB 
'ii.? The number ý6f 
(suicides is increased 
miscarriages ýcases 
of T. B. 
A detailed investigation of these relationshiPs would, hameverg 
take us too far afield, involving as they do considerations Of 
ergativity/transitivity and voice (but cf. Lyons$ 1968a: 
f 8.210 
f 8.3; Anderson, 1971b; Hallidayp 1967/68). 
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in, 148. all describe the going or, putting out of existence of the 
149* a. Sharon is divorced 
b, Sharon is a divorcee 
locational, relation brought into existence by marrying someone 
and that the locational relation, described in 149, is a secondary 
L.: > 
one defined interms CC the having taken place of, such- a journey# 
then it'will bepossible to account for the fact that i49-a- ard b. 
entail such sentences as 150. s, 151,, and 152, belowe 
In particulart 
150* Sharon has been married "(existential interpretation) 





152, Sharon is 3 
'in, gle ýunmarried 
it will be pos sible- to, account for the fact that I (be) Aivorced/a 
divorcee' is hyponymous with '(be) single/unmarried'. Less 
straightforward,, perhaps, is the exit -from marriage constituted 
by 
the event(s) described by 153* arA the locational. relation in 154. 
153. a. Sharon lost her husband 
be Sharon*s husband died 
c. Sharon became a wida-v 
Sharon was widowed 
154. a. Sharon's husband is dead 
Sharon is a widow 
The secondary state described by 'be a widow' is that which comes 
into existence when one's husbard dies (which is a border-crossing 
from existence to non-existence of the man to whom one is married) 
an: l which is usually considered to last until one remarries, The 
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fact that we can speak of a widow remarrying (of. 155. ) suggests 
that I (be) a widow' is also hyponymous with I (be) single/unmarriedl-- 
. A- ---I 
155,. The-wida-v remarried -within a year 
151+- would, in that case, also imply 152.1 Accordingly, the 
various semant icyelýt ions we have been discussing so far can be 
summarized by means of the following figure, representing a possible 
sequence of states and eventst 
However, a. widow may consider herself, or be considered by others 
to be still married or to be still the wife of her dead husband. 
The fact that sentences such as i. ani 2. are possible suggest 
Sharon's husband has been dead for two Years now 
29 Sharon is the wife of the late Peter Woodbury 
that the relation denoteaby 'be the wife/husband of I can be 
treated linguistically as remaining in existence past the point 
in time'at which one ar the participants ceases to exist in 
much the same way as the inalienable kinship relations denoted 
by *be the daughter/sor4/father/mother/brother/sister of'-- 











the wife of 
someone 











the wife of 
someone" 
remarry". Sh n's husband die" ;. 
ron lose her hus- 
ba ," 







be a widair 






The state of being single is re-enterable but after the first instance 
is always associated with some secondary state defined with respect 
to the nature of the event which causes the state of being married 
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to go out of existepces, 
i 
floweven, we can, add yet another dimension to this same 
semantic system, one which is crucial to explicating the logical 
nature of expressions describing looational relations which cannot 
be re-entered once left. Whereas each and every instance of 
marrying someone, marks the cessation of the state of being single,, 
there is a particular instame of the same eventg namely the first, 
which marks the cessation of an entirely different (secondary) 
state, that denoted by 'be a spinster'. (There is,, of course, an 
additional factor of age involved--a young umarried woman is not 
normally described as a spinster (cf. the somewhat archaic Imaidenl)- 
but this does not affect the point at issue. The male counterpart 
'be a bachelor' is perhaps less troublesome in this respecto) That 
is, the situation described by 'A be a spinster' is a, secondary 
state of a special sort: not only is it (at least partially) 
defined in the system in terms of an event which would mark its 
cessation, but it also entails the never-having-happenea of that 
event. Once the event of A getting married has occurred (ioee for 
the first time),, it can never again be the case that the event has 
never mver happenede Accordingly,, we have a state vhich cannot be 
There is no verb Ounmarryl similar to Ountielt Ouncorkig etc., 
That is, the prefixed past parti6iple'lunmarried' is not compar- 
able to $untied'. 'uncorked', etc, but rather to such adjectives 
as unborn', 'uncharted$, The f6rmer set are derived from 
prefixed verbs denoting the undoing"or cancelling of the action 
denoted by the simple, unprefixed verb whereas the latter set 
are derived from the past participle., of a 'positivet verb ('bear', 'chart'), the prefix inclicating that the event denoted 
by that verb has not (yet) taken place or, perhaps equivalently# 
that the state denoted by the past participle is not in existence. 
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(re-) - entered -once it -is left, though it never need be left in the 
first place. ' From what has been said earlier* we would therefore 
expect *be a spinster' (and $be a bachelor') to behave in the same 
way as 'be a virgin*, 'be youngt, 'be fresh' and 'be early' with 
respect to our set, of adverbs. , This is irdeed the case, as 
illustrated 'in 156., (Vote,, howevert that 156. o. and do can be 
given an acceptable interpretation while'the a. and bo sentences 
156. a. Sharon is still a spinster 
b. 'Sharon is not a spinster I any longer 
, -x c. Sharon is already a spinster 
d, x Sharon is nO , t"a spinster yet 
take on an unacceptable itterpretation if it is the age parameter 
which is focussed upon, the being beyond a ma=iageable age and 
never having married, This discrepancy does not arise with $be a 
bachelor'. ) 
The expression 'be a virgin' is like 'be a spinster' in that 
it too denotes a secondary state defined in terms of the never- 
having-happened of some event-in this case,, that of having sexual 
intercourse. There exists a special lingiistic expression far the 
exit from the state of virginity--' lose one's virginity'--whichs 
because it is mcre or less semantically equivalent to 'have inter- 
course fcr the first time$$ denotes a unique, unrepeatable event 
(unlike, for example, 'lose one's husband# ors more concretely,. 
'lose one's umbreliil). What exactly co'nstitutes having sexual 
intercourse may, of course, be disputed arA this will, be reflected 
in disagreement among speakers as to the applicability of the 
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expression #be a virgin$ in certain borderline cases, But this 
does not affect the point at issue, -for under such a social cr 
experiantial'interpretation -of 'virginity as 'that which we are 
considering (of. also the -O*ED, ) it will be the existanoe'or nOD-, 
existence of 'a past instance of such an event or act, however it, 
is defined'f or apart icular'indiviaual or group,. which will determine 
the applicability of lbeýa virgin'. This is in contrast ý to a non- 
experiential view of virginity whereby it is not (the first 
instance of) the act but solely the physical consequences of it 
, rtich are criterial. ý Under such an interpretation it would be 
possible to imagine Possible worlds, in which $physical$ virginity 
could be restored by somd surgica1ýprocess and,, hence, in which 
case -such sentences as 141 ta. i., and -142. a. i., could be given"' 
acceptable interpretations (cfe also Horn,, 1970). In such worlds, 
losing one's virginityt-like, getting marrieaj would be a reversible 
process in the sense that there'would exist a process which 'undoes' 
the result, of having intercourse, thereby taking the person back to 
her, origital, atixte of virginity. However,, it i*. uriler, fLn exper- 
iential view that we have the more interesting principle of tonporal 
irreversibility, the impossibility of 'erasing' the occurrence of an 
event from the past. Any possible world in which 141. aoio and 
11+2. a. i. would be acceptable under an experiential interpretation 
of virginity would be an entirely #ff erent kind of world from that 
But consider the interesting problems posed by such activities 
as rewriting history and annulments, which latter might be 
considered not simply as the undoing of a marriage,, as in the 
case of a divorce, but its removal from the history of an 
individual. 
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with which we are familiar and from those which we can readily 
imagýLnet time,, as ordinarily conceptualized by the English speaker, 
is unidireotional arA noncircular- One never returns to 8L Previous 
point in time* What is done is fcrever doneo The past is closed. 
Let us now consider the complementar7 situation which arises 
in the case of 'be a motherle Although usage. is not quite SO 
clear-cut here, let us assume that, motherhood is a state which 
continues to exist even if one's children cease to exists Further- 
more, we will disregard such complications as those presented by 
foster and adopted parents ani by the Idisowning' of offspring 
(although this latter is mcre relevant to the similar but not 
entirely comparable relation of fatherhood). w-ith these and 
perhaps other provisos 
2 in, mindw the criterial event for defining 
the secondary state denoted by. 1be a mother' is that denoted by 
'bear (? & care for) a child'; and it is only the at-least-onoe, 
ise., the first, occurrence of this event which is crucial* Thus, 
the situation denoted by 'be a mother' is defined in terms of the 
For some discussion of the-azymmetry of the past-fluture axial 
cf. Priorl 1967; Gale, 1967s, 1968; and Rescher & Urquhart 0 971 
2 It will be apparent by niow that all the expressions we have been 
discussing here are bound up with social as well as biological 
faotsý That-is, there are problems about what actually 
constitutes virginity or being married or being a mother, etc* 
and it is to be expected that there win be a certain amount of 
indeterminacy in these areas when various complicating factors 
are introduced and a oertain. degree of individual variation 
as regards the application of ihese terms to borderline or 
pathological situations. 
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at-leant-cýnw) occurrence of that event which marks its incePtiOll 
(rather than its cessation an in the cane of 'be a virgin'); arlap 
because the occurrence itself is all that in crucial and cam0t 
bO 
ferasedt'fro-m the history of the individuals motherhood L3 a state 
w:. ich can come to be but cannot cease to be. 
! ýcnv that the nature of the locational relatiorz denoted by 
'be a virgin* ani 'be a mother' has been explicated in terms or the 
ncver-having, -happened and the ýavin&-happewd-at-lcasf-oncev 
respectively, of nome' criierial event. the relationship and 
nimilarity between the deviart sentences 141. a. i. P 14%a-i- 
and 144. aoii., on the ona hana, arAl 137. b., 02, bt 
139. a. ard i4C. ao, on the other, should become clear. For the 
W-. ter sentences wouIa each entail a non-past inclusive-tens6 
sentence in which the c,, -occurrence requirenents regsxdirg the 
neg-ativity of the Proposition within the scope of the adverbial 
are act satisfied--cf, sentences 157. a. to dw, with 137. b, v iMbop 
139. a., and 140. ass 
157. a. i, YVary has already not /never bad intercourse 
ii. Uary haz already given birth to a child 
b*i* NIfary has not yet not/never had intercourse 
ii, Mary- has not ye, % given birth to 0, child 
c, ýi. Vary hai still not/never had interecurse 
ii. Ollary has still given birth to a child 
d,, i. Vary has no longer not/never had intercourse 
ii. NVary has no lorger given birth to a child 
Pinally, we m3t look briefly at the tber sets of expression3 
which were found, at the begirzdng of this sectionj, to disPIAY 
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similar co-occurrence, restrictions with 'already* and 'yet' or with 
$still' and 'any longer', These were the antonymous or polar pairs 
'be young'/'be old'. 'be fresh'/'be stale' and 'be early'/'be late'. 
Like 'be small'/'be large', 'be good'/'be badt, 'be far'/be rjearlp 
etc.., these all involve implicitly graded or comparative lexemesi 
"they do not refer to independent, 'opposite' qualities, but are 
merely lexical devices fcr grading as 'more than' or 'less than' 
with respect to some implicit norm" (Lyons. 1968: 465-6). However, 
the first set differs from the second in one important respect: 
they are all time-dependent, in the sense that an object's location 
with respect to the norm on the semantic dimension or parameter 
involved is either stationary (the weaker condition) or else moving 
forward (the stronger condition)-i. e. it cannot move backwards* 
A person gets older with each passing moments a loaf of bread either 
gets staler or remains at a particular stage of freshness (e. ge if 
it is frozen), ard it ("now") always gets later. It Is these 
temporal restrictions. which underlie the fact that those expressions 
which describe states corresponding to the 'less than' -side of the 
norm cannot co-occur with 'already' and 'yet's which involve 
inception, and fl-at those which describe states corresponding to the 
fmore than' side of the norm cannot co-occur with 'still' and 'any 
longerts which involve cessation, The contradiction which results 
from such co-occurrence can easily be explicated within our 
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.''. 1,2 framework, whicb we will now proceed to elaborate., 
It will be recalled that in *7-4.3 we noted a relationship 
between 'be young' and 'have existeLl/lived for a short time' and 
lbe(old' and 'have existed/lived for a long time*, the implicit 
norm being transferred to the measure of an extension of time 
from a position within the average life-span. However,, this is 
perhaps a misleading way of putting things, for although a 
particular age may function as a positional norm (say, anyone 
over 20 years of age in old, anyone under 20 years of age is 
young),, aFe itself is an extension and when we say of someone 
that he is so many years old or so many years of age, we are 
saying that the measure of his temporal existential extension up 
to the present moment is so many years. ' When we speak of 
someone reaching a certain age, we are in fact making the same 
kind of statement as Mhen we speak of someone reaching a certain 
height-i. e. that if, (now) is the case that his temporal or 
spatial (vertical) extension is so marjý years or so many inchesq 
respectively. ýicrw, oneln temporal extension,, i. e. one's age, 
is located in one's patt, it is part of one's history,. since it 
in the sum of times at which one has been in existence/alives 
P, ow of these instafices of existential location can-be erased, 
. ence, one s temporal extension can never get shorter though it 
can and, indeed, must get longer each moment one continues to 
be alive. Hence, we can see that it is the sanL% fundamental 
axiom-ti, at past events cannot be erased or changed-that under- 
lien- the temporal. restrictions we have J nf ormally associated with 
these expressioq4. Similar observatiorz could be made in the 
case of 'be eaxlyl/lbe late' (cf. 'It's early in the morningl/ 
11,1ot much of the morning has passed'. 'Its late in the day'/ 
"'Ont of thp. day is gone). In the case of 'be fresh' and Obe 
stale', bomever, - it is more a matter of physical non-reversibilitys 
which in some possible world could conceivably not exist--i, ee as 
with physical virginity, 'one could imagine a world in which it 
was possible to tuxn a stale loaf of bread into a fresh one by 
some physical process. '3imilarly if 'be young' and 'be old' 
aro interpreted in a simply physical way. In such cases, then, 
temporal restrictions as formulated Whove would have to be 
associated wit! -. the normal use of these em: ressions. 
2 
Some of the distinotions discussed in the foregoing section have 
been made quite independently,, and towards different erdss in 
ýlark 
(1974). Her 'entrance-boundnry statf-0 correspondo in 
the present study, to states whiich cannot cease to be (i. ee those 
involving the havi ng-happe ned-at -leas t- o rice of some event) and 
her 'exit-boundary states' to those states which cannot be re- 
entered (i. e. those involving the never-having-happened of some 
event). 
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8.3-4 tincierlying structures 
8-3*4.1 The neeptive/cessative core 
We can account uniforidy for the observations made in 
f 8.3.3 
concerning the co-occurrence potential of *already', 'yet', 'still' 
and 'anyllongert/lany more* if we first assign to 'already' and 
'yet I semantic representations in which the lower-most conf igura- 
tion (i, eo that coming immediately above the structure (X) repres- 
enting the situation being described by the sentence containing one 
of these adverb imls an inceptive structure and to Ostill' and 
'any more' one ir; which the corresponding configuration is a cess- 










semantic representations of 'already' and 'yet' and 159- to those 
of 'still' arA 'any longer% (17e are not, concerned, at the moment, 
with the remainder of the structure above the existential predica- 
tions since this is not crucial to explaining the co-occurrence 
restrictions discussed above an: l would complicate matters at this 
point. ) 
ITOw, let us consider the semantic representation for a sentence 
such as 160. arxI the result of embedding it as X in 158. above. 
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160; "'ary hats never had sexual intercourse 
In 160. # which invqlves 4 n*gated existential interpretation of 
inclusive terze,, the i1elevant inclusive p,! riod is the termporal 
projection Of VarYla-existential extemiong this including t, '* 7, e 
win abbreviate this structure as TP(VARYto),, The essential 
elements, of the semantic representation of i6Oý are given in 161. 
,1 61o 
0 
d ti in 
ti< to loo t 
-"A 
'JARY RAW', 
! 7. XUAL 
If we now embed 161.; in 158. and reduce loe t, (into '! ýW-) to its k 
ultimate conjunitive form we will have the structure in 162, ' Now" 
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conjunction which can be roughly glossed as "at the moment ti junt 
before tk it is the case that within the temporal extension of ', fary 
(Who is in existence at tY there exists a time ti before ti at 
which she had sexual intercoursebut at tk it is not the case that 
there exists suclýmoment% i. e., "at one moment it is true that 
Vary has at sometime in her past had intercourse but at the very 
next moment it is the case that she has never (Le. at no time in 
her past) had intercourse"--cf. 164. below. What wo are left with 
164.3eIt came to be that Vary had never had sexual intercourse 
is the implication that the possibility exists (and only this, since 
we have not considered the uppermost structure, represented by the 
dotted triangle) that an event can disappear from the past. This 
contradicts the basic axiom discussed informally above that what has 
been the case cannot cease to have been the case. Prior (1967: 33P 
35) has suggested various formulations for this axiont n", very true 
proposition concerning the past is necessary'; "Ibatever has been 
the case cannot now not have been the case (CTý, ýJqýPp); ltýhat is the 
case will-always have-been the case (CrGPp)". As we have not 
investigated modal structures, only the third of Prior's suggestions 
-could be given an explicit formulation within our, framework. 
It can easily'be verified, -by reversing what comes undler 
loo t and loc t in 162., that no contradiction results when a i 1-k
structure such as 161. is embedded in a cessative structure such 
as 159,, -cf. 165. belowe Furthermore, since 160. is, at leasts 
i 6"j. It ceased to be that Vary had never had intercourse 
entailed by 166. - the contradiction implied by'i4i. a. i. and 
614* 
166. Pary is a virgin 
14.2. a. io and lacking in 143, a. i. and 144. a. i. will also be accounted 
for* 
Consider now the semantic representation for'a sentence such 
as 167-,,., under an exis tential interpretation. - Assigning the same 
W. 'Uary has borne a child 
meanirAg to-TP(IIARYt ),, the relevart unlerlying structure will be as 
0 




loo ? lNr (TP (V. ARYt 
nE I 
structure 159. .a contradiction will again results, whereas this 
will not be the case if it is embedded as X in the inceptive 
structure 158. -cf. 169. and 170. below. The conjoined structure 
16ge V'It ceased to be that Vary had borne a child 
170. It came to be that Mary had borne a child 
which would be entailed by embedding 168. in 159. is given, in 171 
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A CHILD 
event can disappear. from the past since, roughly, it stands for 
"at one moment it is the case that there exists a time in Vary's 
past at which she bare a child but the very next moment it is not 
true that therie exiets an instance of child bearing in her past". 
And, since 167--will be entailed by or equivalent to 172o, the 
172a Mary is a mother 
deviancy of- . 143. a. ii. arA 141+. a. ii. Emd: 'the aoceptability of 
141. a, it, aiA of 142, a. ii. will follow. 
Finally, we must consider the consequences of embedding the 
I 
urderlying structures of sentences such as 173. anLI 174. in both 
- inoeptive and cessative istructures-cf. 175. ard 176. Simplifying 
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somewhit. j let us represent the degree of freshness of a loaf of 
K C fresh 175, The loaf of'bread becameZ stale 
Xý fresh 
J76, The loaf of 'bread ceased to be 
lKstale 
bread B as P1.11 arsi the- Ofieshness normO for bread as F (B). If -x I- 
-n-h--"- 
the freshness of a loaf of bread, is less than F (B), then the loaf 
of bread can be described as being fresh, if it is greater than 
Fn (B) 1, thqn. it can be described as 
-being 
stale, (F n 
(B) will be a 
range of values rather than a point-value since polar terms are 
contraries rather than contradictions--i. q. a loaf of bread can 
be described as being neither fresh nor stale. -) 
The temporal 
restriction imposed on FýBx) is that , F(B at one moment must be 
greater than or equal to'F(B. ) at the very rext moment. With this 





F(B < 'n(B) 
representation for 173,, in the inceptive structure 158. Reducing 
loc_tk(into E(X)I, to itas oonjunotive sourcep we would have the 
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F(Bi) 4 Fn(B) 
requirements associated with F(B 
x) 
since, if at one moment F(Bj) 
is greater or equal to Fn (B) and atIthe very next moment it is 
less than F. (B)9 then it is not the case, that F(Bi) has remained 
the same cr increased from one moment to the next. A similar 







174.,, is,, embeclaed in a cessative structure. On the other hand, 
no violations occur wben 180. is embeddea in an inceptive structure 
'or 177- in a cessative struoture. 
8.3.4.2' -- The dual time- ref erence and the role of negatio 
'We have still to make precise the full semantic structure of 
our set of adverbs, , So far, we have isolated only the bottom- 
most 'inceptive or cessative existential cortigLwation plus an 
immediately superord*nate temporal locative, What remains to be 
discussed is the nature -of the semarrtic configiwation above this 
locative, 
First of all, it is clear that each of the adverbs involves a 
dual time reference, This has been remarked upon in our 
discussion of co-oocurrence potential in ý8-3-3-1 and'in our 
review of Horn 0970)s Doherty (1973) and morrissev (1973) in 
8.3#2*, For each adverb, the primary temporal reference. point is to 
or some contextually established reference point before or after tb* 
The second reference point is some time earlier than the primary 
one, That is# we appear to be concerned with a'temporal-locative 
configuration of the type required in the sem6, ntic representation 
of inclusive tense sentenoes-in particular, that underlying the 
resultative use of inclusive tense, 
To see what is unique to each adverb, let us begin by consider- 
ing tstill' and 'not yet'. We have already seen that these two 
differ from each other by the fact that 'still' involves a cessative 
structure rhile 'not yet' involves an inceptive one, Howevert it 
is clear that 'still* does not denote simply cessation nor tnot yet' 
simply inception,, On the contrary,, they express a lack of 
619. 
cessatiop and inception, respectively: 181. a. below implies 
18lob. and 181. c. while 18La. implies i82. b. and 182. co Vore 
precisely, 'not yet' in 182. a. indicates that it is not the case 
i8l. a. John is stil. 1 asleep 
-, --b, John is asleep", 
c. John has not woken up (resultative interpretation) 
182* as John is not yet asleep 
b. John is pot asleep 
C, John has not fallen asleep (resultative interpret- 
ation) 
that there is in 
. 
existence at to an instance of John being asleep 
which came into existence some time before to--cf, the semantio 
representation given in 03.1 A rougher gloss of 183. would be 
We have abbreviated the structure in J. below as in 2., where Y 
-dr X in E 
JCH14 ASLEEP 
in 







d*(JCIIN ASL'T, 'FP)i in E 
dt in B 
t <t 00 
(JOHN AST EP)i into B 
"it has not come to be the case that John is asleep". ý In the case 
of 181 , a, aont he cl ; her Iliand, it is the goi ng out of exis 
te nce of a 
state of affairs--John being asleep. --which has not taken place 
(or, 
equivalently, a negative state of affairs which has not (resultative) 
come into existence--see below), The structure in 184. p underlying 
loo to 
n 
d(JCIIN ASLEEP), inE 
o5t, in E 
t to 100 ti 
(JCHN ASL'PEP):, out of E 
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181 a., can be roughly glossed as *It has not ceased to be the 
case that John is at the party",. As the bottom-most proposition in 
83. can be lexicalized as IJohn arrive at the party' and in 184. 
as OJohn left the party* we are in fact dlaiming that i 62. a. is very 
similar if not identical in its semantic structure to i82. c. anclp 
like*ise, that 181. a. and i8l. ce have very similar underlying 
represertat ions. This acoount8-for the fact that i8i. a. and 
182. a. not only entail 181. c. arA i82, c., respectively# but are also 
entailed by them. 
Traugott & Waterhouse (1969: 302) suggest in af oatnote that 
*still' be analyzed, in general, as having the underlying structure 
of 'not yet nott (i. e. the isuppletiie variant of *already not')* 
This relation between *still$ and I (not) yet'-as exemplified belcw-- 
1 65-s John is istill asleep 
John is not yet awake (= not asleep) 
is a reflection of the more general fact that the cessation of a 
state out cf., F, (XI is equivalent to the inception or the complement- 
ary state into E (in i(XD (or simply into, E_(X)-cf. p. 398. ). 
ý(JOIIN) That is,, given the equivalence of in 
F (. TCHN ASLEEP) ard in F 




(JOHII AWAM) i in E 
-'Ioeý 46 ti in H 
e+ t0 00 t 
z 
(JaiN AWAKE)i into E 
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the underlying structure for 186.102 
That is, if out of F, (X) is treated as ultimately into 
FELX) then 
$still' can be seen more clearly to parallel $all' in involving 
the incorporation of two negatives while 'not yet' parallels 
'none' in incorpcrating a single negative. This is consistent 
with the fact that although 1. anI 2. below are logically 
equivalent, 1. is felt to be mcre emphatic, expressing some 
I# John is still not here 
2. - Zohn is not here yet 
element. of alarm, surprise or impatience absent, or present to a 
lesser degree, -in 2., This would be accounted for by the fact 
that the two additional negatives inherent in $still' would be 
associated with two additional cancellings of expectation. 
(cf. Leech, 1974). 
2 Related to this equivalence between 'still' and 'not yet not' is 
a u3e)of 'yet' In non-negative contexts noted in Langendoen 
(1966 : 1. below is perfectly acceptable, is paraphrasable by 2* 




2. It's still early 
3*a. It's not yet late 
b. It's still not late 
,. complemantary terms, 3, does not entail J., and 2. 
). This 
phenomenon is not restricted to sentences involving polar adject- 
ives: as sentences 4. to 6. reveal, the same relations of 
4, We have yet to discuss the question of tenuram, 
5*-We-have-still to discuss the question of tenure 
6. a. We have still not discussed the question of tenure 
b. We have not yet discussed the question of teinrc, 
paraphrase and entailment hold with respect to expressions 
diff ering on a modal/aspectual, dimension. We have not been able 
to investigate this problem further, 
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IN(A anymore/any longer' and 'already' , like 'still' and 
loot yet'. differ, in the first instance, bY the presence of a 
ces: ýative core in the former and an inceptive one in the latter. 
But unlike tho second pair, *not any more' does entail cessation 
and, lalreadyl inception: J88. &. entails 188. b. and 188*0, while 
189. a. entails 189. b. and i89. c. 
188* a. John is no longer asleep 
i, John is not asleep 
-,, o, - John has woken up 
89. a. - Jobu is already asleep 
b., Jobn is asleep 
o, John has fallen asleep ,I 
Let us look-first at 'no longer I/' riot 'any "longer If we 
were to treat this expression as having the semantio structure of 
Istill' plus that of a higher negative-ioe. if we were to assume 
that 'any longer' ard Istill'. formed a suppletive pair-then 188., a. 
would be essentially identical in meaning to,, 190. below. That is, 
unlerlying 'no lorgerl/Inot any longer' would bethree negative 
190. John has not remained asleep (cf. : Et is not the case 
that John , has not ceased to be asleep) 
elements. Weidght therieftre expect 188. a. to be emphatic in a 
way in which 188. c. 9 invOlving only_ One ncgýxtive, element at the 
mostj is not. However, this does not appear', to be the casel 
sentences i9l* and 1929 (cases in which there is no verb to 
lexicalime the cessation of the described situation) are virtumllv 
624* 
191. - flaUl has stopped dating Margaret 
192, Paul 13 no longer dating Margaret 
synonymous, both conceptually and stylistically* The only ditfer- 
ence would aýpear -to-be one of focust 191. concentrates on the 
border-crossing between the coýplementary sitýations of Týaul dating 
ird"Paul -not dating Vargaret (i. e. 'on an event); 192. concentrates 
on'the'preiint ''non-existence of a situation vhich once was in 
existence. - More precisely,, 191, indicates that the outcome of the 
event of Paul ceasing to date Margaret is presently in existence 
(i, ee a, resultative inclusive-tense interpretation) while 192. 
inlicates that Paul's dating Margaret does not extend (ise. is not 
in existence) beyond some unspecified point of time in the past* 
The following structure is proposed to repre3ent this meaningi 
193s 
t. in E 
ti4 t0 loo t 
nE 





PAUL DATE !! ARGARFT 
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904A 
193. can be glossed as "There is a time in the past at which J-sohn 
was dating Margaret such that there exists no time since then Paul 
(i. e. after that'time and up to and including t; 0) at which 
geh-n- 
was dating Margaret". Although we will not go into the details, 
193e can be shown to entail the resultative inclusive-tense structnre 
underlying 191, given below in I%. (We have treated cessation as 
the inception at non-existence. ) Furthermore, it should be possible 
191+0 
loc t 
exi in E 
Xi in (PAUL 45t in E 
DATE MGARET) 
t i4to loo t 
z 
xi into E 
to derive J 93, from 194. (cf .f no % p, 661), Thus, although 193, 
does not contain explicitly a complex semantic predicate out or E 
it does contain the configuration required for the definition of 
this predicate. 
Despite the rather speculative rature of the structure 
proposed in 193,, it does seem to reflect adequately and clearly 
the differeme in focus between J91. an: 1 192. What, is perhaps 
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pore encouragings it enables us to see a possible approach to 
relating this usage of *no longer'/Iany longer' to its other 
temporal, uses,, ancl to its non-temporal uses* Compare, for example, 
the follmving, seateMeq: 
a littlel, 
195. John workea(ýa lot jIlonger than he was required 
196. John didn't -work ary longer than was required 
M. Thekitten is no longer than my foot 
a bit 198* The, kitten is(j. lotj)longýr than my foot 
195* states, that -an activity extended (m was in existence) beyond a 
certain measure. 197* and 198. areparallel except that it is the 
physical extension of a physical object which exterds or aces not 
extend beyond a certain measure. We have not had the time nor 
space to-pursue this relationship further. However, it is 
obviously required that such a relationship be explicated before 
a definitive analysis, of the. -temporal use of 'no/any longer' under 
discussion can be attempted, Similar consideratiom are involved 
in the analysis of 'anymore% which also has both temporal 644' 
(mainly in American Pnglish)ýnorr-temporal uses and which, unlike 
#any longer's has a 'some' variant in non-negative contexts: 
to work. some more 199, John wants 
[some 
more wcrk 
to work-anymore 200, "John wan'ta 
I 
anymore work 
x to work some'mcre 201, John doesn't want some more work 
to work anymore 202. John doesn't want any more work 
Finally, let us'turn our attention to the semaiatio representation 
for 'already'. Unlike 'not arjymorel,, 'already' does seem to involve 
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more than simply the having come to be of the described situation: 
there is some element of emphasis which is often interpretable as 
*sooner than expected" (of, Tesniýere, 1966ý Edgreng 1971). 9 
Compare,, for example, sentemes 203. ard 204,9 the former being 
203. Paul has started dating Margaret 
204. Paul is already dating Margaret 
explicitly inceptive, the latter only implicitly, The difference 
in meaning becomes clear when these are embedded in a context such 
as the following: 
205. Paul-met Margaret yesterday and has started dating her 
206. Paul met Margaret yesterday and is already dating her 
Only 206. contains a'nuance of surprise or subjective evaluation 
(eog* "that's quicker/sooner than one would have expected"). 
Again, we can provide for /but not totally e x-plain 
in an explicit fashion) 4 this element of unexpectedness by 
incorporating into the semantic representation'L-of 'already' a 
negative element. Since we have found that $already' is at least 
implicitly inceptive in nature,, a double negative structure will be 
necessary, in order that the inceptive, content remain unaffected, 
Such a dquble negative configuration would receive additional 
motivation if it could be shown that lalreadyl, whose diachronic 
source is 'all' + 'ready' ("all prepared"), involves universal 
quantification inIts synchronio description, 
1", 
_. 
Let us suppose then that the unlerlying struoture for a 
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in E 
rough gloss is "It is not the case that it has not become the 
case that John is dating Margaret", 
_ 
The 'cancelled. expectation' 
would be the structure under the upper-most in i. e. the 
structure underlying 208. (cf. 18.3, ),, This would accord well with 
208., Paul is -not yet dating Margaret 
the nuance of "sooner than one mijýit expect". Furtherýore, sihee 
the two negatives in 'F, ) -will cancel each other 
logically, we also 
can derive-the simple inceptive structure underlying 203. 'Such a 
suggested semantic representation as 207- 'amounts therefore not to 
treating 'already' and 'yet' ''as a suppietive'pair but rather to 
treating *already' as incorporating both the semantic structure of 
629* 
'mt Yett as well as a higher negative. 
I 
Some support for analyzing $already' as incorporating a structure 
sharing some of, the properties of universal quantification is 
that, und er negationT it behaves in a rather similar fashion to 
lalll/leveryl. Consider first Traugott & ', *,, 'aterhousels (1969: 
287-8) discussion of the somewhat faulty suppletive pattern 
displayed by 'already'/'yet'. They consider the following set 
of sentencesi 
i. a. fie has gone -already 
b. 71fe- has gone. yet 
2. a., ? He hasn't gone already 
b. He hasn*t gone yet 
The -acceptability, under certain conditions, of 2*a. destroys the 
suppletive pattern. However, Traugott & Waterhouse overcome this 
discrepancy by concludi, ng. that 'already' in 2. a. is a different falready' from that in ia* They claim that it is interpreted 
either (1) as "a negative response partially echoing such a 
question as Has he gone alreadv? or a denial echo Of He has gone 
already" (with 'already$ emphatically stressed according to 
T &: W--but see below) or 0) "as the answer to some such question 
as Has the beat man prone to pick up the groom? No. he hasntt 
pone alread " (again, 'with emphatic stress on galready'),, In 
this second reading there is *also an element of surprise, and 
some continuation of the answer is implied,, e, g,, But he will soon.,, 
it implies I'm surprised that you thought that he might have pone 
so sooij/ by now (i. e. by this--speoifio time in the present)"s 
Traugott & Waterhouse conclude that 2. b. is the negative counter- 
part of ioa, and that 2. a. has little or nolconceptual relation- 
ship to i. a. 
This conclusion is an unfortunate one for several reasons, 
First, it ignores the fact that 2, a,, on either of its readings, 
implies 2. b. Secondly, it forces one to recognizeas distinct 
two interpretations of 'already' which are obviously closely 
related., Thirdly, by interpretating the data in such a way-in 
order to rescue an analysis in terms of supplet-jon-the similarity 
of leao and 2, a, with an equally valid pattern is obscured. For 
example, compare 3. arxi 4. below with I. a. and 2, ao above. 
Sentence 4. can be understood in two ways, First, it can be 
John wants.., al, l the fringe,, ýe nefits 
,, 
John doesn't want aU the fringe benefits 
interpreted either as a denial of 3. -(in which case"Idoesn't' 
would be stressed)'or simply as a statement expressing a negated 
proposition--of, 5. below. Under this interpretation a 
59 John has investigated the matter and has decided that 
he doesn't want all the, fringe benefits 
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8,4 OUritill and-laincel adverbials 
8.4,1. Preliminary remarks 
In the following sections we will be considering some of the 
prcblems which arise in characterizing the meanings of 'untill 
anl Isincel 'and-, in representing the semantic structure of sentences 
in which they occur, Howeveri as we' have already dealt briefly 
with Isincel in-our discussion of inclusive tense in ý 8,2,2*p we 
shall 7direct most of our attention to the'semantic description Of 
The reasons 'for grouping 'until' and 'since' together 
will become clear in the course of the discussion*' 
8.4.2. Previous approaches 
There have - appeared varl: ous fragMentary ancl/or irwidental 
obse'rvations on tý'e'syntac'tic or semantio IbI ehaviour of *until$ 
continuation such as 4.1 could be added. This reading of 4. is ,, ý 
4.0 In fact, he -doesn't want !, n z of the, fringe benefits 
parallel to interpretation (i) given above for 2sa. (except that 
we disagree with Traugott & Waterhouse that it is 'already' that 
receives stress (if any element does)), Thus, 2. a. could also 
be followed by a similar completion--e. g. 2. a. It secondly# 4. 
2. a. 1 . In fact, (it looks like) he won't ever be going 
can be interpreted as I "some but I not all" (especially if 'all' 
is stressed). That is, it 'expects' in a strong sense (of,. 
Leech,, 1974) the continaation in 4o I lo Furthermorep if 4o 
4.11 But be wants some of them 
under this irýerpretation is given the completion in 4. ', the 
sentence is deviant. - 
6o Wohn doesn't want all of the fringe benefits-in 
fact, he wants none of them 
The same turns out to be true in the case of the second interpret- 
ation given above for 2. ao with 'already' tresseds 2. a. expects 
2-a- and is odd when continued by, 2oa 
2oao" lie will be going sometime (soon) 
7, Me hasn't gone alread -in fact, he won't be going at all 
This Parallelism between 'all's *none' ard 'some'# on the one hand, 
and 'ýhaz) alrcad I *(will) never' and 1(will) sometime', on the othert seems to tge *author to be just as im]przant ard worthy of further investigation as that between 'some and 'any' and 'already 
and 'yet'. 
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adverbials in the recent literature (cf. Klima,, 1964; Fillmore# 
1969; - Lindholm, 1969; Horn, 1970,, Jackendoff . 1971 ; Chomsky, 
1972; and Seuren, 1974a). 
I M. Geis (1970) discusses in somewhat 
fuller and more ambitious terms both 'until' ard Isincel while 
Leech (1969) provides us with expl&cit proposals for the semantic 
representations of each of these, Both Geis and Leech regard 
'until' and 'since' as being comparable ani very similar in their 
semantic structure* In this section we shall concentrate on the 
details of their proposals while in J8.4.3 we will have occasion 
to refer in some detail to Horn's (1970) presuppo3itional treatment 
of 'until', 
Geis suggestss on the basis of syntactic evidences that 'Until' 
be derived from an urderlying aspectual verb corresponding to 
'begin' and 'since' from one corresponding to lend'. More precisely, 
a sentence such as 209. is to be derived from something like 210. 
209. John lived here until (the time at which) Bill died 
210. John lived here all during a time that enled at the time 
at which Bill died 
An informal, somewhat out-dated, but comprehensive study of both 
synchronio and diachronio aspects of the meanings and syntactic 
properties of 'since' as an adverb preposition and conJunction 
are to be found in Pijn van Draat 
6 904l J gi 09 1912) 9 
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while 211. is to be derived from 212.1 . 
Geis is somewhat vague in 
- 211. John has lived here since (the time at which) Bill died 
2J2, John has lived here all during the time that began at 
the time at which Bill died 
his use of the term $derive': it is not entirely clear whether he 
inýends 209, . for example. to be'the result of applying some set of 
transformational rules to 210. or whether he intends both of them 
to be derived (by transformational rules) from a common underlying 
structure but one which is more similar*in nature td 210. than it 
is to 209. His comment (Me Geis, 1970: 244) that serterres such 
as 210. ani 212. "need only be thought of as sketches of the sort 
of information that must be contained in the underlying 
representations of sentences like J-10.7 and Z2-12*7". p is more in 
1 Geis claims that the temporal interval involved in the case of 
Ountill is necessarily indefinite (cf. 'a timeO in 210. versus 
'the time' in 2129)o Ile states (H. Geis, 1970t 248) that "the 
durative adverbial which until-phrases originate within must 
contain an indefinite determiner... " and suggests Using this 
putative fact in accounting for the possibility of 'ever' 
occurring with tsincel adverbials but not with 'until' adverbialse 
Although we will find that it is not altogether appropriate to 
associate 'until' with the specification of an interval (whether 
'definite' or 'indefinite'), it is nevertheless not always nor 
even usually the case that a beginning point for the interval is 
lacking: it is often implicitly the time of utteranceg tog as 
in i. below; sometimes it is made explicit by, means ofýa 'from' 
phrase, as in 2.; otherwise it is most likely assumed to be 
retrievable from the context, as in 3. 
1. John will live here until Bill dies 
2. John lived here from the time he, graduatea until 
Bill died 
3. John lived hereýuntil Bill died 
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line with the latter interpretation. However,, as his analysis 
stands,, we are left with simply a paraphrase relation (assuming 
it in accurate to view-it as such) between two surface sentenaess 
the elements occurring in M. ard 212, and the syntagmatic 
relations between them still require an explication in semantic 
terms* 
- What is perhaps remarkable is that,, when we turn to Leechts 
(1969) purely semantic analysis of luntill and Isincelt it turns- 
out that his semantic, representations are nearly identical in both 
their, 'vocabulary' and their 'SyntW, formalization and symbol- 
ization aside, to-those of Geis, Letting I star4 fcr "John live 
here" arA, Y for "Bill die"9 Leech's representations-, for 209, -arxl 
211, would be those in- 2136 and 214., respectively* 213. would 
213. (X) - 4DUR 0 10 +PERI I <91 * *ýEXT O> 
+-EXT +EI ID -PERI" 4-TIM e (Y))> 
- 214. (X)-+DUR -'G +PERI 1 401-*- PAT -END -0 -r-rRl * 
<04 a 4-TVI (Y)>> 
be glossed as (X) for the duration of e the period<which 
begins thený(and) <which - ends % at the time <(at) which takes 
place - (Y))>" anLI 214. as "(X) - for the duration cf the period 
<which - begins % at the time <(at) which takes place (Y) >) (and) 
(which , ends - the ný If we compare these representations with 
210, ancl 212., respectivelylo we fird that there are only three 
significant differences between them. pirst, Leech treats 'until* 
as involving a definite time interval (i. e. bounded by a specified 
beginning and erxl point),, not an indefinite one as claimed by Geis 
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I is taken (cf. fn. 1, p. 632): *the beginning-point cf the perioc 
as given (either 'now' 'or 'then'), and the end-point is overtly 
stated (Leech,, 1969: 133). Secondly, Leech's representation in 
2%. makes explicit, in contrast to 212,,, an end point of the 
interval he associates with the meaning of 'since'. However,, we 
would, 'claim that it''is not entirely correct to regard the interval 
of time specified by Isincel aaverbials as ha*ing such an erd point: 
all that is implied is that -the intiival in queiti6n extends up to 
and includes "n6w"/"then". " That is, - a, Isitrel expression 
establishes an op6n-'encled interval of time beginning at some 
specified point arA ekteýding up to and including the primary temp- 
oral reference point (eog, to)a ' 'It is the inclusive 'tense. which 
I I' VVk; 
+S 
e6rR+wm the assignment of the existence of X to the times before 
and up to too not thereby ex6luding, however', the possibility of 
X 'extending through and beyord t6--cf,, ' 86. in t8.2,2. Thirdly, 
whereas Geis had associated . 'until' and Isincel -irith two distinct 
and formally unrelated verbs p Leech'has, by means cC the binary 
system + END combined with the relative system #MCT, made explicit 
the dimension along ihich both he and Geis regard these expressions 
as being semantically opposed# the structural and substantive 
parallelism of the remainder of each I 'oC their paraphrases/semantic 
representations reflecting the' ýature of their supposed'semantic 
similarities. 
However# just asiGeis! s paraphrases fall short of semantic 
representations, so also do many of Lecohis sqmantio systems (eege 
DUR "last for the duration of",, -, 'bFXT "is an extremity of 
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-+TIM "be at time") treat as atomic elements of meaning which 
must be and can be amlyzed further (cf. our comments in f n. I 
P. M 6). More importantly, hairever, both Leech and Geis fail to 
take adequate account of the properties of X in 213. and 214. 
above-i. e. the type of situation being described by the main 
clause'-and, in Particular, how these relate to the fact that each 
of *since' and tuntilO occur in sentences of two distinct kinds. 
As we have already observed, inclusive tense sentences with a 
fsincelý adverbial are susceptible to two,, interpret at ions -what we 
have callaaan existential and a universal reading, (We als 0 
f ound that this phenomenon was not peculiar to 'since'-Of - 87- in 
* 8o2,, 2, ) Leech (1969),, also points out that Osincel can mean 
either *for the period from... to now* or "in the period from,,, to 
now*, depending upon whether X. the described situation, is a state 
or an event (cf. f 6*3.4-3. for Leechts aistinctign, between state 
and event predications). Howevers although Leech pinpoints the 
contextual feature which is responsible for this shift in inter- 
pretation, he is unable to explain -why this shoula, be so arA has to 
treat $since* adverbials as polysemous. As we have seen in 
rr 8Z 2, however, an analysis which takes into account the difference 
in temporal properties of the different kinds of situations which 
sentences may describe reveals that this is not at all necessary. 
The different interpretations are entirely predictable from, or an 
of course, the type of situation described in the luntill or -- 'since' clause is also constrainedi it must, in generalq be a 
situation which is implicitly or explicitly a border-crossings 
i9e. one 'which projects onto a single point in time--cf, Leech's 
use of -FM in 213. and 214. 
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automatic C'omequ'ence of , the type of temporal projection a 
situation of a given type may have. All an aaverbial such as 
'since Bill died' or, for that matterg such as 'during the 
Acts 
conference$, 'while John was speaking', 'today$,, as. is identify 
on the time axis an interval within- which or-Ahrough which the 
situation being desoribed'is located. it will be the temporal- 
existential lexchangevaluet-(to use Bull's term) of the situation 
being described which will determine if it can be located in a 
continuous, manner along all, the points witf? the interval (hence 
the, possibility of a universal interpretation) or if it must have 
single point or bounded temporal project ions. within the interval 
(hence, the requirement of an existential interpretation)* 
Now, in view of the alleged semantic parallelism between 
$since# and 'until' , the question immediately arises as to whether 
#until' adverbials can also be used with both an existential and 
a universal interpretation and, if not . why not. In fact,, and 
it has been remarked upon in most discussions of 'until', an 
existeetial -interpretation is not only notý possible but the 
sentence type with an Ountill adverbial which would be the counter- 
part of an existentially interpretable sentence with a *since' 
adverbial is unacceptable, That is, an 'until' adverbial cannot 
occur when the sertence is understood as describing a non-iterated 
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bounlea situation. Thus,, whereas 215. a. can sustain both 
universal and existential interpretations ard 2115. b. is acceptable 
ana interpreted existentially,, 216. a. has only eý universal inter- 
pretation and 216. b. is umcceptable: 
ý, 215. a. Jo4n has been ill sinoe Christmas 
b, John, hasl charged his mtni since Christmas 
216. zý&. John was ill until Christmas 
b, KJohn changed his mind untwil Christmas 
Howeveri as 'notea by Leech and ý others. if a negative is inserted 
into a sente'nee describing "a: bounded situation, then an tuntill 
adv6rbial may-, occur, as in 217- We shall have, 'more to 'say below 
217* John did not change hjý mincl ýuniil Christmas I 
about this sentence type# which, for reasons which should not be 
too obscure, vý will refer to as the'nagative-existential use of 
funtill The point we wisb to make here'is"* that'thiý aifference 
in behaviour between sentences witý Osincet aaverbials' and those 
The major exception to this statement are cases where the 
described event is'a simple bcrder-crossing, inceptive cr 
cessative in nature. The possibility then arises (but not in 
all instances) of interpreting the luntilO expression as indio- 
ating the end-point of the interval throughout which lasts the 
locational relation which the border-crossing results in: 
I# John lent me the book'untiI Tuesday 
2. The lake froze over until April 
3- Mary fell asleep until the eni ar 11 the lecture 
4. Fred stopped talking until the room was quiet again 
We have already noted that this interpretation is also possible 
with 'for' duritio. ml adverbials-cf. t7.7* 
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with $until' adverbials Ae entirely unpredictable and unaccountable 
for given either of Leech's or Geis's characterizations of these 
adverbials since each assumes that the only difference between the 
two adverbials is-which of the two limits of a temporal interval 
is overtly 'specified. It will be the aim of our investigation to 
demonstrate that the universal, and negative-existential uses of 
$until', advarbials can be re2ated in a, very simple and natural ways 
but that to do so requires. us to abandon the kind of semantic 
characterizations. given for 'until' by Leech ard Geis* most 
generallyl we diverge. in our treatment of 'until' from that of these 
latter by copsidering the inclusion of a 7for the duration of a 
period' component in its- semantic representation, as inappropriate 
and, misleading. 
8.4.3 The negative-existential use of 'until' 
Earlier disoussions of 'until' have, tended either to treat the 
universal interpretation as somehow basici, the-negative-existent: Lal 
use then-being regarded as a-partioular case, or to treat the 
universal and the negative-existential uses as_distin6t and perhaps 
unrelated (this$ ironically$, being_tbe casq,, in Horn's (1970) study, 
the 
I 
only one in which there is a signif icant pre-occupat ion with 
the semantics of both uaes),, An example ofIthe first approach, 




That man didn't get there this time until five o'clock 
219, 'ýThat man got therq this time until five o'clock 
220. That man slept until five o'clock 
221, KA guest arrived this time until five ofolock 
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222. Guests arrived this time until five o'clock 
concludes: "The fact that the element neg provides a favourable 
environment for until then,, in the same way as d6 certain classes 
of verbs and certain types of nominal specification, is not sur- 
prising if we give negation,, in such oases, the by no means 
counter-intuitive interpretation of specifying the absence of what 
is predicated by the same sentence without neg, Simple absence 
would then also inv-clve span of Time", In a similar vein,, 
Fillmore (19691 112) remarks: "A continuing activity, or state, 
necessarily occupies a span of time, and thus it makes sense to 
qualify a continuative verb with & complement which identifies one 
or both of the end-points of such a span, or a distance-measure 
of the span... the negation of a momentary verb can identify a 
continuing state... ". 
On the other hand,, Leech (1969) appears to identify negative- 
existential 'until' with Onot.., before* insofar as he equates 
sentences 223. ard 224. below. HOrn*s (1970) presuppositional. 
223.1 shan't sign the contract until next week- 
224.1 shan't sign the contract before next week 
analysis of 'until# also implicitly treats 'not ... until' as the 
negative counterpart of 'before$. It will be worth our while to 
look at his proposals in detail in order to assess the legitimacy 
of this kirxl of analysis. 
For a sentence such as 225.9 Horn claims that it asserts 226, 
225, It won't start raining until Saturday 
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226. it won't start raining anytime earlier than (i. e. 
before) Saturday 
and presupposes 227. HowqVerl granting the appropriateness of 
227. It will be raining, on Saturday 
I 
such-a preatTpositional treatment, it would, seem preferable to 
regardý 228. below, rather than 227. . as the presupposition of 225. 
228. It will start raining on Saturday 
227. would then be a straightfcrward implication from 228. But is 
it apprcpriate to be talking of presuppositions at all in this 
context, rather than simply of implications? Given the standard 
definition of logical presupposition, a sentence S' is presupposed 
by another sentence S if' it is logically implied by both S and the 
mgation of S (*oS). Nowp if 225. is taken as S,, then 229. below 
229. It is not the case that It won't start raining until 
Saturday 
would be wS. But 229. no longer implies 228.. If,, on the other 
hand, we identify 225. with vwS, then S presumably would have to be 
the unacceptable sentence in 230, , Horn =st be aware of this 
230. KIt will start raining -until Saturday 
1 Horn gives in parentheses after 227. the sentence in 1. below. 
1. It will have started raining by Saturday 
It is not at all clear what status he wishes to give to this 
alternative,, but it clearly could be in contradiction with 226. 
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dilemma, but he slides over it by surreptitiously inviting the 
reader to accept 231. as the non-negative counterpart of 225. 
231. It will ýtart raining before Saturday 
That ist 231. is to be taken as S and 225. as &G3 in the determin- 
ation of 228. as the presupposition of both. However, a bit of 
thought will quickly reveal that 231. does not imply 228. ando 
hence, cannot presuppose it: it may start to rain sometime before 
Saturday,, say on Thursday, but not continue raining through to 
Saturday (i. e. it could stcp raining on Friday). In such a case, 
231- would be true but 228. not necessarily so, Moreover, 231. has 
its own, regular,, negative counterpart, 226. which, again impl: kes 
neither 227. nor 228. It seems safe to cqnclude, therefore, that 
it is incorrect to analyze either 227. or 228. as a presupposition 
of 225. 
Part of the reason for both Leech's and Horn's confusion over 
*not... untill and 'not .. before' could be the fact that they both 
consider only sentences with modal auxiliaries. The semantic 
relation3hiP3 become clearer if we confine our attention to 
examples of past tense Aeatences, where the element of modality is 
absent. , Consider in this respect the sentermes in 232. to 235. 
232, It did not start raining until Saturday 
.,. 
233. It did not start raining before Saturday 
234. It started raining before Saturday 
235. It started raining on Saturday, 
Sentence 233- is clearly the negative counterPart of 234. --it could 
be used to assert the negative of the prcposition erpressed by 
eR A 044-90 
234. or, with stress on 'not', to deny 234. Furthermore, it is 
entailed by 232. but is not eqUvalent to it--cf. 236. and 237. 
That is, whereas 232. entails 235., 233, does not. In facto the 
236. As had been forecast,, it didn't start raining before 
Saturday--in fact, it didn't start raining before/ 
until Monday of the next week 
237. ? As had been forecast. it didn't start raining until 
Saturday-in fact', it- didn't start raining before/ 
until Monday of the next week 
conjunction of 233. and 235. --cf. 238. --entails 232, and, we would 
238. It started raining on Saturday and not bef ore (a It 
did not start raining before Saturday arx%Aut it 
started raining on Saturday) 
like to claim,, can be appropriately viewed as a rough gloss of the 
semantic representation for such a sentence as 232. Postponing 
until later the details of an explicit characterization of the 
underlying structure, let us pursue, in the remainder of this 
section, some of the semantic and syntactic consequences of adopting 
such a *conjunctional' analysis of the meaning of this negative- 
existential use of Ountilt, 
There are sentence types involving a negative-existential use 
of-*until' which are logically equivalent to the corresponding 
sentence type with *not ... before' in place of 'not ... until' and 
others which are pragmatically, if not, logicallyp equivalent,, to the 
corresponding sentence type with 'not ... until' replaced by 'at'/'on'/ 
'in'/'when'. These facts can be explained on the basis of an 
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unierlying conJunctioml source for Inot.., untill. Let us look 
first at the case where a sentence with 'notooountil'. is 109icP-11Y 
equivalent to the corresponding sentence with 'not ... before'. 718 
could pr edict that this would be the case if the 'at'/lonl/linl/ 
'when' conjunct (hencefcrth simply the 'at' conjunct) is tauto- 
logical (by the Identity Law P&T MP). Consider in this light 
the foUowing sets of seriterces: 
239. a, John didn't stop running towards the river until he 
had reached it 
be John didn't stop running toward3 the river before he 
had reached it 
a, John stopped running towards the river when/at the 
time at which, he had reached it 
240, a, Mary didn't stop drawing the pioture until she had 
finished it (ise. finished drawing the picture) 
b. Mary didn't stop drawing the picture before she had 
f inished it 
c. Mary stopped drawing the picture when she had finished 
it 
Now, at the moment at which a moving object reaches a place (or, 
more generally, finishes a journey) it is at that place (the goal Of 
4 
the Journey). Hence, it cannotp at that moment, be going towards 
that place. The finishing of a journey,, at time tj entails the 
cessation at ti of that journey and, in particular# Of the directional 
process irwolved in that Journey (cf. J6.2.2t *7*5.2). Thus, the 
ce sentences in 239. and 240. are tautological by virtue of the fact 
that their main clause is entailed by the $when' clause. 
KI'L, 
Accordingly, if each of the a. sentenods is logically equivalent 
to thO COUNZOtiOn Of the corresponding b. arA c. sentences, then 
the tautological rature of the c. sdntences explair*3 why each a* 
seLtence is also logoally equivalent to simply the b. sentencee 
Consiaer n= the opposite situation,, exemplified by the 
follordn, ',?, sets Of SentOnOCS: 
241, a. Sheryl didn't 103e her virginity until her wedding 
night 
b. Sheryl didn't lose her virginity before her wedding 
night 
0. Sherly lost her virginity on her wedding niEýt 
242. a* The, baby wasn't, born until 5too the next morning 
b,, The baby wasn't born before 5tOO the next m. orning 
C, The baby was born at 5tOO the next morning 
As used to make statements about our actual world,, 'lose one 'a 
virginity' and 'be born$ der4te unique, non-reversible and, hence, 
non-repeatable events., -Bodause of this, if 24i. c. an. 1 242, ci are 
trueg then it cannot be the 'ease that there exists any other time 
at which Sheryl lost bar virginity nor-arq other-time at vehich the 
baby was born. lb-particular, there cannot be a time earlier than 
Sheryl's wedding night at-which she lost bar virginity zor a time 
before 5: 00 of the morning in question at which the child wa3 born* 
Hence,, the a, aentence-are; ýInot only logically equivalent to the 
conjunction of -the acrresponding b. ana c. sentenc, es. but the ce 
sertence3 alone,, -in a pragmatic sense at least, will, entail 
the a* 
sentences* Given the conjunctional 4paly3is of Inototountillp it 
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will be the Inot... beforel conjunct which is redundant in the 
context of the tat' conjunct; 
Let us now turn citr attention to one aspect of the syntactic 
behaviour of *until' as used in a negative-existential context.. 
What we wish to consider areAhe constraints on the 'deletion-under- 
identity' prooesses'which might be-postulated within a syntactic 
framework to account for the following sets of sentences: 
243. a. John didn't leave, until Bill left 
b, John didn't'leave, until Bill did 
o. x John didn't leave until Bill 
2449 a* John didn't leave before Bill left 
b. --John didn"t- leave beforo, Bill did 
John didn't leave before Bill 
245, a. John left whe4/at-the time at which Bill left 
b. John left whe"t the time at which Bill did 
C. K John left, wher4/at the time at which Bill 
Mat must be accounted for is the fact that"ihe structure under- 
lying 243. a. 'can only be reduced to'that underlying 243. b. whereas 
that underlying 244oat-can be- reduced not only to that underlying 
244, b, but also to that underlying 244. c. - 'Geis (1970) suggests 
that such maximal reduction as illustrated in 244, c. is possible 
only in comparative structures. Furthermore, he argues that 
'before' and. 0after' are derived from underlying structures 
similar, if not identical,,, to those underlying *earlier than' and 
'later than% respectively, and that this would explain why su0b 
maximal reduction is possible in the case of these expressions,, 
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Looking novr at 21+3. and 245*, 5 we find that they displgy the same 
pattern as regards reduction, According to our proposal for the 
semantic analysis 'of negative-existential 'until$, 243. a. and 
246, would have ve , ry similar if "not identical, underlying structures. 
246. John left when Bin left and not before (a John didn't 
leave bef ore, Bill left andAut he Ief t whop/at the time 
at v&ich Bill left) 
Now, let us make the plausible assumption "that one of the constraints 
on the lexicalizati6n of "not., o. before & at" to Inot... until' is 
that p if reduction has taken place , it must 'be of the same kind in 
both conjuncts, Since the second conjunct can only be reduced in 
the minimal-way (of. 21+5. b., ),,, the first conjunct must also be of 
this minimal kind. Accordingly, the postulation of the two 
conjuncts in the semantic structure or negative-existenti&l $until' 
sentemes allows one to give a uniform, acaount of the restrictions 
on reductions in both 'until! and 'when' clauses and,, at the same 
time,, to account for both the similarities and differences in the 
application'of this process to *until' and ObeforeO clauses* 
Sucli an analysis may also be able to account for Chomsky's 0972) problematic pair of 3entences given in i. ard 2. below. 
Joh. n won't leave until midnight,,. but Bill will 
2, KBill will leave until midnight 
Although we find the acceptability of i. 'rather dubious, if it 
is acceptable, as Chomsky claims, it presumably has the inter- 
pretation that John will leave at midnighto and not before (midnight), but that Bill will leave before (midnight). Thust 




that reduction has taken place on the third 
(footnote oontinaed over page) 
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conjunct, with respect týO the "not ... before* conjunot-cf. 3- and 
. 4o. below-rbefore lexicalization to Inot... untill takes places 
3ý John won't leave before midnight, but Bill will leave 
before midnight 
John won't leave before midnight but Bill will 
In a somewhat more speculative key, we would suggest that 
there is another aspect of the, syntaotic behaviour of Inot... 
until* which the conjunctional analysis could help explain. 
This involves the postulated rule of 'negative-raising' (cf. 
Seuren,, 1974a, for discussion and references) which 'raises' 
the negative from the propositioraVaententi&l structure under- 
lying the 'that' clause in a sentence such as J, a, below to that 
unlerlying the main clause, the resulting structure being 
realized as 247*b. What is peculiar about sentences involving 
a* Fr ed believes 
f tht John will not arrive on time 
joest think '3 -II b. Plied cI believe 
_that 
John will arrive on time 
a negative-existential use of 'until'-in which case the 
presence of a negative element is'obligatory---is- that there 
appears to be two dialects# one in which negative raising can 
apply to the negative element and one in which' it cannot., That 
is, speakers will disagree'as to the acceptability of 2, b, below: 
2. a. Fred 
thinks that John won't arrive until midnij: ht 
ýbelieveal 
b. Fred doesnOt think 
Ithat 
John will arriva, until 
Ibeliev
midnight 
Now, negative-raiming cannot take place in cases where the negative is located in only one conjunct of a conjoined structure--there is 
no reading of 3. b. below which is equivalent to the interpretation 
of 3*a, If we assume that 'not ... untilt is thý result of the 
a. Fred thinks that John will get seared and not wait for us 
11, --1 1 
b,, Fred doesn't think that John will got soared arA wait for us 
lexicalization of Onot... before & at"-, 'which process'de 
, 
stroys the 
conjoined structure, then the two dialects could be distinguished 
with respect to the order in which the two processes of lexical- ization of 'until' and negative-raising occur. if negative- 
raising occurs before lexicalization, then the former will be blocked by the presence of the conjoined structure; if negative- 
raising occurs after lexicalization, it will be able to apply 
since the negative is no longer within a conjoined structure. 
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8.4.4 The universal use of 'until' 
In this section we will argue that the universal interpretation 
of 'until' adverbials-as already exemplified in 209, and 216*a,, 
above--also in7olves, in its semantio, characterization, & conjunct- 
ion of two distinat, temporal propositions, More preciselyp we 
shall claim that a,, Jentewe such as 247, entails'not only 248, but 
also 249. and that týqi. conjunotion of 248, and 2491 entails 247. 
247- Shaun was- asleep (from noon) until 4sOO 
248, 'Shaun was asleep at all times prior to WOO (and 
subsequent to noon) 
249. Shaun was not'asleep at 4tOO 
Thus$ whereas the negative-existential use of' 'until' can be glossed 
as *(the event X takes place) at no time prior to (ta )-and, (the 
event X takes place) at (t&)" (the term Inegative-existentiall 
referring to the nature of the quantified temporal locative in the 
first conjunct), the universal use can be glossed as "(the state/ 
process X is. in existence) at all times prior to (ta. ) and (the 
state/process X is) not (in existence) at (t )" (the term *universal' a 
again referring to the nature of the temporal quantification in the 
first conjunct). 
Various kinIs of evidence, similar in natureto those adduced 
in the preceding section, can be brought fwward in support of a 
conjunctional analysis ccr universal 'until$ adverbialso For 
example, the presence of the second conjunct ("not (in existence) 
at*) is responsible for the deviancy of the a. sentencess compared 
to the b. sentences, in 250. and 251. below. 
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20. a. John was Irritable until he had solved the crossword 
puzzle and he remained so for the rest of the 
afternoon 
b. John was irritable -'all the while before he had solved 
I-I* the crossword -puzzle and he remained so for th, e rest 
of the afternoon 
251 . 'ai 
Nary was ý in good humour until bar ex; -hu-sbatd arrived 
and, she-continued to' be for the rest of the evening 
b. Mary, was in good, humour all the while before her 
ex-husbarA arrived ard sý, - continaed to be for the 
, "rqst 
of the evening 
Consider also the bizarre flavour of such sentences as 252. 
to 254. That is strange about these sentences is that they merely 
252, Wohn was asleep until (the time at which) he woke up 
253. ?. Tohn was here until (the time at whioh) he left 
254. ? John, wa: s working until (the time a-t which) he stopped 
workirg 
tell us tha -a particular state or process was in existence and 
ceased to be in existence, in that -order. The 'until' clause 
apparently fails to give any temporal speoif ication whatsoever of 
the duration of the situation described in the main clause, The 
s8li-tautOlOgicalp semantically empty nature of these sentarxes is 
entirely predictable ani explicable within the framework we have 
developed in Chapter 7j-given the, proposea conjunotional analysis 
for 'until', To take the most general case,, let us consider the 
conjunctional paraphrase of 254. which, we s uggest, is that given 
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in 255. Both conjuncts presuppose the existence of a unique 
255s Wohn was working at all timea before the time at which 
he stopped working and John was not working at the, time 
at which he stopped working 
(relative to the context) time, say t:,, atwhich John stopped 
working. - Now, 'given our- analysis of the' derived semantic predicate 
out of r. ý( ) urderlying --'stop', a yet'more analyU6 paraphrase 
of-the second'oonjunat of 255. would be that in 256. Even in this 
256* At the time, ti; such that at'the time immediately 
preceding ti John was working and at ti John was not 
working, John was not working 
informal format, the source of the tautology is obvioust what is 
asserted is entailed by what is presupposed, 
The, situation is somewhat more complex in the case of the first 
conjunct of 255. If there is no contextual specifioationp 
implicit or explicit, of a time at which John began to work,, then 
254. and the first conjunct of 255. will be semarticallY irjfcrmBtive-- 
over and above the presupposed existence of a time at which John 
stopped workin&--to the extent that it will be implied that John 
had never, previous to tip not been working. the other hand '6, '2 
if a beginning, point for John's working is retrievable from the 
context as,, for example, would be the case if 252. were prefaced by 
257- , then a tautology win result in the following 
1 257. John began working at 9: 00 
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way* 
I The presupposition of a unique time at which John stopped 
working following the contextually specified time at which he 
began working implies, the non-existence of any time within thýLt 
5 
, spanitime. 
(i. ee after the time at which he began ard before ti) at 
which John stopped -working. That is, there wi3l be no pair of 
successive times such that at the first', john was working ana at 
the second John vasn't working. --Prom this it follows that there 
can be no time within the time span involved at which it is not 
the case that John is working, ' Hence, what is asserted by the 
first conjunct of 2559 will likewise be entailed by what it 
presuppo-ses* 
without going into the details 0 we may also note., in 
conclusion,. that a similar kirAI of argumentation could be invoked 
to account for the logical equiyalences between the r4embers of each 
of the following sets of sentences: 
258, a* John fell asleep at 5: 00 and was asleep until 
midnight 
b, John fell asleep at 5: 00 and didn't wake up until 
midnight 
Vote that we could compound, the bizarreness of 252,, by adding a 
'from' phraze which involves another tautology of the same type- 
of* I below. -This is in contrast to such a perfectly 
1. John was working from the time at which he began vorking 
until the time at which he stopped vorking 
accepts. ble ard irformative sentenoe as 2. belm. 
2. JOhn was grouchy from thýe time at which he began 
working until the time at which he stopped working 
652o 
a. John fell asleep at 5: 00 and remained asleep Until 
midnight 
259. a. John arrived at 5: 00 and was here until midnight 
b., John arrived at 5: 00 and didntt leave until 
midnight 
0. John arrived at 5100 and stayed until midnight 
260. a. John began vorking at 5: 00 and was working until 
midnight 
b. John began working at 5tOO and didn't stop working 
until midnight 
0. John began working at 5tOO ar4 contimed working 
until midnight 
Here, the predicti6n:.. the. these sentences will be logically equiv- 
alent depends upon the appropriateness of the conjunctional analysis 
for both the universal ana the negative-existential uses of 'Until'. 
8.4.5 The kemanticrepresentation of 'until# adverbials 
So far we have motivated fcr each of the two uses of 'until' 
distinct semantic analyses in terms of conjoined struatures, the 
first conjunct of each involving quantification with respect to 
times prior to the time identified by the clause or temporal noun 
phrase following 'until'. We would now like to formalize these 
characterizations and thereby demonstrate that they have more in 
common than simply their conjunctional structure, Let us 
consider the semantic representations for sentences 26J. and 262. 
261. John was working until 5tOO 
262. John didn't stop working until 5: 00 
6'53 o 
within our descriptive framework* Sentence 261. will be repres- 
ented as 263. and 262. as 264.: 
263. 
et in E 
t4 5100 iu 










& 1,00 5tOO 
of E 
JOHN WORK 
We will make the standard assumption that in F(loc t(in E(X)D is 
6, %. 
logically equivalent to loo t(in i(in E(X)_)). 
I This will enable 
us to propose 265* as a logically equivalent alternative for 263. 
A comparison of 265. with 264. now reveals a striking parallelism 
This equivalence serves as an axiom in a family of logical 
systems,, called. positional cr topdlogical logics# which include 
some temporal arA tense logics, Such systems *have a very 
general nature, capable of reflecting the characteristics of a 
wide range of logical systems, including not only temporal 
logic, but also what may be-called a locative or place logic# 
and even a logic of 'possible worlds"" (Rescher & Urquhartj 
1971: 12). In addition to a system of standard propositional 
logic$ a topological logic has 'the parametrized operator ED 
where *Pck(R A. )" is to be read and understood as "the propositlon 
is rýaized at the positionso.... Regardless of the 
specific interpretation given the P-operator, the following two 
basic axiom schemata obtain: 
P *((fwA) 6 *-p o((A) (PI ) 
F ot e. - B) S 
[Pd. (A) & Po((13)3 (P2) 
The axiom (PI) asserts that if not-'R obtains at some positions 
then it is not the case that 2 obtains at that position, and 
conversely. This axiom schema embodies a decision to construct 
topological logic from a two-valued point of view: the (positionally indefinite) propositions at issue are to be either 
true or else false at any given position.... " (ibid. i 13-4)o 
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between the two interpretation3 of 'until,. Common to the 
semantic representation of both is the structure schematized in 
266. It will be the existential structure of Y which will 
266. 
cS t in 
Y 
determine whether a negative-existential or a universal interpret- 
ation is involved-. if Y is in 'E (Xl,. into EM or out of- ;, 'ýX) then 
a negative-existential. interpretation is involved; if Y is in W9 
then a universal interpretation is involved, Hence, -if anything# 
it is the universal interpretation which is a special case of the 
JCHN WORK 
656* 
negative-; -existential use and notý the reverse* However, we would 
prefer to regard 'until# in'sentences where it is Iiiderstood, 
universally as having incorporated the two negative elements in 
the semantic representation (cf. 'all'. Istill', *already') and 
'until' An contexts where it is understood (negative, )existentially 
as having incorporated no negative elements., the om negative 
required in the underlying structure being overtly realized as 
Inott (cf. 'any', 'any longerlt #yet). 
To conclude our discussion of #until$ we win illustrate 
how the semantio structure we have postulated fcr it can clarify an 
interesting and rather subtle phenomenon whereby a sentence contain- 
ing in 'until' adverbial can be given two logically equivalent 
interpretations--one in which 'until' is interpreted universally 
and one in which it is interpreted (negative-) existentially-- 
and, what is more, each interpretation (i. e. the corresponding 
underlying structures) has different syntactic consequences. A 
sentence which illustrates this peculiarity is 267, below. It can 
be given a universal interpretation more or less equivalent to that 
267- John was not aware (of the fact) that Pred was really 
out to destroy him until it was too late 
of 268, or, it can be construed in a negative-existential way,, 
268ý John was ýinaware/unconsoioue of the fact that Fred was. 
really out to destroy him until it was too late 
in which case its semantic repr6sentatioh w(mlil'ýbe very similar tO 
that of 269. If we- tow turn our attention to-the ayutaotic 
6579 
269, John did not become aware (of the. fact) that Fred was 
really out to destroy him until it was too late 
process whereby temporal adverbials are preposed to sentence- 
initial position,, we find that in sentences with 'until' in a 
mgative-existential context, the negative must be preposed as well 
ard subject-verb inversion must take place in the main clause (this 
also being-the case with tany longer' and 'yet'). Universally- 
construed 'until' is fronted with no aocompanying subjeot-verb 
inversion. Accordingly, each of 268. and, 269. has only one 
possible variant involving prepoaing--cf, 270, and 271- In the 
270. a. Umtil it was too late, John was unaware of the fact 
that Fred was reany out to 'destroy him 
b. mUntil it was too late was John unaware of the fact 
that Fred was reaUy out to destroy him 
271. a. KUntil it was too late, John'did not become aware of 
the fact that Prea was really out to destroy him 
b. Vot until it was too late did John become aware of 
the fact that Fred was really, out to -destroy 
him 
case of 267., however, both kinds of preposing are possiblep this 
reflecting the two distinct possibilities for its underlying 
structurei 
272i a. Until it was too late, John was not aware of the fact 
that Fred was reany out to destroy him 
b. Not until it was too late was John aware of the fact 
that Fred was really out to destroy him 
Sentenoe 272. a. will be understood universally (the main clause 
658. 
expressing a, negative proposition), 272, b, negative-existentially 
(the main clause expressing a positive proposition). Letting X 
stand for "John be aware of the fact that Fred was really out to 
destroy him", the two semantio representations for 267- would be 
those in 273. a. and 273. b., universal and (negeLtive-)existential 
respectively. The two successive in 'Va above X will cancel each 
273. a. 
dt in E&A 100 t: L -401S, 
in P. 
t 4t i /\Ioo t Ain i 
in 'P, 
273. b. 









The range of linguistic phenomena surveyed and investigated in 
this study constitutes an exceptionally fascinating* challenging 
and instructive area for semantic analysis* Our efforts have 
been directed towards motivating a descriptiv e framework capable 
of accounting for, in an explicit fashLong various kinds of semantic 
properties and relations displayed by expressions structuring the 
two closely related and interdependent semantic domains of apace 
and time. The following is a brief recapitulation of the more 
important and interesting findings of the study. 
In generalp we hope to have demonstrated the ntedg in the 
semantic analysis of individual expressions or sets of expressionsp 
to constantly take into consideration the context--in particular$ 
the intra-sentential context--in which these expressions occur. The 
isolation of the pertinent contextual factors followed by a detailed 
and comprehensive examination of their interaction was found to 
result in simpler and more accurate descriptions of the meanings 
of the individual spatial, temporal and aspectual expressions with 
which we dealt. An important dimension of the interaction of 
contextual factors within the sentence was seen to be the confL&ur- 
atLonal definition of the various types of propositions (according 
to their temporal-exLstentLal -structure) which a sentence may express. 
It was only in terms of such complex, essentially covert categories 
that many semantic facts. such as those concerning co-occurrence 
and interpretation potential, could be explained. 
Related to this has been the desirability of establishing 
semantic representations of (the relevant aspects of) whole sentences. 






under investigation be explicitly accounted for--that ist be 
predictable solely on the basis of properties of such semantic 
representations and basic axioms of the system. Howeverg to 
establish semantic representations for whole sentences often 
requires one to take into account, in a rudimentary way at leasto 
the semantics of linguistic elements which may be or appear to 
be peripheral to one's main concern. This was the case with such 
fac, ts of linguistic structure as negation, quantification and 
proposition type. However, what we found was that these elements 
and configurations not only play a crucial role within the semantic 
domain& we were focussing on, but also that, in principles they 
could be integrated and interpreted within our descriptive frame- 
work in a straightforward and intuitively satisfying way. ý . 
More particularly, then, we have seen that the notion of 
existential status carries an exceptionally high and diversified 
functional load in the semantic description of this central area 
of English. A wide range of aspectual phenomena (using the term 
1ý 
laspectuall in its broadest sense), as well as negation and, quenti- 
Motion, can be given a uniform and insightful treatment in terms 
of the very small set of basic and derived existential predicates 
in E. in into E and out of E. Of especial relevance-to the 
analysis Of temporal expressions is the role these predicates play 
in mediating the linguistic mapping of situations (stateal events#. 
processesp etc. ) onto the time axis--that is, in explicating the- 
semantic functiot%s of temporal adverbi&ls (and tenses). Moreovers 
these existential predicates play an analogous mediating role in 
the semantic description of expressions of physical extent- In 
other words, these predicates are the cn denominator as regards 
M* 
the specification of boundaries and extensions of objects in 
space and of situations in time and space. The beginning and end 
points of a (linear) physical object are the points at which it 
comes into existence and goes out of existence,. respectively; 
its extension or length is (the measure of) the set of points 
at which it is in existence. Similarly, the beginning and and of 
a situation in time (which is conceptualized linguistically as 
one-dimensional) are the points in time at which it comes into 
existence and goes out of existence, respectively; its extension 
or duration is, again, the set of points at which it is in exis- 
tence. The property of boundedness, both wi, tlr respect to ObiikOts 
and with respect to situations, in therefore semantically chorac- 
terizable in terms of the, possession by the object-or situation, of 
inherent points at which it comes into existence and at which it 
goes out of existence. A particularly, important-class of bounded 
situations are those we have called journeys. 
However, in E and in E, and derivatively into-E and out of-Ep 
are themselves analyzable as abstractions from the notion of loca- 
tion in space (and time); and it was with those expressions whose 
meanings involve the most concrete instances of locational relations 
--spatial adverbials of place and orientation (order, static direc- 
tion)--that we began our investigation. We found that the basic 
constructs of simple location and order have both temporal analogues 
(location on the time axis--at a point or in an interval--and temporal 
succession) and abstract manifestations (stateso properties# condi- 
tions, class membership, inclinations, tendenciest etc. ). However* 
the explicit characterization of the more complex spatial constructs 
--that is, movement towards (dynamic direction), border-crossingso 
2. 
extended journeys (all of these again having both concrete and 
abstract manifestations)--involves various orderings in time of 
the existences non-existence, coming into existence and/or going 
out of existence of one or more basic locational relations. It 
was the unravelling of these rather intricate relationships and 
dependencies within the semantic systems of space, time and exLe- 
tence that ultimately led to the establishment of a localLst 
classification and characterization of proposition types. 
Finally, our investigation of spatial adverbLals also revealed 
the importance of the intrinsic orientational properties of the 
speaker/observer and the principles of canonical position and 
encounter and of egocentric and anthropocentric extension in 
characterizing the meanings of these expressions and, in particu- 
lar, in accounting for their interpretation and use in specific 
contexts. These principles. in conjunction with the localist 
hypothesis, represent components of a theory of language structure 
which need not seek an explanation for linguistic universals in 
terms of innate, language-specific categories and rules but rather 
which can relate them to shared features of the enviromentsg, physical 
and social. 0 in which all languages operate and to more general 
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